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The Politics of Exhaustion and Migrant Subjectivities:  





A thesis submitted to the School of Social Sciences of the University of 
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Situated within critical border and migration studies, this thesis is a detailed 
ethnographic account of the ‘border struggles’ associated with the UK-France borderzone 
in northern France, where human mobilities meet state endeavours to control and regain 
a hold over migratory movement. Through an ‘embodied encounter,’ which draws on the 
voices and experiences of 75 migrant interlocutors and other interviewees with first-
hand experience of the UK-France borderzone, the thesis generates a unique, in-depth 
understanding of how migration governance operates at the UK-France border.  
It is argued that the juxtaposed border arrangements between the UK and France have 
not merely led to the re-localisation of the UK’s physical border controls to an 
extraterritorial space; the ‘border’ has also entered into spaces of migrants’ everyday life 
in the borderzone. Traditional spatial interdictions and restrictions emerging from non-
entrée policies, reliant on tactics such as confinement, bordering fences, and deportation, 
have been successively complemented by more insidious, temporal, and corporeal 
biopolitical technologies of bordering. The latter consists of an array of tactics devised to 
render life governable and pliant, and bodies docile, with the premeditated intention to 
negate one’s personal autonomy, agency, wellbeing, and self-efficacy. This ‘politics of 
exhaustion’ thus seeks to curb autonomous migratory movements, influence decisions, 
and manage intent through the physical, mental, and emotional exhaustion of its subjects. 
In this sense, exhaustion is understood as constitutive of bordering processes, as well as 
of the ‘border’ itself, but cannot be grasped within the biopolitical ‘making live/letting 
die’ dichotomy. Thus, the thesis makes a significant contribution to advancing scholarly 
work which challenges this binary.  
Moreover, rather than privileging an understanding power that is totalising, the thesis 
subsequently shifts its focus onto the heterogeneity of ways in which migrants respond 
to, and shape, through their ability and desires to move, the apparatuses of power, and 
the technologies of the politics of exhaustion. As such, the thesis allows for a gaze into the 
possibilities of articulating new subjectivities within borderzones characterised by 
stringent state control and biopolitical techniques, opening powerful ways to think of 
spaces for resistance, alternative subjectivities, and the performance of political 
belonging outside traditional notions of citizenship. In doing so, the thesis mobilises a 
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heterogenisation of the ‘border’, advancing scholarly work which understands the 
interlinkages between power and subjectivities as processual, ambivalent, and 
interwoven. 
Lastly, given the brutality of the politics of exhaustion and its harmful impact upon the 
bodies and minds of racialised migrants, the thesis reverts back to this concept once 
more, arguing that a displacement of responsibility from state authorities onto the bodies 
and minds of migrants serves to depoliticise suffering. This, in combination with the 
partial absence, or invisibility, of clearly defined and identifiable ‘human culprits’ in the 
implementation of the politics of exhaustion, may give an illusion of an absence of 
intention to cause harm, thus sanitising and invisibilising violence whilst also producing 
an aura of legitimacy. The thesis thus contributes to an ongoing ontological shift within 
critical border and migration scholarship, by emphasising ways in which violence is 
constitutive of bordering technologies; something that has only intermittently figured 
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1. Introduction: Setting the scene for a research inquiry 
into externalised UK border struggles  
1.1. Introduction  
As Roxanne Lynn Doty (2013: 129) powerfully suggests,  
Deep tensions strain at the edges of the nation-state and the contemporary 
mobilities that continually contradict presumptions of stability and stasis, which 
underpin conventional notions of a world of sovereign entities which are willing 
and able to control movements across and within their territories.  
 
Indeed, the past several years have seen a multiplication and heterogenisation of ‘border 
struggles’ across Europe and beyond, producing temporal and spatial locations where 
autonomous human mobility projects meet states’ increasingly brutal control measures. 
One such site of struggle is the ‘borderscape’ (Perera, 2007) in northern France, where 
the United Kingdom’s externalised border control strategy appears to be contingent upon 
the French state serving as an implementing actor. The violent and harm-inducing 
situation for migrants in transit in northern France has been persistent, if cyclically so, 
since the early 1990s. Encampments have sprung up and been flattened to the ground, 
individuals have come and gone, been dispersed, pushed back, and then returned. 
Women, men, and children have suffered violence and abuse, and some have tragically 
perished.  
 
Arguably due to an insufficient acknowledgement of the complex dynamics which have 
co-constituted this situation, with a tunnel vision and an unrelenting narrative of ‘illegal 
migration’ and ‘organised criminality’ which need to be curbed at all costs, UK statutory 
funding has been injected time and again to increase securitisation measures and build 
walls and fences, while tacitly supporting the French state’s uprooting and harassment of 
migrants. This is accompanied by the attempted depletion of the relentless grassroots 
solidarity and aid movements operating on the ground. In 2015, when the number of 
people on the move in the northern France area started to increase rapidly, then-UK 
Prime Minister David Cameron promised to ‘work hand-in-glove’ with France to stop the 
‘swarm of migrants’ from reaching Britain (BBC News, 2015). The UK Government was 
thus quick to flex its ‘sovereign muscle,’ alongside its French counterparts, through 
enhanced forms of visible, spatial containment: 
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Strong, visible and effective security […] is a core part of our joint [UK-France] 
strategy. Besides its importance for border control, we believe that highly effective 
security reduces the incentive for would-be illegal migrants to travel towards 
Calais or to remain there. (Cazeneuve and May, 2015) 
 
During the years that followed, the absence of constructive solutions to the situation in 
northern France has been striking. The UK and French state authorities have continued 
to privilege the harmful clampdown on human mobility, anchored in the aforementioned 
narrative of ‘migrant illegality.’ Needless to say, these dynamics at the UK-France border 
are situated within the wider context of European migration governance, which has far 
too often led to widespread human suffering across Europe, and is also closely 
intertwined with (post)colonial global dynamics. These aspects will be discussed briefly 
in the following sub-section, without attempting to provide an exhaustive account of the 
complexities of the European response to migration, nor of the racialised and 
(post)colonial linkages and continuities within which the UK-France border struggles are 
situated. 
 
1.2. Broader context: Human mobilities meet contemporary European 
border regimes  
 
The UK-France border struggles are situated in an era of accelerated globalisation and 
global mobility which has witnessed a concomitant growth in border control methods 
(Bosworth et al, 2018: 35). Predominantly White, prosperous liberal democratic 
countries located across Europe, North America, and Australasia have resorted to 
increasingly drastic measures to make their borders impenetrable to certain ‘undesired’ 
groups (Fassin, 2011a: 214; see also Bauman, 1998), while making the same borders 
‘hyperpermeable to desired groups and individuals, as well as certain goods and services’ 
(Mountz and Hiemstra, 2012: 455; see also Sparke, 2006). Indeed, we have seen the 
erection of a ‘wall around the West,’ (Andreas and Snyder, 2000) where people seeking 
to cross borders become ‘illegalised’ (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2016a). On one hand, 
contemporary neoliberal policies encourage the flow of goods across borders and boost 
the demand for cheap labour, whilst on the other hand, xenophobic immigration policies 
discourage the safe and legal movement of individuals across borders, subjecting them to 
a panoply of border enforcement tactics (Tellez et al, 2018: 2), and making borders 
‘disaggregated for different types of human traffic’ (McNevin, 2013: 182).  
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Aimed to deter and exclude, many states have adopted policies of ‘non-entrée’ (Hathaway, 
1992: 40-41), which are oftentimes contingent upon a strong element of delegation of 
migration controls to a third country acting as containment state (Barbero and Donadio, 
2019: 137). The latter is a well-studied and researched phenomenon invariably termed 
as ‘extraterritorial migration control’ (Dastayari and Hirsch, 2019: 435), 
‘deterritorialized control’ (see FitzGerald, 2019: 4), and ‘externalization’ (Hyndman and 
Mountz, 2008: 249-269; Akkermann, 2018; Zaiotti, 2016; Loughnan, 2019b).  
At the same time, the broader context is found within underlying structures of deeply 
cemented global inequalities, marked by Europe’s history of colonialism, where some of 
the world’s most disadvantaged groups of people are excluded and prevented from 
accessing their share of the world’s resources and spaces of safety. Racialised populaces 
are trapped by borders and by the Western world’s immigration rules within situations 
of war, conflict, and persecution, but also other forms of protracted crises such as deeply 
entrenched poverty or critical environmental crises (Jones, 2016; Andersson, 2014). 
Other driving factors of human mobility include polarised distributions of wealth, both 
within and between countries, unevenly distributed employment opportunities between 
regions and countries, conflicts and unrest in states of origin, as well as well-established 
industries facilitating unauthorised cross-border movements (McNevin, 2007: 671). 
Therefore, the current response to migration in Europe ought to come with an 
acknowledgement of a long legacy of past and present entanglement with countries and 
populations around the world, as well as an acknowledgement of the very intimate links 
between the current situation and the damages and injustices brought on by episodes in 
history such as colonisation, exploitation of resources, and different forms of domination. 
Nevertheless, migration towards Europe is instead situated in a space and time where 
(post)colonial and neoliberal migration governance leads to hardened borders; where 
autonomous and heterogenous migratory projects and migrant subjectivities are met 
with securitisation and exclusion, co-producing a heterogeneity of border struggles 
across the continent.  
When compared with migratory movements in other parts of the world, or contrasted 
with migration figures during earlier periods of time in Europe, the current numbers of 
arrivals are nothing exceptional (Crawley et al, 2018: 14). Indeed, the arrivals in Europe 
in 2015 represented just a small proportion of those who were displaced around the 
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world during that year. The vast majority (86%) went to neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 
2016) rather than making their way to Europe. Moreover, migration into and across 
Europe is, of course, nothing new; the end of World War II brought the largest migratory 
movements in European history, followed by large numbers fleeing Hungary in 1956 and 
more than three million people fleeing the Balkans in the early 1990s. The contemporary 
arrival of individuals via the Mediterranean Sea is nothing new, but has seen an 
intensification in human mobility since 2010 (Crawley et al, 2018: 15-17). Migration via 
this route is interlinked with, amongst other factors, the political instability which 
troubled North Africa following the ‘Arab Spring,’ which not only affected nationals of 
these countries, but also groups of people from other African nations who had been 
residing in North Africa. The descent of Libya into civil war further enabled militias and 
factions across the country to profit from smuggling into, through and out of Libya, 
contributing to the complexity of the situation (Crawley et al, 2018: 19).  
 
Meanwhile, the route into Europe via the Aegean Sea saw an increase from 7,432 arrivals 
in October 2014 to more than 210,000 people in October 2015, understood as a result of 
a range of factors combined, including the war in Syria and instability in many other 
countries in the wider Middle Eastern and South Asian regions (Crawley et al, 2018: 21). 
The increased number of arrivals in Europe in the past few years has widely been framed 
as the ‘European migration crisis.’ Arguably, however, the real crisis we are witnessing is 
rather a preventable crisis of solidarity and hostile policies leading to widespread chaos 
along the European external and internal borders.  
 
Upon arrival in Europe, many individuals intend to claim asylum, thus exercising their 
right under international law, first recognised in Article 14.1 of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which states that: ‘Everyone has the right to seek and to 
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’. Following World War II, the 
international community recognised the need to create a legal framework for the 
protection of displaced individuals, which resulted in the 1951 Geneva Convention and 
its subsequent 1967 Protocol, signed and ratified by 142 states, including the United 
Kingdom. The Convention defines who ought to be considered a refugee and stipulates 




 […] owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UN General 
Assembly, 1951)  
 
This definition of who qualifies for refugee protection, as per the Convention, is arguably 
outdated given the wide range of new ‘drivers’ for displacement around the world have 
emerged, such as food insecurity and environmental change, state fragility, and 
protracted crises (see e.g. Andersson, 2014). In any event, a particularly important 
protection contained within the Convention is the prohibition of collective expulsion (ie. 
the principle of non-refoulement), which means that states cannot return individuals to a 
country where their safety and freedoms may be threatened. Non-refoulement is 
nowadays considered a customary, or jus cogens, norm of International Human Rights 
Law. The European Union’s approach to handling asylum claims is stipulated in the set of 
EU laws dating back to 2005, comprising the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
and the so-called Dublin System (the Dublin Regulation and the Eurodac fingerprints 
database). The stated aim of the CEAS was to ensure a joint approach to member states’ 
asylum systems by setting out minimum procedures and standards both for processing 
and deciding asylum applications, as well as for the treatment of asylum seekers and 
recognised refugees.  
However, the implementation of the CEAS varies greatly throughout the European Union, 
with some states failing to operate fairly and with effective systems, which has largely led 
to a patchwork of 28 (now 27) asylum systems with uneven results across the continent. 
Meanwhile, the Dublin Regulation, which first entered the force in 1997 and is 
complemented by the Eurodac database tracking individuals’ movements, specifies that 
the responsibility for processing asylum claims would primarily lie with the state where 
a person first entered the EU (EUR-Lex, 2013).  It is a widely held view that the Dublin 
Regulation, with revisions leading to the Dublin II Regulation in 2003 and the Dublin III 
Regulation in 2013, is a failed EU policy approach, mostly because it inevitably places 
disproportionate responsibility on first entry-countries such as Italy and Greece, leading 
to tensions between EU member states over how to handle arrivals and asylum 
applications. Moreover, the Dublin System has come under heavy criticism from civil 
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society groups, in that it denies the right of asylum seekers to choose where they have 
their asylum claim processed in accordance with their personal circumstances. This 
plunges large numbers of migrants into protracted displacement, trapped under horrific 
conditions encountered at EU ‘Hotspots’ on the Greek islands, in Italy, or at transit points 
and border closures. Those determined to carry on to their intended destination are 
caught up in convoluted journeys between European countries, taking treacherous 
routes, with some, as we shall see, ending up desperately trying their chances at the UK-
France border. The French civil society organisation, La Cimade, sums up the problems 
inherent in the Dublin Regulation as follows: 
For many people in exile who seek asylum when they come to Europe, the word 
‘Dublin’ brings to mind thoughts of a constant threat which might knock them 
down at any moment. […] ‘Dublin’ puts them back into endless procedures, 
continual suspicion, and fear of being sent back to a country where they don’t want 
to live. (La Cimade, 2019). 
Despite the critical shortcomings of the system, a 2017 court ruling by the European 
Court of Justice ruled that the Dublin Regulation must be upheld, effectively granting 
states the continued right to remove asylum seekers and send them back to the first 
country of entry in the EU (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2017). Attempts to 
restructure the CEAS system, with particular emphasis on the Dublin Regulation, have 
largely been stalled at the EU level due to important differences in approach between 
different member states. Certain states are calling for increased controls at external 
borders, whilst other countries are instead pushing for a ‘fairer distribution of 
responsibility’ for new arrivals between member states, including the proposal of new, 
mandatory quotas for responsibility sharing (see e.g. Morgese, 2019; Di Filippo, 2018, 
2020).  
 
It was not until September 2020 that the European Commission finally published its 
proposed New Pact on Migration and Asylum (European Commission, 2020), which 
outlines new plans for a pan-European approach to asylum and migration. However, 
while the European Commission refers to the Pact as ‘a fresh start to asylum and 
migration,’ the proposals largely replicate or exacerbate past problems under a new 
guise. There is an overbearing focus on preventing access to EU territory, as though the 
success of the EU’s approach to migration ought to be measured by its efficacy in ‘keeping 
numbers down’ (Joannon et al, 2020). At the time of writing, it is still unclear to what 
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extent the current proposals will be adopted by the EU and its member states, and in the 
meantime, the human realities on the ground across Europe are perhaps bleaker than 
ever, with continued drownings in the Mediterranean in combination with the 
obstruction of search and rescue vessels and criminalisation of solidarity. Likewise, large-
scale human rights infringements continue to be inflicted against individuals trapped in 
detention-like camps at Hotspots and borderzones, resulting from a combination of 
insufficient resource allocation, combined with an unforgiving implementation of policies 
that regulate movement into and across Europe.  
 
Thus, little to no concern is given to the thousands of asylum seekers who remain trapped 
on the Greek islands in unacceptable living conditions causing physical sickness, mental 
health problems, and increasing tensions, or to those experiencing violence, trafficking, 
and sexual slavery on European soil, or, as we shall see in this thesis, those who are hiding 
away in the woodlands and streets of Calais, Grande-Synthe, and in parks and streets of 
Brussels and Paris, with the hope of finding sanctuary in the UK or elsewhere. It is 
precisely within this wider context of a failed European approach to asylum and 
migration that the longstanding struggles at the UK-France border have been drastically 
exacerbated over the past few years, most notably since 2015, as will be discussed in the 
subsequent sections.  
 
1.3. The hostile UK approach to migration and asylum  
Within the broader European response to asylum and migration, the United Kingdom has 
continuously taken an individualistic approach, first by refraining from joining the 
Schengen Area of the European Union, and subsequently by ensuring the prevention of 
the arrival of prospective asylum seekers arriving at its frontier through bilateral 
agreements with France. Moreover, the UK put forward proposals within the EU in 2003 
to externalise the EU’s border management through ‘transit processing centres’ in non-
EU third countries on key migration routes to the EU, in order for claims to be assessed 
‘in situ’ before people arrived. Individuals arriving spontaneously, the Home Office 
suggested, should:  
[be] sent back to such centres for ‘status determination;’ those whose requests 
were approved would be resettled within the EU or the region, while the others 
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would be returned to their country of origin under ‘new and strengthened re-
admission agreements.’ (Bialasiewicz, 2012: 851)  
Although this was never implemented, it set the stage for a model of externalised border 
controls and offshore asylum processing which would later become the norm for the 
European Union. 
The UK also continued its hard-line approach during the peak of the so-called ‘migration 
crisis’ in 2015 by keeping its borders tightly closed to those seeking asylum; a notable 
exception being the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Programme. In cooperation 
with UNHCR, this programme identifies ‘those most at risk’ among those who have fled 
conflict in Syria to neighbouring countries, in order to bring them to the UK (Home Office, 
2017). However, the scheme was paused in March 2020 due to the global Covid-19 
pandemic, followed by an announcement in November that it would resume in early 2021 
(Bulman, 2020; Refugee Council, 2020). Whilst it is certainly commendable to participate 
in the resettlement of vulnerable individuals, this scheme potentially satisfies segments 
of UK society, but it is clear that this is also used as a pretext for keeping the border with 
France closely sealed and refusing entry for those arriving spontaneously at the frontier. 
The UK thus fails to play a much-needed role in the wider European response to 
processing asylum applications of those already on European territory.  
Domestically, the issues of asylum and immigration have been politically contentious at 
least since the 1990s, when numbers of asylum applications increased sharply from 3,998 
in 1988; to 11,640 in 1989; and 44,840 in 1991. The Labour government presented the 
1998 White Paper ‘Fairer, faster, and firmer’ (Home Office, 1998), which constituted a 
hostile approach to asylum. In February 2003, then-Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair 
said in an interview on the BBC News (2003) that he would reduce the number of asylum 
seekers by half within a few months, by ensuring pre-arrival controls, tightened asylum 
procedures and increased removals. Subsequently, during the 2010 General Election 
campaign, the Conservative Party pledged to bring down net migration to ‘the tens of 
thousands’ by 2015 (The Conservative Party, 2010: 21) by following a similar logic. Thus, 
both Labour and Conservative governments have put forward remarkably similar 
policies over the years that take a restrictive approach to asylum, fuelled by frequent 
claims within British tabloid media of a supposed ‘immigration crisis’ unfolding. 
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While unauthorised entry and overstaying had been criminal offences already under the 
Immigration Act 1971, then-Home Secretary Theresa May announced in an interview in 
May 2012 that she aimed to create a ‘really hostile environment’ for so-called irregular 
migrants on UK soil (Kirkup and Winnett, 2012), which marked the beginning of the UK’s 
‘hostile environment’ policies, meant to ‘make the UK a less welcoming and less 
hospitable place to discourage people from coming to the UK, and if they were already in 
the UK, to discourage them from staying’ (Dajani, 2020: 2). This set of policies introduced 
new measures to limit access to work, health care, bank accounts, housing, and so on for 
migrants with irregular status, and established a system of citizen-on-citizen immigration 
checks (Yeo, 2018). Most of these policy proposals were incorporated into law through 
the Immigration Act 2014 and were subsequently expanded through the Immigration Act 
2016. Later, in 2017, this policy approach was renamed the ‘compliant environment’ but 
essentially remained the same (Yeo, 2018). The hostile environment policies comprise a 
wide array of internal manifestations of UK border control through a ‘structurally 
embedded’ border (Weber, 2013). This has been thoroughly dissected and analysed in 
academia (see e.g. Bowling and Westenra, 2018; Hiam et al, 2018; Dajani, 2020; as well 
as Goodfellow, 2019 for a profound deconstruction of UK immigration policy), and 
heavily criticised by activists, rights groups, and communities across the UK. 
With the UK’s European Union (EU) membership referendum on 23 June 2016, 
commonly referred to as the Brexit referendum, 52% of voters demanded a formal exit 
from the EU. The ‘leave’ campaign mobilised anti-immigration narratives and fears over 
a lack of sovereign border control as part of their campaign. This highlighted fear of 
immigration into the UK as one of the key reasons that large numbers of British citizens 
favoured leaving the EU, which likely co-created and further exacerbated the 
environment of anti-immigrant sentiment, xenophobia, and intolerance, fanned and 
encouraged by the right-wing media. Indeed, much of the debate was based on 
immigration and border control with media and parts of public opinion at the time being 
particularly hostile to immigration from EU countries and due to the so-called refugee 
‘crisis’ in Europe. (see e.g. Canning, 2017; Goodfellow, 2019). Within this context, it is not 
surprising that successive governments have been so keen to ‘bring down’ net migration 




1.4. Offshoring through juxtaposed border controls  
By the same token, it appears unsurprising that the UK openly promotes the offshoring 
of its borders as a corner stone of its border ‘defence’ (Ryan, 2010: 10), with France acting 
as its third-party containment state. The strengthening of the UK’s border with France 
has been in the making ever since then-President François Mitterrand and Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher signed the treaty for the Channel Tunnel in February 1986, followed 
by the signing of the Sangatte Protocol in 1992 and the entry into force of the Channel 
Tunnel Order of 1993, introducing juxtaposed border controls at the respective entry and 
exit points of the Channel Tunnel. At this point, the close collaboration between France 
and the UK for border control entered a new era (Cazeneuve and May, 2015). As the 
narrowest point of the Channel, the Calais-Dover route has the shortest ferry times, the 
highest number of ferry crossings, and the most regular trains via the Eurotunnel which 
opened in May 1994, linking Folkstone in the UK with Coquelles, Pas-de-Calais in 
northern France. This is, therefore, a logical/strategic common point for prospective 
asylum seekers looking to enter the UK, and the period between 1995 and 2000 saw an 
average of 700 individuals per month presenting themselves at the international 
terminal, based at Waterloo station in London at the time, with the total number of 
asylum applications peaking at 76,040 in 2000 (Select Committee on Home Affairs, 2001).   
The extraterritorial arrangements on French territory to deny leave to enter were 
executed through the 1991 Sangatte Protocol, 2000 Additional Sangatte Protocol, and 
2003 Le Touquet Treaty, and given effect in Britain through The Nationality, Immigration 
and Asylum Act 2002 (Juxtaposed Controls) Order 2003 (UK Government, 2003). This 
externalisation constitutes a move described by the UK Government as ‘fundamentally 
altering the way the UK operates at its border’ (UK Cabinet Office, 2007). The first actual 
juxtaposed controls were introduced on French territory in 1994 (Vine, 2013: 3), 
meaning that immigration checks took place prior to passengers boarding a train or ferry 
rather than upon arrival in the UK. This means that the UK border has in practice been 
moved from Dover to seven locations in Belgium and France (Calais, Calais-Fréthun, 
Dunkirk, Coquelles, Paris, Brussels, and Lille), with British border controls taking place 
on French and Belgian soil.  
The juxtaposed arrangements have been heavily criticised by rights groups arguing that 
this policy, in the absence of means to access the UK asylum system, contributes to a 
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breach of the UK’s international legal obligations by ‘circumventing the right to asylum, 
and as a result, also the protection against non-refoulement’ (Refugee Rights Europe, 
2020; see also Amnesty International, 2017). As a signatory to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention and the subsequent 1967 Protocol, the United Kingdom has legal 
commitments to ensure the right to asylum, and protection responsibilities towards 
those seeking asylum. It is moreover obliged to refrain from returning (or refouling) 
individuals to a country where they may face persecution.  
Nevertheless, the UK stands firm in refusing entry to prospective asylum seekers of 
undocumented individuals at its border with France. To put this into effect, it has 
deployed hundreds of UK Border Force (UKBF) guards to French territory, along with the 
opening of UK detention facilities (Short Term Holding Facilities) in Coquelles and 
Dunkirk in northern France (Bosworth, 2020; Timberlake, 2020b), and the application of 
select UK criminal law powers beyond its territory. In brief, these arrangements mean 
that individuals are at once prevented from reaching UK soil to seek asylum, and denied 
the possibility of presenting a UK asylum claim from outside the territory. This has, as we 
shall see, successively led to ‘the emergence of a ‘border zone’ stretching from Calais and 
Grande-Synthe in northern France to the capitals of Brussels and Paris if not further 
afield’ (Welander, 2020a: 33). Within this bottle-neck scenario, individuals become 
trapped in the UK-France borderzone, unable to lodge an asylum application in the UK 
without taking treacherous, life-threatening, and unauthorised journeys (King, 2016: 
104), often stowed away on lorries or risking their lives on small boats and rubber 
dinghies. UKBF reportedly detected 30,180 attempts to enter the UK from March 2014 to 
the end of January 2015. However, these do not represent 30,000 individuals, but are 
likely to represent a smaller number of people who made repeated attempts at crossing 
(House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2015: 8). 
Rather than seeking a humane and sustainable response to the situation at the border, 
the official response has largely revolved around additional border security measures, 
including new detection technology, increased dog searches, larger numbers of border 
guards, and a widened securitised zone (Reinisch, 2015: 517). Between 2010 and 2016, 
the UK Government spent the staggering sum of at least £315.9 million on border 
enforcement in northern France (Full Fact, 2017), reinforced by further security funding 
commitments in subsequent years. This is a strategy not only to externalise border 
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controls but also to export responsibility for policing and other matters to France, 
propped up by UK funding; lessening UK legal responsibility. 
 In a joint UK-France ministerial declaration in 2015, the announcement of a joint 
command and control centre in Calais was made, stating that it would ‘bring together 
French policing assets, together with permanent desks for teams from the United 
Kingdom Border Force, National Crime Agency, and other agencies’ (Cazeneuve and May, 
2015). It was agreed that France would continue to allocate ‘significant resources,’ 
towards the deployment of police officers, gendarmes, and mobile units to ensure 
‘exceptional law enforcement capacity to the Calais region’ (Ibid.). Additional resources 
from the UK would be used to secure the railhead through fencing, CCTV, infrared 
detection technology, flood lighting, and to strengthen security within the tunnel itself 
whilst also supporting Eurotunnel Ltd. to increase its security guards. In addition, the UK 
committed to providing increased resources in an integrated control room and 24/7 
freight search teams to look for ‘stowaways’, amongst other measures (House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2015: 4). 
In December 2018, in response to the heavy mediatisation of a rise in people crossing by 
small boat from northern France, then-Home Secretary Sajid Javid interrupted his 
holidays and created a big spectacle out of the crossing of a few hundred people arriving 
on small boats from northern France to the UK across the Channel (Marsh, 2018; 
Welander, 2019a). This was followed by an announcement that the Home Secretary 
would work with his French counterpart, Christophe Castaner, to ‘increase [their] joint 
work to address the issue.’ The two had reportedly agreed:  
[To] ramp-up cooperation [… to ensure] strong collaborative measures around 
prevention, monitoring, and patrols, with operations being run out of the […] UK-
France Coordination and Information Centre in Coquelles [opened in November 
2018]. (Home Office, 2018)  
Desperate individuals’ reliance on small boat crossings to reach UK territory continued 
to increase throughout 2019, with a notable peak during the spring and summer of 2020. 
This sparked heightened media attention and renewed policy debates in the UK, which, 
of course, also coincided with the final stretch of the Government’s attempts to steer its 
Brexit plans. The Home Office, under the leadership of Home Secretary Priti Patel, has 
been taking a hard-line approach towards immigration throughout 2020, with a 
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heightened rhetoric of ‘illegality.’ At the Conservative conference in October 2020, for 
instance, she announced: 
I will introduce a new system that is firm and fair [...] We will make more 
immediate returns of those who come here illegally and break our rules every 
single week. And we will continue to examine all practical measures to effectively 
deter illegal migration. (Conservative Party, 2020) 
Patel also appointed former National Crime Agency executive Dan O’Mahoney as 
‘Clandestine Channel Threat Commander’ responsible for ‘tackling illegal attempts to 
reach the UK’ and ‘making the Channel route unviable for small boat crossings’ (Home 
Office, 2020), marking a reinforcement of the border as a site of criminality. This would 
be done in close collaboration with the French authorities, which would entail ‘urgently 
exploring tougher action in France, including stronger enforcement measures and 
adopting interceptions at sea and the direct return of boats’ (Ibid). Shortly thereafter, the 
Home Office admitted that it was considering using water cannons and nets to stop small 
boats from making the crossing. In a Daily Telegraph interview, O’Mahoney explained 
that nets could be used to clog boat propellers, thus causing boats to come to a standstill: 
‘It’s that type of thing, yes. So, safely disabling the engine and then taking the migrants 
onboard our vessel.’ Individuals would then be taken to oilrigs more than 5,000 miles 
away in the Ascension Island in the south Atlantic, where they would be locked up 
(Grierson, 2020). Indeed, rather than addressing the situation in northern France in a 
sustainable and humane manner, a major preoccupation for contemporary UK 
immigration control has been to increase border securitisation even further.  
1.5. The making of the ‘Forever Temporary’ borderzone  
As a direct result of the UK’s border securitisation, a bottleneck scenario built up in 
northern France and the wider UK-France borderzone, with the continued arrival of 
individuals seeking to reach the UK but who remain blocked from doing so. The situation 
there has been described by some as a ‘forever temporary’ (Reinisch, 2015; Kremer, 
2002); a nomenclature which highlights the absurd nature of a situation which is at once 
temporary and transitory, yet seemingly permanent, due to the repeated destruction and 
re-emergence of settlements, continued dispersals and returns, arrivals and departures 
of displaced people passing through this transit point. In order to provide further context 
for the subsequent chapters which explore the dynamics in the borderzone through the 
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analysis of extensive research findings, this section looks in further detail at different 
turning points in the area from the late 1990s to the emergence of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp 
in 2015.  
Looking back at the years 1998-1999, settlements created by those blocked at the British 
border started appearing in the Calais area (King, 2016: 103). The number of displaced 
people sleeping in the streets of Calais and surrounding areas, with the hope of reaching 
the UK via the Eurotunnel at the Calais port and Dunkirk, thus started increasing 
gradually (Reinisch, 2015: 515). In 1999, the French government opened a warehouse in 
Sangatte run by the Red Cross, to use as a centre for migrants, one mile from the 
Eurotunnel entrance, in response to the growing number of people present in the area 
(Ibid.). It was envisaged that the Sangatte camp would be able to accommodate up to 600 
people at any given time. By October 2002, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) had 
established a permanent presence in the Sangatte camp, providing one-to-one legal 
counselling and advice. A transient population in excess of 3,000 people was estimated, 
with an average of 1,700 present in the camp at any given time, hence greatly exceeding 
its maximum capacity. The UNHCR and the Red Cross reported that that more than 80% 
of individuals in the area originated from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan (UNHCR, 2002). 
At the end of 2002, under significant pressure from the UK government, which saw the 
Sangatte centre as a ‘pull factor’ (King, 2016: 103), Nicolas Sarkozy, then minister for 
Home Affairs, announced its closure. This followed on from two unsuccessful legal 
proceedings initiated by Eurotunnel, the private operator, to have the centre closed down 
(Reinisch, 2015: 515). As part of an ensuing ‘burden sharing agreement,’ the UK agreed 
to take around 1,000 Iraqi Kurds and 200 Afghans under work visa arrangements, while 
France took responsibility for the remaining 300 Sangatte centre residents (Reinisch, 
2015: 516).  
 
In the early days of 2003, following the closure of the Sangatte camp, displaced 
individuals in the area moved out of the spotlight. However, squats and makeshift 
shelters, named by the communities living in them as ‘jungles,’ soon started to emerge, 
only to be periodically torn down again by French state authorities. Local volunteer 
groups provided hot meals and dry clothes throughout the period, whilst regular 
‘warnings’ were issued about the deterioration of conditions in the area. Two main policy 
positions started to take shape in France during this period: the argument in favour of 
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providing people with shelter and basic care, and the opposing view that France should 
make conditions as inhospitable as possible, so as to deter new arrivals (Reinisch, 2015: 
516). By 2009, a makeshift camp had emerged in the area, hosting 1,000 inhabitants. It 
was subsequently bulldozed, and 190 people were arrested (Barber, 2016). Then-UK 
Home Secretary Alan Johnson welcomed the closure with the following words:  
The measures that we have put in place are not only there to prevent illegal 
immigration, but also to stop people trafficking. We are working with the French, 
not only to strengthen our shared border, but that of Europe as a whole. (Reinisch, 
2015: 517) 
 
By July 2009, the group Calais Migrant Solidarity, affiliated with the ‘no borders’ 
networks, embarked upon efforts to document and call out human rights violations, also 
keeping a record of deaths of displaced people. From July 2009 to July 2012, the UNHCR 
provided legal aid and counselling to individuals in the area. However, in July 2012, the 
UNHCR’s responsibilities were transferred to the French third-sector organisation 
France Terre d’Asile. 
 
By December 2014, the UNHCR reported that the number of displaced people had risen 
to nearly 2,500 people, compared to around 500 during previous winters. The majority 
of these individuals were from countries affected by war or civil unrest, including 
Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, and Syria (Spindler, 2014). Most people were staying in 
improvised shelters propped up in the woodlands, or on abandoned industrial sites. 
Others stayed in squats or buildings rented by the No Borders activists (Wannesson, 
2017b), set up small encampments in the town of Calais (House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee, 2015: 3), or were hosted by citizens of Calais (Wannesson, 2017b). 
The European director of UNHCR described the situation in Calais as follows: ‘The 
conditions are totally unacceptable and are not consistent with the kind of values that a 
democratic society should have’ (Taylor and Grandjean, 2014). In January 2015, the 
French authorities eventually opened an official reception centre at ’Jules Ferry,’ a former 
holiday camp site for children. The centre was run by the third-sector organisation La Vie 
Active (Wannesson, 2017b) and consisted of three large tents to begin with where 
overnight accommodation for women and young children was provided, in addition to 




In March 2015, around 1,200 people were evicted from squats and small camps around 
Calais, and moved to the site by the Jules Ferry centre. This was precisely the site which 
would become the future ‘Jungle camp,’ as it started gathering increasing numbers of 
displaced people (Ibid.). In the same month, March 2015, the British Home Affairs 
Committee reported that:  
The migrants we met in Calais were overwhelmingly from regions suffering from 
war, internal conflict, and failure of the state, who would appear eligible to apply 
for asylum in Europe once they reach a safe destination. (House of Commons 
Home Affairs Committee, 2015: 7)  
 
During the same month, Doctors of the World reported that there were more than 3,000 
people in makeshift camps in the area. The organisation reported that the population is 
‘often young (15 to 25 years old), male, and travelling alone [with] growing numbers of 
women [and] children.’ (Doctors of the World UK, 2015: 2) Critical concerns were raised 
in relation to the living conditions, which were described as ‘absolutely inadequate.’ 
Moreover, the medical NGO reported a range of health problems resulting from the poor 
living conditions, including skin conditions, respiratory problems, colds and flu, gastric 
problems, among others. Police violence was commonplace in the most visible camps in 
the northern France area, while those in Steenvoorde, Angres, Norrent-Fontes, and 
Tatinghem remained relatively protected and shielded from this form of abuse (Suel, 
2017: 126).  
 
In June 2015, the French Housing Minister, Sylvia Pinel, announced that the government 
would take measures to improve the conditions in the ‘new Jungle.’ This would include 
the installation of street lighting and water points (La Voix du Nord, 2015a).  Around a 
month later, in July 2015, when the camp population had reached beyond 3,000 people 
(Whitehead et al, 2015), the first school was set up by volunteers and camp residents, 
providing a space to learn French, English, history, and geography (La Voix du Nord, 
2015b). Over the next few months, the so-called ‘Jungle’ camp experienced a boom in 
social community spaces such as restaurants, churches, mosques, a library, and a learning 
hub, amongst others. Whilst romanticised by some, this camp soon received widespread 
media attention as the ‘worst refugee camp in the world,’ and came to host 10,000 
individuals at its peak in 2016, with vast numbers of volunteers and activists arriving 
from Britain and wider Europe to establish and support different services. It is precisely 
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this point in time which constitutes the starting point for my engagement in the 
borderzone, and also serves as the birth of this research project.   
1.6. On the need for a scholarly inquiry and the emergence of my 
research questions  
My research project is situated precisely in the site that I refer to as the French-UK 
‘borderzone,’ understood as stretching from the juxtaposed border controls in northern 
France to the capitals of Brussels and Paris, if not further afield. My theoretical and 
empirical engagement with, and interest in, the UK-France borderzone, is rooted in 
travels, encounters, experiences, and friendships across borders, and forms of activism 
that have deeply influenced my work and life, including deep immersion into the refugee 
situation at the Lebanese-Syrian border and camps where I conducted academic field 
research in 2015. Upon my return to Europe, bearing witness to the intensity and 
seemingly never-ending nature of the struggle at the UK-France border despite its deeply 
damaging impact on human lives, I was compelled to undertake this PhD research project. 
Puzzled by the seemingly contradictory and non-sensical, if not futile, state response to 
the migratory situation in the area, I set out to explore, through my PhD project, the ways 
in which the externalisation of the UK border and immigration control to France has 
contributed towards the production of violence, suffering, and self-reinforcing cycles of 
further ‘securitisation’ of the border.  
An in-depth scholarly study of the UK-France border is a noteworthy and important case 
beyond its own local context, in several respects. Firstly, it constitutes a key 
contemporary example of what Barbero and Donadio (2019) have referred to as ‘internal 
externalisation.’ While subordinate relationships between a country in the global North 
and a counterpart from the global South typically spring to mind when discussing 
externalisation of border controls (e.g. Australia’s outsourcing of bordering tactics to 
Indonesia and Italy’s and the EU’s reliance on Libya), a study which looks at the UK-
France border brings about new important insights  into the various technologies which 
are deployed as part of externalised border enforcement also between European states. 
This generates insights which ought to be of interest to scholars focusing not only on 
geographical locations such as the US-Mexico border, the land border between Spain and 
Morocco in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, but also those studying ‘North-North 
cooperation’ on bordering and migration management.  
25 
 
The UK-France border is moreover particularly fruitful as a case study due to the fact that 
many seemingly disparate border policing and migration management tactics witnessed 
across Europe appear to converge at this border. For anyone who has set foot amongst 
the migrant communities living in destitution in the Calais and Grande-Synthe area, it is 
clear that the intensity with which state authorities are seeking to hinder human mobility 
here is extremely stark in comparison with many other borderzones across Europe. This 
intensity allowed me as a researcher to clearly identify various bordering tactics and 
draw up a new conceptualisation under the term ‘politics of exhaustion.’ This 
conceptualisation, in turn, could be applied to various borderzones across Europe and 
beyond, and serve other scholars as a useful conceptual tool for diagnosing border 
struggles in different geographical locations. In particular, this helps advance an 
emerging body of scholarship that looks at how states are resorting to increasingly 
sophisticated (micro) practices and policies to deter, exclude and control, by influencing 
the choices and intention of people on the move; not only at the UK-France borderzone 
but also further afield. 
As such, as part of my underlying rationale for choosing to focus my PhD thesis on the 
UK-France border specifically, was the understanding that my research findings would 
not just be relevant to the localised situation in Calais; they would have strong relevance 
to the study of the treatment of migrants, and the management of human mobility, across 
Europe, and beyond. Indeed, the case of the UK-France border, and my thesis itself, 
therefore has much broader applicability, and ought to be useful to other researchers 
elsewhere. 
Within the existing literature, there has been some important work conducted in relation 
to the migratory situation in northern France, some of which was published throughout 
the course of my PhD project period. Notably, in Les Migrants de Calais: Enquête sur la vie 
en transit, Sophie Djigo (2016) provides a sociological and philosophical approach to the 
migratory situation in Calais, drawing on the voices, vocabularies, and viewpoints of 
migrants themselves. As such, she outlines the living conditions and the reception policies 
of the French states, which she describes as being in contradiction to the principles of 
democracy, liberty, and human rights. Well-renowned anthropologist Michel Agier and 
colleagues provide a detailed image of life in the former ‘Jungle’ camp in Calais in The 
Jungle. Calais’s camps and migrants (Agier et al, 2019). In doing so, the authors emphasise 
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‘the power of place’ and humanity found within the camp and its inhabitants, whilst also 
covering matters of government policies as well as solidarity movement. The work also 
traces the links between the Jungle and the wider global migration context and broader 
societal changes which have been unfolding locally and globally. Meanwhile, Yasmin 
Ibrahim and Anita Howarth (2018) in Calais and Its Border Politics commence their work 
by tracing the history of the town of Calais, highlighting it as ‘a space inscribed through 
migrant and refugee politics over time’ (2018: 13). The authors subsequently review the 
timeline of camps in Calais from the perspective of contemporary politics and from the 
viewpoint of its historical trajectory. Following a review of British and EU policies, the 
book moreover examines the imaging and visualisation of ‘the refugee’ and ‘the jungle,’ 
interrogating how the media gaze produces camp inhabitants as objects (2018: 14). 
Eventually, the authors argue that ‘periodic erasure seeks to affirm sovereign power and 
the production of bare life through the border politics of control and expulsion’ (Ibid).  
Furthermore, in the collection of texts and images from Calais and further afield, 
Decamper: De Lampedusa a Calais, un livre de textes et d’images & un disque pour parler 
d’une terre sans acceuil, Samuel Lequette and Delphine Le Vergos (eds) (2016) question 
the contemporary European migration politics, state powers, and humanitarian action 
alike. The book provides insight into the living conditions in the camps in northern France 
since 2002, when the Sangatte camp closed, giving the centre stage to refugees, 
volunteers, researchers, journalists, artists, and others immersed in the area. In her book 
chapter ‘Calais, Patras, Subotica,’ Sara Prestianni (2014) illustrates the phenomenon of 
smaller ‘jungle’ camps which cropped up in the northern France area following the 
closure of the Sangatte camp in 2002. Her work stands as a stark reminder of the cyclical 
nature of the migratory situation at the UK-France border and traces linkages to the 
wider migratory situation across Europe. Additionally, over the past few years, in 
particular during the aftermath of the demolition of the unique phenomenon presented 
by the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp, there has been an emergence of anglophone scholarly journal 
articles relating to the camp and the wider migratory situation, which includes accounts 
of volunteer movements (Sandri, 2018), autonomous accommodation, solidarities, and 
no-borders activism in the area (Rygiel, 2011; King, 2016; Mudu and Chattopadhya, 
2016), the role of play and arts in resistance (McGee and Pelham , 2017; Esin, and 
Lounasmaa, 2020), and an analysis of the camp from biopolitical perspectives. 
Additionally, Oli Mould (2017) has suggested conceptualising the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp not 
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as an informal camp or state of exception, but as a ‘slum of the UK’s making,’ while Jane 
Freedman (2018) argues that ‘mismanagement’ and ‘inaction’ of the French state is at the 
root of the situation of human suffering in the Calais area, suggesting that the state 
chooses to leave individuals in adverse conditions with the hope that they will effectively 
disappear.  
These important contributions to the documentation and analysis of the migratory 
situation in northern France notwithstanding, little academic attention has been 
accorded to the specific nature of the technologies and tactics of bordering inherent in 
the externalisation of the UK border to France, and the impact thereof.  My work hence 
aims to do something different than what others have sought to explore before. Indeed, 
upon my first visit to Calais, as I started thinking of this border from an ontological 
perspective, I found that existing theorisations within the broad and inter-disciplinary 
field of critical border and migration studies provided a helpful foundation and starting 
point for my research inquiry, but did not seem to fully account for the confounding 
dynamics found within the struggles, control technologies and forms of resistance which 
characterise the UK-France border in northern France; something I had witnessed 
through my first-hand exposure and engagement in the borderzone. I thus discovered a 
gap in academic work relating to the bordering technologies operating at the UK-France 
border and their entanglement with migrant subjectivities. This signalled a need to 
explore how bordering tactics may have evolved beyond spatial containment, 
interdictions, and non-entrée policies at the physical border, and to uncover the ways 
they are mutually constitutive with migrant resistance and defiance.  
Through this project, I am joining a small inter-disciplinary body of emerging academic 
literature which dissects and challenges the UK’s border policies in northern France (see 
e.g. Bosworth, 2016a, 2016b, 2020; Ansems de Vries and Welander, 2016a, 2016b; 
Welander 2019a, 2020; Timberlake, 2020a; 2020b), whilst bringing a new theoretical 
lens through which the border struggles here can be understood and dissected. Following 
Martina Tazzioli et al (2015), I believe that further critical interrogation of struggles, and 
a more in-depth understanding of borders as a site of struggle, are greatly needed, and 





1.7. Research questions and hypothesis, thesis structure and 
contribution to knowledge 
A noteworthy gap within the scholarly literature has thus been identified, and this is what 
led me to embark upon this project aimed at examining the UK-France borderzone as an 
intensified site of political struggles over mobility and control. I ask the following 
overarching question:   
In what ways, and why, has the externalisation of UK border and immigration 
control to France led to the evolution of (violent) bordering tactics beyond 
traditional border control measures of spatial containment and interdiction/non-
entrée, and how are these contested by migrant subjects?  
 
In response to this overarching question, my hypothesis is that the juxtaposed border 
arrangements between the UK and France have not merely led to the localisation of the 
UK’s physical border controls to an extraterritorial space; the ‘border’ has also entered 
into spaces of everyday life of migrants in the borderzone, which also entails a complex 
dialectical and interwoven relationship between autonomous mobilities and violent state 
control. To test this hypothesis, I developed three key research questions for 
investigation as part of an in-depth field research study and theoretical analysis; a 
process which is explained in greater detail in the subsequent chapter 3. The questions 
read as follows:  
• What is the nature of the bordering tactics performed at the UK-France border to 
deter, control and exclude groups of people profiled as ‘undesired’? How well do 
sovereign conceptions of power account for the current politics and struggles at 
the UK-France border?  
• In what ways are migrant subjectivities subverting, resisting and challenging the 
control methods in the borderzone, and how are these subjectivities performed 
and (re)produced? (How) do these interact with the (re)production of bordering 
tactics?  
• How is violence produced within the external dimensions of the UK’s border, and 
how can the violent nature of the bordering tactics be understood and accounted 
for? Why might the present bordering technologies be privileged over other forms 
of migration government control in the borderzone? 
The thesis is structured as follows. Having contextualised the UK-France border above, 
the following chapter discusses the theoretical framework which informs my analysis, 
allowing me to go on a journey through the ontological developments around the concept 
of ‘border’ and ‘bordering’ within the critical border and migration scholarship. Having 
thus situated my thesis within the wider field of study, I proceed to providing insights 
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into the methodological approach and the concrete methods deployed, also reflecting on 
questions of representation, subalternity, and reflexivity.  
 
I then move on to presenting my field research, analysed through the lens of biopolitics, 
which allows me to shed light on an array of insidious technologies of migration 
governance upon which the externalisation of the UK border to French territory partly 
depends. To that end, I develop the conceptualisation of ‘politics of exhaustion’ within the 
context of the UK-France border. Through the voices of my interlocutors, I generate a 
unique, in-depth understanding of how migration governance operates at this border. I 
argue that the politics of exhaustion cannot be grasped within the biopolitical ‘making 
live/letting die’ dichotomy and notions of necropolitics, but rather requires us to move 
beyond this binary. Thus, the thesis makes a significant contribution to advancing 
scholarly work which challenges precisely this binary, by providing insights into the ways 
in which biopolitical technologies in the context of migration governance can operate in 
ways which neither foster life, nor lead/amount to death. My contribution thus advances 
efforts of moving the critical border and migration scholarship out of the ‘impasse’ 
regarding whether/how biopolitics need to be substituted (e.g. through necropolitical or 
thanatopolitical theorisations) in order to make sense of seemingly contradictory and 
non-sensical biopolitical technologies.  
 
In the subsequent chapter, I trace the contours of political subjectivities and forms of 
human agency in the borderzone, in order to demonstrate the complex interrelationship 
and co-constituent nature of bordering technologies and migrant subjectivities. I thus 
offer my empirical and theoretical analysis regarding the co-production of migrant 
subjectivities and control, and regarding the relationship between the politics of 
exhaustion and the autonomy of migration. Through this chapter, the thesis contributes 
to the autonomy of migration scholarship in important ways, by helping to move further 
beyond criticisms that this scholarship is ‘romanticising migration’ and ‘glosses over’ the 
relational and embodied aspects of border struggles. My typology on ‘resistance in border 
struggles’ demonstrates how many of the smaller acts taking place in borderzones – 
including certain very subtle, daily forms of resistance – are also inherently political and 
produce migrant subjectivities and performative politics outside of citizenship. Thus, 
through my embodied encounter in northern France, I propose an epistemological shift 
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away from Realist and other mainstream state-centric IR approaches, whilst also bringing 
together literatures of autonomy of migration and those relating to migrant citizenship.  
Given the apparent brutality of the politics of exhaustion upon the bodies and minds of 
racialised migrants, I was compelled to return to this concept once more in the final 
chapter, where I interpret the politics of exhaustion as a form of invisibilised violence. 
Here, I argue that violence cannot be understood through the minimalist oppositions of 
direct/structural violence, biopolitical/necropolitical violence, but rather as an 
invisibilised form of violence dependent on a de-politicisation of suffering, a ‘moral alibi,’ 
and racial subjugation. Through this chapter, I thus contribute towards an ongoing 
ontological shift within critical border and migration scholarship, where the constitutive 
nature of violence in bordering technologies is emphasised. To-date, this has been largely 
missing within traditional migration studies, with some noteworthy exceptions of course. 
My thesis ends with concluding remarks reflecting on the implications of the ‘politics of 
exhaustion’ on human lives, and the potential for resistance, as well as my own personal 
reflections in regards to a future research agenda. Overall, my work is a very timely and 
important piece of academic work, and the fact that I have approached my research 
questions not only as an academic, but also as an activist with longstanding policy-related 






2. An overview of scholarly perspectives on borders, 
migration, and bordering: Beyond a ‘line in the sand’ to 
biopolitics and the autonomy of migration  
 
2.1. Introduction  
There is a burgeoning and inter-disciplinary body of academic literature concerned with 
matters of migration, mobility, borders, and bordering tactics which saw an increased 
intensity since 2015 and the so-called European ‘refugee crisis’ (Bojadzijev and 
Mezzadra, 2015). It is within the broader academic field of critical border and migration 
studies that this thesis is situated; one which has received increased attention from 
scholars across academic disciplines through heterogenous attempts to make sense of 
the contemporary tensions between human mobility projects, the multiplication of forced 
migration phenomena, and the variety of ways observed in regards to states’ mobility 
governance.  
This chapter discusses scholarly perspectives on borders, migration, and bordering 
within a broader theoretical framework, which informs the analysis of my subsequent 
field research analysis and discussion. The chapter commences by addressing relevant 
ontological approaches to ‘borders,’ going beyond traditional territorial, geopolitical, and 
state-centric epistemologies and into critical understandings of the ‘border,’ most notably 
biopolitical and necropolitical perspectives. The subsequent section is concerned with 
academic literature which plunges deeper into matters of bordering tactics and, more 
precisely, the matters of bio(necro)political mobility governance. The third and final 
section of the chapter is concerned with the ‘contested politics of mobility’ (Squire, 2011) 
through the lens of the scholarly strand broadly understood as theorising the ‘autonomy 
of migration.’ As such, the chapter provides an overview of three strategically selected 
key debates within the vast, heterogenous, and ever-growing interdisciplinary field of 
critical border and migration studies, to serve as the theoretical foundation for the 
ensuing research questions and inquiry of the project. Meanwhile, it was acknowledged 
that an exhaustive summary of this field of study would be near impossible, and certainly 





2.2. Border ontologies: The shift from a geopolitical traditionalist 
paradigm to biopolitics  
 
Over the past several years, the proliferation of border controls beyond national 
territorial borders has led to critical rethinking of state power at their frontiers, with 
scholarly work expanding our understanding of the sites and practices which count as 
‘border control’ (Burridge et al, 2017: 240-241). Indeed, the inadequacies of traditional 
understandings of borders as ‘lines’ or ‘walls’ have led many scholars to call for the 
articulation of new border vocabularies, imaginaries, and understandings, which better 
correspond to the complex de facto relationship between borders, territory, and mobility 
than the traditional geopolitical tradition (Balibar, 1998; Salter 2012; Parker and 
Vaughan-Williams, 2009; Vaughan-Williams, 2015). Etienne Balibar (2002: 76) 
highlights in his essay, ‘What is a border?’ the ‘polysemy’ and ‘heterogeneity’ of borders 
and notes that their ‘multiplicity, their hypothetical and fictive nature’ does not mean 
they are any less real. For Eyal Weizman (2007: 6), frontiers are not rigid or fixed, but 
rather elastic: 
The linear border, a cartographic imaginary inherited from the military and 
political spatiality of the nation state has splintered into a multitude of temporary, 
transportable, deployable, and removable border-synonyms – ‘separation walls,’ 
‘barriers,’ ‘blockades,’ ‘closures,’ ‘road blocks,’ ‘checkpoints, […] and ‘killing zones.’ 
(Weizman, 2007: 6; see also Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013: 8) 
Others have emphasised that, not only are there various types of borders which different 
groups of people experience differently (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013: 4); borders, 
moreover, perform ‘several functions of demarcation and territorialization – between 
distinct social exchanges or flows, between distinct rights, and so forth’ (Balibar, 2002: 
79). As such, Balibar (1998: 217-218) asserts that ‘borders […] are no longer at the 
border, an institutionalized site that could be materialized on the ground and inscribed 
on the map, where one sovereignty ends and another begins.’ This is not to say, however, 
that scholars are suggesting that the border is an anachronistic concept. Instead, scholars 
have called for a commitment to diagnose how political practices of borders change 
beyond the so-called ‘territorial trap’ (Vaughan-Williams, 2009: 3).  
Similarly, in Border as Method, Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2013: 3) assert that 
the ‘multiple (legal and cultural, social, and economic) components of the concept and 
institution of the border tend to tear apart from the magnetic line corresponding to the 
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geopolitical line of separation between nation-states.’ Thus, scholars have differentiated 
between ‘paper borders’ referring to the pre-border limits performed through visa 
control, and ‘iron borders,’ which are the actual physical border controls (van Houtum 
and Lacy, 2020: 4). Meanwhile, Mezzadra and Neilson (2013: 1-2), through the lens of 
New York City taxi drivers, look at how ‘linguistic’ and ‘social’ borders figure into the 
composition of the labour force. What follows is that critical border and migration studies 
need not only speak of the proliferation of borders, but also their heterogenization 
(Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013: 3). As such, a more reflective, and what Nick Vaughan-
Williams (2015: 6) refers to as ‘consciously self-critical’ approach to border studies, has 
emerged within academia, which could be broadly understood as constituting a 
heterogenic and inter-disciplinary strand of critical border and migration studies.  
Within this context, in an article from 2009, Noel Parker and Vaughan-Williams sought to 
lay the foundation for precisely a movement towards an agenda for critical border and 
migration studies. The inspiration and motivation for their programme of discussion was 
what they perceived as the continued privileging of the aforementioned pervasive 
‘territorialist epistemology,’ despite an increasingly complex relationship between 
borders and territory (Parker and Vaughan-Williams, 2009: 583). Nonetheless, the 
authors recognise the critical shift which had been taking place in border studies, and it 
was upon the emergence of such literature that their agenda was located; seeking to build 
on the same with the aim of ‘free[ing] the study of borders from the epistemological, 
ontological, and methodological shackles of an ultra-modernistic, ‘territorialist’ Western 
geopolitical imagination’ (Parker and Vaughan-Williams, 2009: 586).  
This shift within critical border and migration studies has led to the emergence of critical 
scholarship on migration governance, largely influenced by the writings of Michel 
Foucault (1998, 2003, 2007), who articulated a paradigmatic account of biopolitics, 
shifting our focus away from defence and territory towards the relationship between 
populations and government (Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 7). Indeed, the impact of 
Foucault’s work on border and migration studies today is evidenced by the rapidly 
growing body of work relating to biopolitics and borders (Walters, 2015: 2), which is also 
where my theorisation of the politics of exhaustion in the UK-France borderzone sits, as 
we examine in the following chapter. Before further delving into this sub-field of scholarly 
work, the following passages will firstly trace the contours of Foucault’s work on 
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biopolitics in order to foreground the critical migration scholarship, but, importantly, also 
without claiming to provide an exhaustive account, or analysis, of Foucault’s work.  
While the notion of biopolitics pre-existed the scholarly work of Foucault, it is the latter 
which is perhaps most commonly associated with the term. Breaking with earlier 
naturalist and politicist interpretations of the concept, Foucault provided an analysis of 
the historical process, which culminated in the emergence of ‘life’ as the central concern 
of political strategies of government (Lemke, 2011: 33). As for Foucault’s (1978) work, 
amongst the first places where the concept of biopolitics first appeared, the first volume 
of History of Sexuality served to conceptualise biopolitics as a specific modern form of 
power and a ‘transformation in the order of politics’ (Lemke, 2011: 34). In the words of 
Foucault (1978: 142-143):  
For the first time in history… biological existence was reflected in political 
existence […] But what might be called a society’s ‘threshold of modernity’ has 
been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. 
For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the 
additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose 
politics places his existence as a living being in question. 
The concept would later reappear throughout three years of lectures at the College de 
France, throughout 1976–1979 (namely in Society Must be Defended, Security, Territory, 
and Population, and The Birth of Biopolitics), and was interchangeably used with the term 
‘biopower.’ According to Foucault (1978: 139), political technologies were organised 
around two poles; the human body as a machine, and also around the population as the 
‘species body’ (see also Lemm and Vatter, 2014). From this perspective, scholars of 
critical border and migration studies understand biopolitical modes of mobility 
governance not only as attempts to discipline and control individual ‘bodies,’ but also 
through the management of, and intervention in, the population in its entirety (Vaughan-
Williams, 2015: 7). This hence takes us beyond viewing the ‘border’ as merely a 
demarcation of sovereign territory, as viewed through the traditional geopolitical lens, to 
an understanding of mobility governance as a means to enhance mobility and circulation, 
and to optimise the population by sifting and excluding perceived risks to the health of 
the population as a ‘species body’ (Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 7).  
In accordance with Foucault’s (2004) theorisations of ‘governmentality,’ this emerged 
out of a crisis of sovereignty. Governmentality has populations as its object, and includes 
35 
 
various institutions, procedures, actions, and reflections (Fassin, 2011a: 241). Foucault 
proposes a three-fold definition for the term. Firstly, it ‘has the population as its target, 
political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its 
essential technical instrument.’ Secondly, it designates the power of ‘government,’ which 
has driven the formation of governmental apparatuses and bodies of knowledge. Thirdly, 
it serves to describe ‘the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle 
Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries’ (Foucault, 
2007: 108-109). Foucault introduced this concept partly as a critique of the ‘circular 
ontology of the state asserting itself and growing like a huge monster or automatic 
machine’ (Ibid: 354). As Rose (2007: 54) argues, I have within the parameters of this 
thesis, mobilised biopolitics more in terms of a ‘perspective than a concept,’ focusing on 
‘attempts by authorities to intervene upon the vital characteristics of human existence.’  
In a similar manner, Thomas Lemke (2011: xi) refers to biopolitics as an ‘interpretive 
key,’ which focuses on ‘how the production and protection of life is articulated with the 
proliferation of death.’ Vaughan-Williams (2015: 10) notes that biopolitics, thanks to its 
diversity as a ‘rich and agile […] register for understanding seemingly contradictory 
practices in the field of contemporary European [sic.] border security and migration 
management beyond the limits of extant approaches.’ Along similar lines, William 
Walters (2015: 4) emphasises that one must caution against deploying governmentality 
as a ‘ready-made framework that merely needs to be applied to migration research,’ as 
this risk becomes a filter rather than a lens, which could, in turn, ‘make for a rather 
monochromatic view of power relations and somewhat predictable kinds of analysis’ 
(Ibid). In a similar vein, my thesis takes inspiration from the critical and experimental 
‘ethos of inquiry,’ which Foucault practiced (Walters, 2015: 4), rather than treating 
governmentality as a fixed template, which can be simply applied to the project.  
This resonates with Andrew Neal (2009), who suggested that ‘we should not allow 
Foucauldian concepts to become disciplinary when Foucault did not think twice about 
abandoning them’ (cited in Walters, 2015: 4). Indeed, I understand the concept of 
governmentality as a tool to diagnose ‘unexpected, paradoxical, heterogenous, and 
perhaps unstable combinations of rationalities and techniques’ (Walters, 2015: 5). That 
said, one of the concepts directly borrowed from Foucault, which will feature heavily in 
my thesis, is that of ‘technologies of power’ or ‘political technologies.’ For Foucault, these 
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are technologies which ‘determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain 
ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject’ (Foucault, 1982). Within the context 
of theorising the politics of exhaustion as a means to govern conduct in a subsequent 
chapter, this becomes highly relevant.  
Meanwhile, it should be noted here that the application of the Foucauldian frame of 
biopolitical governance within critical border and migration studies has not been without 
its critics. As a result, the critical scholarship on migration governmentality has taken 
several turns, including a thanatopolitical shift through the approach of Giorgio Agamben, 
and the necropolitical turn through the lens of Achille Mbembe. Indeed, a strand of critical 
border and migration scholars has resorted to utilising the work of Giorgio Agamben 
(1998; 2005) in an attempt to account for the role of sovereign power and the negative, 
or deadly, dimensions of contemporary biopolitical bordering practices; the introduction 
of ‘thanatopolitical’ dynamics to complement the ‘vitalist’ approach of Foucauldian 
biopolitics.  
I will now trace the contours of Agamben’s work, again without a pretence at going into 
any deep or lengthy analysis thereof. For Agamben, the ‘construction of sovereign power 
assumes the creation of a biopolitical body. Inclusion in political society is only possible 
[…] through the simultaneous exclusion of human beings who are denied full legal status’ 
(Lemke, 2011: 54). Reaching back through medieval to Roman juridical 
conceptualisations of sovereignty, and building on Carl Schmitt’s work in which the 
theory of the contiguity between the state of exception and sovereignty is theorised, 
Agamben proposes a legal theory to explain the ‘no man’s land between public law and 
political fact, and between the juridical order and life’ (Agamben, 1998: 1). Whilst 
scholars have focused on the ‘sovereign/subject relationship’ derived from Foucault 
(Owens, 2010: 571), Agamben, following Schmitt, instead defines the ‘sovereign’ as ‘he 
who decides the exception’ (Agamben, 2005: 1). Agamben traces the ‘state of exception’ 
back to the French Revolution and the subsequent Chartre of 1814, which granted the 
sovereign the powers to ‘make regulations and ordinances necessary for the execution of 
the law and the security of the State’ (Agamben, 2005: 11), and suggest that ‘[t]he 
sovereign, having the legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places himself 
outside the law’ (Agamben, 1998: 15). In other words, Agamben explores and accounts 
for the existence of a sphere of human activity not subject to law, known as the ‘state of 
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exception’ (Humphreys, 2006: 677). He discusses legal traditions and their 
corresponding scholarship in relation to the state of exception, suggesting that the 
topographical opposition (inside/outside), which these scholars and philosophers 
propose, is insufficient to account for the state of exception. Instead, he proposes:  
In truth, the state of exception is neither external nor internal to the juridical 
order, and the problem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of 
indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other, but rather blur 
with each other. (Agamben, 1998: 23)  
In praxis then, the state of exception opens a space for political decision and enables the 
sovereign to act outside the existing legal system, not being bound by any external 
overarching control. Therefore, it is situated in an ‘ambiguous, uncertain, borderline 
fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the political,’ (Fontana, 1999: 16, cited in 
Agamben, 2005: 1) and the sovereign hence is the authority with the ultimate power of 
decision to surpass the norm and create a legal void, otherwise known as a ‘state of 
exception.’ Following this, Agamben emphasises that others, when theorising the state of 
exception, have placed too much insistence on the ‘confusion of powers’ (the acts of the 
executive and the legislative powers respectively). Instead, he asserts, what is ultimately 
at stake in the state of exception, is the separation of ‘force of law’ from the law itself. 
Agamben elaborates, ‘That is to say, in extreme situations, ‘force of law’ floats as an 
indeterminate element that can be claimed […] The state of exception is an anomic space 
in which what is at stake is a force of law without law’ (Agamben, 1998: 38-39).    
In line with Agamben’s theoretical discussion, the state of exception is the paradigm 
which provides a site for what he refers to as ‘bare life’ and ‘homo sacer,’ two oft-cited 
concepts within critical border and migration studies aimed at making sense of the lethal 
and dehumanising, rather than vitalist, aspects of biopolitical bordering technologies. 
Drawing on early strands of political theory, including Aristotle’s concept of man as a 
political animal, Agamben (1998) elaborates the notion of sovereignty as power over 
human life. Contrary to Schmitt, Agamben states that the main border of separation to 
conceptualise is not the difference ‘between friend and enemy’ (Schmitt, 1996: 28), but 
rather the difference between political life (bios) and bare life (zoē). This expounds on the 
difference between the mere existence of humans and the legal status afforded to humans 
(Agamben, 1998: 7; Lemke, 2005: 5). Agamben (1998: 8) suggests that the sovereign 
draws its power from its exceptional power to exclude an individual from the political 
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community, through the ‘ban’ which confines the person to ‘bare life’ (biological existence 
as opposed to political life with rights) as ‘homo sacer.’ Paradoxically, however, this 
exclusion is necessarily also an act of inclusion; the excluded person becomes included in 
the political community through her exclusion (Ibid. 1998: 7).  
As such, ‘homo sacer’ is excluded from both human and divine law, as it ‘takes the form 
of a double exception, both from the ius humanum and from the ius divinum’ (Agamben, 
1998:82). This double exclusion means that the killing of ‘homo sacer’ is neither classified 
as sacrifice nor killing, which attributes to ‘homo sacer’ as an exceptional status. Thus, in 
Agamben’s analysis of ‘Homo sacer,’ sacrality becomes indissociable from sovereign 
power, in that ‘homo sacer belongs to God in the form of un-sacrifice ability and it included 
in the community in the form of being able to be killed’ (Agamben, 1998: 82). By 
extension, the violence perpetrated against ‘homo sacer’ opens up a ‘sphere of human 
action,’ which is neither the sphere of sacrifice, nor a sphere of profane human activity. 
‘Homo sacer’ is confined to bare life, a form of existence without political agency. It is here 
that Agamben highlights the links between ‘homo sacer’ and the sphere of sovereign 
decision, the latter which ‘suspends law in the state of exception and thus implicates bare 
life within it’ (Agamben, 1998: 83).  
Furthermore, for Agamben, the ‘Camp’ is not so much a concrete place or spatial concept, 
but rather the symbol for the border between ‘bare life’ and political existence (Lemke, 
2011: 56). As such, this concept does not just refer to places like deportation centres or 
the Nazi concentration camps of the Second World War. Rather, it is any space where 
‘bare life’ is found. In Agamben’s words, ‘the camp is the space that is opened when the 
state of exception begins to become the rule’ (Agamben, 1998: 168-169, emphasis in 
original). A number of scholars within critical border and migration studies have hence 
used Agamben to supplement the Foucauldian account in order to make sense of the life-
taking dimensions of biopolitical bordering tactics, namely the deadly and dehumanising 
effects thereof. Such a conceptualisation, I will argue, is insufficiently nuanced as a lens 
for theorising the UK-France borderzone, as we shall see.  
That said, the application of Agamben’s work has become popular within critical border 
and migration studies, as it has allowed for an analysis of ‘the logic according to which 
contemporary biopolitical border security practices attempt to produce forms of 
subjectivities that are amenable to being governed’ (Vaughan-Williams 2015: 8). As such, 
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Agamben has been mobilised by critical border and migration scholars to develop an 
approach to biopolitical border security and enable understandings of the seemingly 
unforgiving implementation of border control tactics in contemporary Europe and 
throughout other regions. Numerous scholars have mobilised the Agambenian concept 
to explore sovereign power, camps, borderlands, and transit points as ‘state of exception’ 
and the wide-ranging vulnerabilities that refugees and migrants are exposed to, in 
particular when they are in states of ‘irregularity’ (Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2005; Rajaram and 
Grundy-Warr, 2004; Diken, 2004; Hanafi and Long, 2010; Nair, 2010). Such texts stress 
the limits to migrants’ agency, while some, but not all, go as far as arguing the 
impossibility of politics from a position of ‘bare life’ (see McNevin 2013: 184). Here, 
migrants see their status as human beings taken away from them in extraterritorial 
‘abject spaces,’ where international and national law is somehow suspended (Isin and 
Rygiel, 2007). Alison Mountz (2011) explores ports and islands as such spaces of 
suspension, while Rajaram et al (2004) analyse detention centres as productive of ‘bare 
life.’ Along similar lines, Nira Yuval-Davis et al (2019) propose the concept of 
‘borderscopes’ to illustrate grey zones of exclusion locally and globally (see also Dajani, 
2020: 3). Meanwhile, Nick Dines et al (2015) interrogate the role of the island of 
Lampedusa in producing a borderzone of ‘bare life.’  
While Agamben’s work provides a foundation for theorising the thanatopolitics of the 
contemporary bordering regimes and tactics, the notion of necropolitics was to later 
emerge with the work of Achille Mbembe (2003), theorising the necropolitical effects of 
governmental processes. For Mbembe, the notion of necropower emerges from the 
position that sovereignty lies in the power and capacity to ‘dictate who may live and who 
must die’ (2003: 11). Arguing that biopolitics is insufficient as a concept if we are to 
account for subjugation of life to the power of death in contemporary contexts, 
necropolitics is an instrumental concept to reconfigure relations between resistance, 
sacrifice, and terror (2003: 39-40). Accordingly, necropower is in addition to the life-
enhancing biopolitical function (Lee and Pratt, 2012: 891) and refers to ‘the generalized 
instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies 
and populations’ (Mbembe, 2003:14). Understood as a function of the modern state with 
indirect or direct murder of racialised others, Mbembe refers specifically to the cruelty 
found within situations for slaves on colonial era plantations, and describes how they 
were ‘kept alive but in a state of injury, in a phantom-like world of horrors and intense 
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cruelty and profanity […] Slave life, in many ways, is a form of death-in-life’ (2003: 21, 
emphasis in original).  
2.3. Escape and control: The autonomy of migration and border struggles  
 
The Agambenian paradigm has been critiqued by scholars for its control bias and for 
privileging sovereign power and control over migrant agency. Hence, scholars have been 
advocating for a deeper understanding of border struggles and their relationship with 
‘control,’ often based on empirical research which evidences resistance, agency, and 
political activity amongst migrants. Such work includes for instance Patricia Owens 
(2010), Ernesto Laclau (2007), and Nadia Latif (2008), to name but a few, who have 
sought to ‘de-exceptionalize the exception’ (Honig, 2009:1; see also Sigona, 2015: 5). 
Along the same lines, Andreas Kalyvas (2005: 115) asserts that: 
Agamben can no longer localise the contingency of political and social struggles. 
His approach […] assumes an almost totalistic, agentless history, and though it is 
concerned with politics and its eclipse, it is itself quite unpolitical.  
Meanwhile, Reece Jones (2012: 686) argues that the ‘theorization of sovereign power 
precludes meaningful resistance, because any perceived threat can be neutralized 
through the use of the exception, a time and space where power relations are replaced by 
violence relations.’ According to Chiara Brambilla and Reece Jones (2020: 292), this could 
help produce the very effect such literature critiques in the first place, through ‘a de-
politicisation of this very relationship, which is naturalised, devoided [sic.] of historicity, 
and situated far apart, outside history.’  
In particular, in response to scholarship deploying Agamben to understand the dynamics 
of borders and mobility, another key perspective has developed within critical border 
and migration studies. It derives its central premises from Autonomous Marxist thought 
that emerged in Italy in the 1960s, and its standpoint straddles academia and activist 
milieus (McNevin, 2013: 184). Rejecting the ‘control bias’ of the Agambenian approach to 
biopolitical border security, the strand of scholarship which has been identified as the 
‘autonomy of migration’ scholarship claims that the shift based on Agamben’s theories is  
[E]mpirically and politically problematic because it privileges sovereign power 
and control over political struggle and contestation, fails to account for the role of 
migrant agency in shaping and resisting contemporary border regimes, and tends 
to flatten and generalize across diverse border sites and migrants’ experience. 
(Vaughan-Williams 2015: 8) 
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The emergence of the autonomy of migration scholarship can be traced back to the 
extensive writings of Yann Moulier-Boutang, who promoted a reversal of dominant 
narratives that viewed mobility through the state-centred lens of ‘capture’ and the 
coherence of state institutions (Moulier-Boutang, 1998; see also Casas-Cortes, 2015: 895-
896). Instead, he argued that the focus should be on the primacy of migration, particularly 
within the history of the development of capitalism. Following these claims, numerous 
scholars and activists have gathered around the concept of autonomy of migration, which 
indeed represents a shift away from the apparatuses of control and onto ‘the multiple and 
diverse ways in which migration responds to, operates independently from, and, in turn, 
shapes those apparatuses and their corresponding institutions and practices’ (Casas-
Cortes et al, 2015: 895).  
Whilst also emphasising the biopolitical nature of sovereign power, the autonomy of 
migration is particularly concerned with the political terrain between power, resistance, 
and the tensions between mobility and control, often using empirical examples to 
highlight strategic acts of resistance and refusal amongst irregular migrants, paying 
attention to the subversive quality of migrants and their movements (McNevin 2013: 
192). Rejecting the image of borders as impenetrable walls or as fortress, antiracist 
activist movements in Germany around the year 2000 coalesced around the notion of 
autonomy of migration (Casas-Cortes et al, 2015: 898; Bojadžijev and Karakayalı, 2010), 
whilst autonomy of migration scholars have sought to question the traditional 
presumption that migration policies are determined by states and the institutions of 
border control (Bojadžijev and Karakayalı, 2010) and shed light on migrants’ capacity to 
render borders porous (Scheel, 2013: 279), as well as to conceptualise borders not 
merely as devices which serve to exclude, but which also produce the differential 
inclusion of migrants (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013). Indeed, Peter Nyers (2015) asserts 
that the autonomy of migration perspective was:  
 designed to liberate research and activism on migration from some of the 
prevailing frameworks […] Autonomy of migration is, at once, a research program 
with its own distinct analytical tools and conceptual framework, and also a 
political project that is connected to anti-racist social movements for refugees and 
migrant rights. (2015: 26)  
The analytical value of taking mobilities as the starting point for analysis, and the 
importance of representing the subjective diversity of migration, are emphasised by 
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autonomy of migration scholars. For Manuela Bojadžijev and Serhat Karakayalı (2010), 
this approach to critical border and migration studies traces: 
[T]he crossing of borders, the traversing of territories, the enmeshing of cultures, 
the unsettling of institutions (first among them nation-states, but also citizenship), 
the connecting of languages, and the flight from exploitation and oppression— [we 
are] interested, in other words, in investigating what migration teaches us about 
the conditions of contemporary forms of sociality, and that which goes beyond 
them.  
According to the autonomy of migration perspective, migrants’ transformative force 
precedes and can subvert the sovereign power and bring about new social relations. 
Indeed, along these lines, scholars critique Agamben and associated scholarly work due 
to its lack of emphasis on, or understanding of, migrant agency. In Escape Routes: Control 
and Subversion in the 21st Century, for instance, Dimitris Papadopoulos et al assert:  
[Agamben] fails to understand the agency of the excluded; he cannot grasp their 
involvement in immanent processes of social change. That is, the excluded are cast 
as another characteristic of modern sovereignty; they may pose a local or political 
problem about the extension and limits of sovereignty, but – from this perspective 
– they do not figure as a possible constituent force which can trigger 
transformations on the part of sovereignty. (Papadopoulos et al, 2008: 7)  
As such, Papadopoulos et al highlight how the sovereign order can be undermined by 
everyday acts of resistance among migrants. The scholars moreover refer to 
‘imperceptible politics,’ not in the sense of invisibility, but rather as ways to evade being 
categorised in accordance with the logic of sovereignty. Accordingly, imperceptibility ‘is 
made up of everyday, singular, unpretentious acts of subverting subjectification and 
betraying representation’ (Papadopoulos et al, 2008: 61), meaning that irregular 
migration is constituted by conflicts and actors which:  
cannot be conceived within the existing framework of citizenship […] we see this 
as the moment where subaltern social groups put so much pressure on the 
modern state, that the state cannot respond by expanding its inclusion practices; 
instead a fundamental transformation of the state’s own structure is initiated. 
(Ibid: 14) 
Meanwhile, Nicholas De Genova (2010) suggests that the large scope of ‘irregular 
migration’ witnessed in the world today is, in and of itself, a ‘permanent and incorrigible 
affront to state sovereignty and the power of the state to manage its social space’ (De 
Genova 2010: 39). Papadopoulos et al (2008) moreover explain how the autonomy of 
migration scholarship has sought to change the perspective from viewing migrants as 
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‘people forced to respond to social or economic necessities’ to instead being viewed as 
‘active constructors of the realities they find themselves in or of the realities they create 
when they move.’ As such, this theoretical perspective sees migration as autonomous, 
meaning ‘against a long history of social control over mobility, as well as a similarly 
oppressive research in the field of migration studies – migration has been, and continues 
to be, a constituent force in the formation of sovereignty.’ Mezzadra (2011), through the 
concept of ‘gaze of autonomy,’ refers to a relational understanding of power and the role 
of mobility movements in the constitution and transformation of borders and border 
regimes. This, as will be demonstrated in chapter 5, is highly relevant to my thesis, in 
which I analyse field research findings through the lens of migrant subjectivities, 
resistance, and agency.  
Meanwhile, De Genova (2009: 461) emphasises the ontologically pre-existing nature of 
agency and subversion prior to the powers that are mobilised to contain and subordinate 
it:  
Migrant labour’s sheer subjective (productive and creative) force within the 
processes of capital accumulation nevertheless precedes and exceeds any of the 
powers mobilised to contain and subordinate it. Hence, migrant workers – as 
subjects – remain an incorrigible constituent power within capital and the 
constituted ‘sovereign’ power of the state.  
Kim Rygiel (2011: 807) explores the emergence of ‘the camp’ (migrant and refugee 
camps, detention centres, shanty towns) as ‘dominant spaces for governing population 
movements,’ and seeks to challenge existing geographical imaginings by proving the 
camp is one of agency and politics rather than an abject space of exception. Rygiel thinks 
about camps as ‘proto-urban’ spaces of citizenships, thus suggesting a move away from 
the Agambenean reading of camps, which, according to Rygiel (2012: 812), has ‘led to a 
certain idealization and a historicization of camps.’ The portrayal of migration as a 
creative force or even as ‘irreducible force’ (Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2008) has been 
criticised for exaggerating its potential for transformation.  
In any event, scholars from this standpoint highlight the subversive potential of migrants 
to undermine sovereign power, rather than being passive victims without agency, as 
mentioned. Indeed, accordingly, migration is understood as a shaping force within social, 
cultural, and economic structures, rather than being isolated from them. Papadopoulos 
et al (2008: 203) further assert that the perspective ‘subverts the liberal discourse of the 
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new migrant as a useful and adaptable worker, as well as the logic of victimisation 
prevalent in NGO paternalistic interventionism.’ Heather L. Johnson (2014) similarly 
argues that relations of violence in border struggles do not mean that displaced people 
are unable to, and do not, in practice, exercise different forms of agency: ‘Indeed, 
persistent contestations of the sovereign power and the exceptionality of the Camp are 
perceptible throughout their everyday strategies and activities’ (2014: 149).  
Papadopoulos et al (2008: 202) assert, ‘[t]o speak of the autonomy of migration, is to 
understand migration as a social movement in the literal sense of the words, not as a mere 
response to economic and social malaise.’ The scholars continue, ‘The autonomy of 
migration approach does not, of course, consider migration in isolation from social, 
cultural, and economic structures. The opposite is true: migration is understood as a 
creative force within these structures’ (Ibid). Nonetheless, the regulation of mobility 
follows the mobility of migrants according to this perspective, indeed emphasising the 
primacy of migration over efforts to assert control over it. De Genova (2017: 24) stresses 
the importance of taking an approach concerned with the ‘autonomous dynamics of 
human mobility on a global scale and the formations of state power and sovereignty that 
react to the exercise of an elementary freedom of movement through diverse tactics and 
techniques of bordering.’  
Meanwhile, Mezzadra (2011: 121) holds that the autonomy of migration approach calls 
for the use of ‘a different gaze.’ Indeed, it means to look at movements and mobility 
conflicts in ways which prioritise ‘the subjective practices, the desires, the expectations, 
and the behaviours of migrants themselves’ (Ibid). As such, Mezzadra suggests that the 
emphasis should be on the fact that migrants act like citizens even when they are not, 
irrespective of their legal status (136-137). As we shall see, this is highly relevant for my 
thesis, in particular as part of the theorisations of migrant subjectivities in chapter 5. 
Indeed, migration is conceptualised as always preceding a politics of control that is aimed 
at hindering movement. Similarly, De Genova (2017c: 11) suggests that ‘state tactics of 
bordering have been abundantly shown to be convulsive reaction formations, responding 
always to the primacy of the sheer autonomy of migration.’ Autonomy of migration 
scholars generally take inspiration from the work of Antonio Negri and arguably give 
greater emphasis to the ‘positive’ and vitalist notion in Foucault. As Vaughan-Williams 
(2015: 8) suggests: 
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Thus, according to the AoM perspective, the mobility of people is reinterpreted as 
ontologically prior to any attempts by border security authorities to control them 
– ‘Escape comes first!’ – and sovereign regimes prompted by the constitutive 
creativity of migrants will always ultimately be outwitted and rendered porous. 
The notion of ‘escape comes first’ runs in the vein of Gilles Deleuze’s affirmation, 
‘Resistance comes first’ (Deleuze 1988, 89), that is to say, the primacy of subversion, as it 
highlights the primacy of mobility over control. On this note, scholars of the autonomist 
tradition have, at times, been criticised for the level of abstraction with which they 
describe migrant agency (see e.g. Nyers, 2015: 30) or for romanticising migration and 
migrants themselves. Indeed, Papadopoulos et al made claims such as suggesting that 
migration’s ‘target is not relocation, but the active transformation of social space’ (2008: 
211).  
This appears to attribute a political transformative ambition to migrants, which is not 
always there. The autonomy of migration scholarship has also been criticised for 
adopting a homogenous and ‘disembodied’ image of ‘the migrant,’ as any account of 
mobility struggles must reflect that ‘the experience of migration and border controls is 
always embodied, relational, and situated within and across various contexts, identities, 
and contested histories’ (Nyers, 2015: 30, see also Sharma, 2009; and Scheel, 2013b). In 
response to this, Stephan Scheel (2013b), amongst others, have thought to develop the 
concept of autonomy of migration beyond its romanticisation, arguing that it should be 
understood through the lens of the ‘irreconcilable conflict between migration and the 
attempts to control and regulate it by migrants’ practices of appropriation of mobility and 
other resources’ (279). As Scheel states, by reading autonomy in this way, we 
acknowledge that moments of excess and uncontrollability of human mobility always 
occur relationally within a conflict with governance and techniques of mobility 
management, rather than being misread as completely self-determined and untouched 
by the effects of governmentality (Ibid).  
Following the divide between the Agambenian approach and that of the autonomy of 
migration scholarship, scholars have subsequently proceeded to contrast, and bridge, the 
two perspectives. Vaughan-Williams (2015), for instance, believes that the contrasting of 
these two perspectives have led to a conceptual crisis with critical border and migration 
studies. Therefore, Vaughan-Williams proposes an approach, via Roberto Esposito, which 
sees borders as an immune system. He argues that we must consider Esposito’s concept 
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of (auto)immunity, in order to understand the European border crisis and its paradoxical 
humanitarian government, where the protection of life necessitates the incorporation of 
anything threatening in small doses, in order to develop immunity to it.  
 
Tazzioli (2018: 20) takes a different stance, highlighting how the temporalities of 
migration ‘are not completely autonomous, insofar as they are to a large extent the 
outcome of the limits and conditions imposed by migration policies’ (see also McNevin, 
2011). Meanwhile, Anne McNevin (2013) does so in order to highlight a ‘reductive 
reading of power that underwrites Agamben’s work and that of certain figures amongst 
the Autonomy of Migration scholars’ (McNevin 2013: 185). Drawing on field work 
amongst irregular migrants in Germany in 2009, the scholar introduces the concept of 
ambivalence as a basis for a different theorisation of migrants’ struggles, suggesting that 
ambivalence acknowledges ‘the transformative potential of claims based in human rights’ 
(McNevin 2013: 185) and which takes into account the ‘haphazard, short-term 
instrumental and dislocated dimensions’ (Ibid: 193). McNevin thus highlights the 
importance of an approach to contemporary border and migration studies, focusing on 
the ambivalence of power and contestation, offering an ‘alternative theorisation of 
irregular migrants’ political claims that starts from the notion of ambivalence’ (McNevin, 
2013: 195). According to McNevin:  
[N]eat lines drawn between cause and effect rarely illuminate the complex 
interrelationships that generate social change. Surely, the view that human 
mobility is the springboard of social transformation that precedes sovereign 
control is just as reductive as the view that sovereign power is the sole origin and 
arbiter of citizen and human subjects. At the heart of both approaches are 
ontological assumptions that orient understanding of human potential towards 
‘lack’ in one case and ‘abundance’ in the other. (McNevin2013: 193)  
 
In a similar vein, Scheel (2013b) argues that the study of ‘embodied encounters’ or 
‘situated reading of autonomy’ (2013b: 283) allows the autonomy of migration to escape 
the trap of excessive abstractness and transcend the question of structure vs. agency, 
highlighting that migration is always relational and embodied (2013b: 279-280). Sarah 
Green suggests that that the ‘border’ is not only about separation, but also about relations 
and ‘border as such cannot be taken for granted in understanding the difference borders 
make to peoples’ lives’ (2010: 261). Meanwhile, Nyers (2015: 28) highlights how the 
‘relationship between migrants and borders is not a straightforward encounter of 
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exclusion, but involved complex and ambiguous negotiations, contestations, and 
refusals.’ Mezzadra (cited in Casas-Cortes et al, 2015: 899) states that: 
The autonomy of migration approach, in this regard […] does not lead to 
downplaying the role of power relationships within this field; rather, it is intended 
to open up a new angle on these very relationships, emphasizing resistance and 
struggle as their constitutive elements. We are not far from Foucault’s theory of 
power, in this general sense. 
It is precisely within this approach to autonomy of migration where my thesis is situated; 
studying embodied encounters in the UK-France borderzone in order to contribute to 
academic literature on border struggles with the border as its critical vantage point, and 
exploring the complex and intertwined relationship and the ambivalence between human 
mobilities and state control. Thus, the following two chapters of this thesis precisely 
analyse these complex contestations, contributing to the scholarly literature through 
extensive empirical research on one site of Europe’s border struggles. Relevant to my 
work is also a strand of scholarship which engages with the theories and concepts from 
the perspective of ‘acts of citizenship.’ Here, Nyers (2015) theorises migrant citizenships 
which are both formal and performative, and in essence, different from the conventional 
notion of citizenship, which take the perspective of migrants ‘from below’ (23). As such, 
the scholar contributes new perspectives to traditional questions within the political 
sciences in relation to what counts as political activity, who is a subject, and who is a 
member of the political community. Indeed, this is particularly relevant to one of my 
subsequent chapters which examines the production of subjectivities in the UK-France 
borderzone, as we shall see. Here, we ask not the question of ‘who is a citizen?’ but rather 
how subjects constitute themselves as citizens (Nyers, 2015: 33), which, as we shall see, 
is particularly relevant to the analysis in chapter 5.  There, I will explore micro practices 
of agency, resistance, and subversion in the borderzone which alter the way we might 
think about what it is ‘to be political’ and highlights an ‘ambivalence’ (McNevin, 2013) or 
‘ambivalent condition’ (Squire, 2011) enacted not only through the politics of control and 
exclusion, but also through politics of mobility and subversion.  
The dialectical interrelationship between control and agency will also be discussed, 
suggesting that they are not static binaries, but rather interrelated and co-constitutive 
elements (co)producing the borderzone.  Following this, McNevin (2013) argues that 
both the Agambenian and autonomy of migration approach tend to rely on a necessarily 
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reductive reading of power, and therefore the notion of ambivalence introduced by 
McNevin (2013: 185) serves to hold together the various tensions we encounter when 
studying migrants’ struggles, whilst also being generative of potential for 
transformations.  
As Mezzadra and Neilson (2013: 3) assert, borders are ‘not merely geographical margins 
or territorial edges. They are complex social institutions, which are marked by tensions 
between practices of border enforcement and border crossings.’ This leads us neatly to 
the aspect of border enforcement, as well as the theoretical perspectives on political 
technologies of bordering, which will be the focus of the next section.   
 
2.4. The (bio)political technologies of bordering  
Particularly relevant to this research project is the shift within critical border and 
migration studies to a standpoint which understands the border as ‘increasingly 
fractured throughout society,’ which is incompatible with traditional understandings of 
‘inside and outside’ (Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 6). Along with this decentring has been a 
shift towards theorisations of borders as a set of practices with performative effects 
(Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 6) through a sociological lens, which gives more space to the 
examination of everyday (micro)practices, allowing for increased complexity. In 
particular, when it comes to theorising and understanding the proliferation and 
multiplication of borders in relation to ‘irregular migration,’ scholars have been seeking 
to examine bordering practices and technologies in ‘borderzones’ from a multi-
dimensional perspective (Squire, 2011: 2), as well as spatial displacements of the border. 
Serhat Karakayali and Vassilis Tsianos (2010) propose the concept of ‘border regime’ to 
better capture the notion of the border by placing the agency of migrants in the 
conceptualisation of borders through an ethnographic analysis. Others have privileged 
the term ‘borderscapes’ (Perera, 2007) or ‘multi-sited’ approach to bordering (Brambilla, 
2015; Brambilla and Jones, 2020). Meanwhile, Anssi Paasi (1999: 670) suggests that the 
border ought to be understood as ‘practices and discourses that ‘spread’ into the whole 
of society.’  
Indeed, scholars have highlighted new practices and sites which constitute bordering 
work, including in churches (Ehrkamp and Nagel, 2017), advertising campaigns 
(Watkins, 2017), detention centres (Hiemstra and Conlon, 2017; Bosworth, 2020), and 
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through the indirect outsourcing of bordering to aid organisations (Williams, 2017). For 
Ponzanesi and Blaagaard (2011: 3), borders are:  
moving from physical (the gate to European territories and citizenship) and 
symbolic (the myth of Europe and its idea of superiority) to material borders (the 
marked body of foreigners, immigrants and asylums seekers), which become 
‘border’ figurations (construction of otherness, foreignness, alienness).  
Meanwhile, Biao Xiang and Johan Lindquist (2014: S124) discuss how a ‘migration 
infrastructure’ serves to condition and mediate mobility through ‘systematically 
interlinked technologies, institutions, and actors.’ Mezzadra and Nielsen (2013: 186) also 
emphasise the constitutive role of multiple layers and actors in the making of borders, 
such as ‘government agencies (including police, customs, intelligence, diplomatic corps, 
and military), NGOs, intergovernmental, and international organizations, epistemic 
communities, activists, media, and the migrants […].’ Meanwhile, Tsianos and Karakayali 
(2010: 374) highlight: 
The most common manifestation of the border in Europe is not to be found along 
the geographical border line of the Schengen area, but rather in the records on the 
laptops of the border police; in the visa records of the European embassies […] in 
the online entries of the Schengen Information System (SIS), where the data on 
persons denied entry to the Schengen area is administered; in the Eurodac, the 
data system administered by the European Commission, where the fingerprints of 
asylum seekers and apprehended illegal migrants are stored. 
Furthermore, Balibar (2009: 203) highlights the dislocation of borders within territories: 
‘wherever militarized police operations are waged against illegal aliens’ (203). He also 
emphasises their transportation beyond the borderline: ‘externalizing the camps […] on 
the territory of neighbouring ‘client’ states, who would agree to act as auxiliary 
immigration officers’ (Ibid). Due to the heterogeneity of forms, sites, and practices which 
constitute contemporary borders, Burridge et al (2017) have proposed reconceptualising 
borders as ‘polymorphic,’ which allows us to grasp the manners in which borders take on 
a multiplicity of forms at the same time.  
Along similar lines, Saskia Sassen (2005: 525) has referred to the complex 
transformations of borders as ‘the actual and heuristic disaggregation of ‘the border.’’ 
Brambilla and Jones (2020: 296) adopt a ‘multi-sited’ approach to the borderscape to 
ensure that it allows one to also take into account ‘protests, resistances, activisms, and 
struggles that pervade borders’ (see also Brambilla, 2015). Thus, the ‘border’ is no longer 
taken as a given foundation for political and scholarly analysis, but rather becomes ‘a site 
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of interrogation in its own right’ (Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 6). Meanwhile, Mezzadra and 
Neilson (2013: 7) argue that ‘borders are equally devices of inclusion that select and filter 
people and different forms of circulation in ways no less violent than those deployed in 
exclusionary measures.’ The scholars therefore developed theories of ‘differential 
inclusion’ in their work on the ‘border’ as a methodological viewpoint. Within this 
broader ontological, epistemological, and methodological shift, the centrality of practices 
and performativity has been given increased attention by scholars in the field, 
representing a paradigm shift from studying the ‘border’ to interrogating the notion of 
‘bordering practice,’ within what Chris Rumford (2009) referred to as ‘border work.’ It is 
precisely the analytical vantagepoint of borders as a set of practices which is particularly 
relevant to the theorisation of the politics of exhaustion, which is concerned with 
precisely how states are seeking to govern mobility in a multiplicity of ways, through a 
heterogeneity of biopolitical and necropolitical mechanisms for ‘getting hold over 
migrants’ lives and movements’ (Tazzioli and De Genova, 2020: 5). Indeed, this is a 
preoccupation with which a range of critical migration and border studies scholars have 
sought to investigate.  
Moreover, an increasing body of work is concerned with technologies of immigration 
control and the heterogeneity of bordering strategies. As Nassar and Stel (2019: 44) 
contend, migrants often face ‘an unpredictable, hybrid form of governance that emerges 
at the continuously shifting interface between formal and informal forms of regulation.’ 
Furthermore, the critical migration scholarship has shown that the control of mobility is 
not merely carried out through arrest, detention, and interdictions, but also through new 
and heterogenous bordering practices. 
A technology of bordering theorised by Tazzioli (2017; 2019a) is the governing of 
migration through mobility. For Tazzioli, migrants across Europe are facing containment 
through forced mobility; their geographies are ‘diverted and decelerated,’ (2017: 30) and 
as such, they are controlled and excluded. Tazzioli highlights how migrants’ movements 
are ‘controlled, disrupted, and diverted not (only) through detention and immobility, but 
by generating effects of containment keeping migrants on the move and forcing them to 
engage in convoluted geography’ (Tazzioli, 2019a: 1). Leonie Ansems de Vries and 
Elspeth Guild (2018: 1) have followed down a similar path, as they refer to the notion of 
‘forced, obstructed, and circulatory mobility’ being used as a common migration 
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management tactic across Europe; something which is indeed clearly identifiable in the 
context of northern France. Lorena Gazzotti and Maria Hagan (2020: 3) similarly report 
an absurd use of dispersals in the context of Morocco, where migrants would be dispersed 
to the south of the country, only to then make their way back in a few days (or even 
hours). Similarly, Fiorenza Picozza (2017: 239) highlights the common phenomenon of 
‘Dublined’ migrants who experience being stuck in transit ‘spending between five and ten 
years struggling to settle.’ According to Tazzioli and De Genova (2020), kidnapping of 
migrants has also emerged as yet another bordering tactic, as part of the authorities’ need 
to ‘persistently experiment with new tactics for the deployment of violence, and thereby 
also constantly engage in renewed gambits of legitimation’ (2020: 6). The scholars draw 
attention to ‘the heterogeneity of modes of migrant confinement, which are not reducible 
to detention as such, and may entail coercive forms of mobilisation rather than 
immobilisation as measures that serve the ends of governing the lives of border crossers’ 
(2020: 9).  
 
The temporal dimension of borders is of significant importance in these types of 
theorisations of the border. Mezzadra and Neilsen (2013: 13) emphasise ‘the necessity to 
analyze the border, not only in its spatial, but also in its temporal, dimensions.’ They 
highlight the need to take into account ‘the temporal thickness and diversity that is not 
fully discernible within an analysis that systematically privileges spatial qualities’ (2013: 
133). Along these lines, some have worked on dissecting technologies of temporal 
management, such as technologies to speed up processes through biometrics (Walters, 
2002; Amoore, 2006; Feldman, 2012; Scheel, 2018), through detention and dispersals 
(Gazzotti and Hagan, 2020), and through the aforementioned use of forced mobility, 
which serves to convolute journeys (Tazzioli, 2017, 2019a). Moreover, Glenda Garelli and 
Martina Tazzioli (2017: 171) argue that the ‘government of people’s freedom of 
movement does not only operate through sheer blockage– as, for instance, in 
incarceration, detention, or encampment; it also works through mechanisms of spatial 
and temporal suspension of people’s lives.’ As such, the notion of temporal borders 
enables a deepened understanding of the diverse strategies that are constitutive of the 
border. Linked to this are biopolitical techniques and tactics devised to render life 
governable and pliant, with the premeditated intention to curb autonomous migratory 
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movements through the influencing of decisions and intent management. This is precisely 
where my work is situated, and where the major contribution of this thesis will be made.  
 
Within the small but growing body of scholarly work addressing biopolitical techniques 
of intent management and the influencing of conduct, Nicolay B. Johansen (2013) argues, 
within the context of refused asylum seekers in Norway, that in cases where the state 
finds difficulties in removing or deporting individuals from the territory, authorities 
confine them to miserable conditions as part of a ‘funnel of expulsion,’ with the hope that 
they will eventually give in and decide to leave Norway voluntarily. As such, everyday 
practices and arrangements are designed to slowly erode people’s resilience and their 
ability to persist and survive. Similarly, Leanne Weber and Sharon Pickering (2014) 
contend that technologies of ‘intent management’ are utilised in the context of Australian 
border control, where ‘new forms of border governance are emerging that seek to shape 
individual decision-making to promote ‘voluntary’ compliance with migration 
management goals’ (2014: 17). This echoes what Rose (2000: 324) refers to as the 
‘technologies for the conduct of conduct.’  
Along similar lines, Behrouz Boochani, a Kurdish scholar and writer who was held in 
detention in the Australian-run detention centre on Manus Island for years, noted that 
‘the system in these prisons has been created so that incarcerated refugees experience an 
unbearable amount of pressure, reach the point of hopelessness, and finally decide to 
return to their country of origin’ (Boochani, cited in Loughnan, 2019a). My work aims to 
complicate, and contribute to, this body of literature in a number of ways. First of all, my 
project will be elaborating a new framework, the ‘politics of exhaustion,’ for grasping how 
technologies, or ‘techniques of governmentality’ (Tazzioli and De Genova, 2020) that are 
at play at Europe’s borders, have become increasingly sophisticated and are deterring, 
controlling and excluding by inflicting exhaustion upon migrants’ bodies and psyches as 
a way of controlling intention. The use of intent management through physical, mental, 
and emotional exhaustion is a bordering tactic which remains heavily under-theorised. 
In doing so, I moreover emphasise the centrality of violence within seemingly more 
benign bordering practices, thus contributing to an ongoing ontological shift which 
understands violence constitutive of bordering technologies and has been largely absent 
in traditional migration studies, albeit with some important contributions (Brambilla and 
Jones, 2020: 288).  
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2.5. Theorising violence and borders  
The centrality of violence within the bordering tactics addressed in this project calls for 
a brief theoretical overview of the concept, once again without making pretence at 
providing an exhaustive theoretical discussion. The etymological roots of the word 
‘violence’ come from the Latin words violentia and violentus, meaning ‘vehement.’ This is 
what Simon Springer and Philippe Le Billon (2016: 1) believe may come from the notion 
of ‘deprived of mind.’ However, the origins of the word remain unclear, as it also has 
connections with the French word vouloir, which is related to the Greek Bia, meaning 
‘force’ or ‘constraint’ (Springer and Le Billon, 2016). Lacking a single agreed-upon 
definition, violence could be understood as a highly confounding concept (Springer and 
Billon, 2016: 1). 
The past couple of decades have also witnessed what James Tyner and Stian Rice (2015: 
2) refer to as ‘an upswing in the geographic writing – and theorizing – of violence.’ Such 
endeavours have included efforts aimed at deepening our understanding of violence, not 
only in terms of its consequences, but also theories of the ‘act’ or ‘event of violence (Ibid). 
As part of this work, Tyner and Rice (2015: 2) highlight academic efforts at addressing 
the philosophical distinction between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die.’ For example, Mary Anglin 
(1998) explores violence produced by structures of dominations, which impede people’s 
prospects for survival, and Tania Murray Li (2009) analyses the harmful impact of 
biopolitics in rural Asia, which has led to the dispossession of large numbers of people 
from access to land, while neoliberal policies have simultaneously curtailed programmes 
that could help sustain the same populations, making them a ‘surplus’ population. 
 
While there tends to be a privileging of what Slavoj Žižek (2008) refers to as ‘subjective’ 
physical violence, namely a type of violence carried out by a clearly identifiable actor, 
Kirsten Simonsen and Lasse Koefoed (2020) argue that a more nuanced and broader 
understanding of violence is required. They refer to ‘symbolic violence,’ (Galtung, 1990) 
which works through ‘humiliation and affects dignity, sense of worth and value, and 
integrity’ (Simonson and Kofoed, 2020). The authors explain that ‘symbolic violence’ is 
related to and from parts of systemic violence, but refers specifically to the ‘violence of 
language,’ through which the latter cements relations of domination, often through 
Othering and Orientalist discourses. A vast body of academic work on violence has also 
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sought to demonstrate how the traditional binary between direct and structural violence 
are sometimes mutually constitutive, seen as a dialectical relationship.  
 
For instance, Tyner and Rice (2015: 9) demonstrate how the threat of direct violence in 
the context of Democratic Kampuchea made possible the enforcement of harmful policies 
and ‘administrative violence,’ while concurrently, these same policies facilitated the 
foundation for direct violence. As such, the ‘taking of life’ was dependent on, and central 
to, the ‘disallowal of life’ in this case study. While challenging the binary relationship 
between direct and structural violence, this work also questions the moral differentiation 
between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die.’ Tyner and Rice (2015: 9), once again referring to the 
case of Democratic Kampuchea, highlight how the political leaders had an awareness of 
the harm caused by their policies and practices, whilst also having the opportunity to stop 
them, but chose not to, and also had the capability to prevent harm being done. For these 
reasons, the authors argue, the deaths resulting from this ‘administrative violence’ 
through policy suggests that they should be considered as immoral, direct ‘killings.’  
 
Springer and Le Billon (2016:1) argue that,  
[We] can find the ignominious expression of violence in virtually every facet of our 
everyday existence. Sometimes, it comes in the form of an overt appearance, 
where we can easily recognize its horrifying effects and deadly consequences. In 
other instances, it is hardly recognizable at all, hidden beneath ideology, 
mundanity, and the suspension of critical thought, where we have to look very 
closely through the lens of theory to appreciate how a particular set of social 
relations is imbued with violence.  
 
This assertion certainly highlights the need to go beyond traditional concepts of violence 
and seek a broadened conceptualisation, which are not always overt in appearance, but 
perhaps mundane and not immediate in their harmful consequences. Moreover, the 
scholars highlight that violence ought to be seen as ‘a processual and unfolding moment, 
rather than as an ‘act’ or ‘outcome’’ (2016: 2). According to Tyner and Rice (2015: 4), 
violence is ‘any action or inaction that affects the material conditions of another, and in 
so doing, reduces one’s potential to survive. To put it another way, violence is any action 




Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (2004: 2) highlight how violence ‘defies 
easy categorization.’ Therefore, they propose the deployment of the concept of a 
‘continuum of violence’ (see also Cockburn, 2004), which ranges from everyday small-
scale matters to catastrophic forms of violence, such as genocide.  Through their work, 
they strive above all ‘to ‘trouble’ the distinctions between public and private, visible and 
invisible, legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence, in times that can best be described 
as neither war nor peacetime in so many parts of the world’ (2004: 4). They argue that:  
[V]iolence can never be understood solely in terms of its physicality - force, 
assault, or the infliction of pain - alone. Violence also includes assaults on the 
personhood, dignity, sense of worth, or value of the victim. The social and cultural 
dimensions of violence are what gives violence its power and meaning. (Scheper-
Hughes and Bourgois 2004: 1) 
 
The notion of structural violence was first highlighted in Johan Galtung’s (1969) article 
Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Galtung differentiates between direct violence, which 
occurs when there is an identified actor perpetrating the violence, and structural 
violence, when no actor is identifiable. Galtung (1969: 170-171) adds that: 
[…] whereas in the first case, these consequences can be traced back to concrete 
persons or actors, in the second case, this is no longer meaningful. There may not 
be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is 
built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and, consequently, 
unequal life chances.  
 
Later, Paul Farmer (2010: 354) argues that ‘structural violence’ ‘cause[s] epistemological 
jitters’ due to the difficulties in defining it. Farmer himself defines it as ‘violence exerted 
systematically – that is, indirectly – by everyone who belongs to a certain social order […] 
In short, the concept of structural violence is intended to inform the study of the social 
machinery of oppression.’ On a separate occasion, Farmer (1996: 261) asks:  
Can we identify those most at risk of great suffering? Among those whose suffering 
is not mortal, is it possible to identify those most likely to sustain permanent and 
disabling damage? Are certain ‘event’ assaults, such as torture or rape, more likely 
to lead to late sequelae than are sustained and insidious suffering, such as the pain 
born of deep poverty or of racism? Under this latter rubric, are certain forms of 
discrimination demonstrably more noxious than others?  
 
Tyner and Rice (2015) assert that while Galtung’s conceptualisation has been influential, 
it comes with several conceptual challenges. For instance, it focuses on outcomes rather 
than processes (Tyner and Rice, 2015: 2; see also Gupta, 2012: 21). In addition, the 
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theoretical separation of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ violence has also been dissected by Tyner 
and Rice (2015), who argue that this limits our dialectical understanding of violence and 
advocate for a process of abstraction and separation. Meanwhile, Rob Nixon (2011: 2) 
describes ‘slow violence’ as ‘a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence 
of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, and attritional violence 
that is typically not viewed as violence at all.’ He continues to emphasise the importance 
of paying attention, not only to violence as ‘events’ or ‘actions’ that are spectacular and 
sensationally visibly, but also to forms of violence that are ‘neither spectacular nor 
instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing 
out across a range of temporal scales’ (Ibid). 
 
Claire Thomas (2011: 1834-1835) highlights the dangers of utilising euphemisms rather 
than calling an act of violence for what it is, stating that it risks ‘glossing over the damage 
done or the gruesome nature of the act’ (2011: 1834), and risks hiding the fact that the 
act does harm to individuals, making a potentially brutal act sound ‘normal,’ ‘clean,’ or 
simply an unavoidable part of life, and of the foundational relations between states. 
Therefore, we need to construct a proper discourse on violence which emphasises that 
‘the effect of violence is always felt by individuals’ (2011: 1834), whether it is taking place 
between states, at the individual level, or otherwise. As Thomas (2011: 1835) outlines, 
we ought to acknowledge that ‘violence does harm to individuals, whether that be a just 
war, rape, or a car bomb, and if we build a discourse based on euphemisms, it is all too 
easy to forget this.  On the other hand, she also notes, ‘But if we expand the concept to 
also include social injustice, we talk about everything and nothing’ (Thomas, 2011: 1836). 
In this project, it will be argued that violence must be understood as a personal matter, 
because it is always necessarily linked to the harm caused to a person (Thomas, 2011: 
1834). 
 
The relationship between violence and power is also of immediate relevance to this 
research project. Hannah Arendt (1970: 87) famously wrote that:  
every decrease in power is an open invitation to violence – if only because those 
who hold power and feel it slipping from their hands, be they the government or 
be they the governed, have always found it difficult to resist the temptation to 
substitute violence for it.  
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She furthermore suggested (1970: 56) that from a political perspective, it is not sufficient 
to simply think of power and violence as being the same, as they are in fact opposites: 
‘where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent,’ she argues (Ibid). In this sense, 
‘[v]iolence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in 
power’s disappearance.’ For Arendt, the implication of this is that the opposite of violence 
is not nonviolence: ‘to speak of non-violent power is actually redundant. Violence can 
destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it.’ (Ibid)  
Along similar lines, Springer and Le Billon (2016: 1) clarify that ‘certainly violence can be 
said to involve a particular relation of power, but violence is not tantamount to power.’ 
Meanwhile, Judith Butler (2004: 231) has suggested that ‘violence is done in the name of 
preserving western values,’ thus saying that violence performs an ‘ordering function’ 
(Shepherd, 2007: 250), which organises politics and power in a way which preserves an 
image aligned with western values. She adds: ‘Clearly, the west does not author all 
violence, but it does, upon suffering or anticipating injury, marshal violence to preserve 
its borders, real or imaginary’ (Ibid). As Springer and Le Billon (2016: 2) highlight, critical 
theory has introduced a range of levels of analysis of violence, including accounts which 
see the body or corporeal as the key site of analysis (see Fluri, 2011), analyses of 
‘symbolic violence’ (see Bourdieu, 2001), and forms of violence hidden behind cultural 
values (see Tyner et al, 2012).  
In seeking to broaden the concept of violence beyond the traditionalist international 
relations tradition, we must nonetheless also be careful not to end up with a construct of 
violence which can encompass virtually any and every form of human invective (Jenkins, 
1998: 124; see also Thomas, 2011). Therefore, Thomas (2011: 1834) develops a 
composite definition which lays the foundations for my project, which analyses the 
external aspects of the UK border through a lens of violence. She proposes a definition of 
violence in international relations as ‘an intentional act designed to cause harm, which is 
direct and physical or psychological. It is instrumental, a tool in order to achieve a 
particular aim.’ As Thomas highlights, such a definition is helpful to the study of 
international politics, given its relatively narrow scope which facilitates fruitful analyses 
of real-life events without risking to cause confusion or broadening the term too widely. 
Another aspect rendering this particular definition useful is its ability to be applicable to 
any actor, irrespective of whether their actions are considered legitimate or illegitimate, 
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so long as they are understood to cause harm to an individual. This, in turn, allows us to 
analyse ‘each case in its own terms’ (Thomas, 2011: 1835). 
 
In the subsequent chapters, this conceptual foundation of violence allows for an 
exploration of how violence is performed, experienced, and contested in the UK 
borderzone. Whilst making the case for an increased interrogation of violence within 
critical border and migration studies, Brambilla and Jones (2020: 288) highlight certain 
attempts made to advance the understanding of the intersections of borders and violence, 
both within critical border studies, as well as within interdisciplinary work on violence 
and conflict. These efforts include the work of Jones (2012; 2016) on migration and the 
violence of borders, Harsha Walia’s (2013) work on ‘border imperialism,’ the work by 
Henk van Houtum (2010) on what he refers to as ‘the global apartheid of the EU’s external 
border regimes,’ the work by Henk van Houtum and Freerk Boedeltje (2009) on the 
increase of border violence, and Henk van Houtum and Rodrigo Bueno Lacy (2020) on 
the EU’s ‘deadly bordering regime.’ Brambilla and Jones (2020) specifically study the 
intersections of borders, violence, and conflict to foster a better understanding of how 
these converge together.  
 
The following chapters of this thesis serve to contribute to an advanced understanding of 
the role of a form of ‘invisiblised’ and ‘sanitised’ state violence in the context of the 
border-migration nexus. We learn from M. Gabriela Torres (2018) that state violence is 
defined broadly by social scientists, with definitions ranging ‘from direct political 
violence and genocide to the redefinition of state violence as the neoliberal exit of the 
state from the provision of social services and the covert use of new technologies of 
citizen surveillance’ (2018: 381). Within the scholarship, there are different forms of state 
violence represented (including genocide, political violence, and juridical violence), and 
Torres (2018) suggests that there is an emerging trend prompting us to also consider 
structural inequalities and the incorporation of new technologies of violent governance. 
Here, my thesis will be making a contribution through the embodied encounters in the 
UK-France borderzone, as we shall see in chapter 6. 
 
Overall, my thesis makes an important contribution to knowledge by engaging directly 
with the empirical, taking the border as its starting point. This helps us to expand our 
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understanding and theorisation of the complex tensions, dialogues, and interactions 
which take place between the autonomous movements of migrants on the one hand, and 
the state apparatuses of governmentality and sovereign control on the other. Indeed, it 
has been argued that ‘[o]nly from the subjective viewpoint of border crossings and 
struggles can the temporal thickness and heterogeneity of the border be discerned’ 
(Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013: 166). It is precisely from such an engagement and 
viewpoint which my contribution to knowledge emerges. As such, I have chosen ‘border 
struggles’ as my epistemological vantage point, and proceed to asking the following 
overarching question:  
In what ways, and why, has the externalisation of UK border and immigration 
control to France led to the evolution of (violent) bordering tactics beyond 
traditional border control measures of spatial containment and interdiction/non-
entrée, and how are these contested by migrant subjects?  
 
In the interest of preventing any doubt, it should be noted here that the primary focus of 
my study is directed at the United Kingdom’s approach to border and immigration 
control, characterised by its juxtaposed border arrangements with France, with the latter 
acting as an implementing partner. In the following chapter, I outline my methodological 





3. Methodology: Pursuing ethnographic Bricolage with 
‘struggles’ as epistemological vantage point  
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, relevant strands of debates within critical border and migration 
studies were explored, thus setting the scene for the research inquiry of the thesis. In this 
chapter, I discuss the epistemological and ontological positioning of my thesis, before 
addressing my methodological choices, as well as my reflections relating to ethnography-
inspired and multimethod field work across multiple locations in the UK-France 
borderzone, more specifically in Calais, Paris and Brussels; all of which are major 
migratory nodal points for migrants seeking to eventually cross the UK border (Map 1). I 
introduce the various field research methods adopted and how the field work has been 
carried out in practice. Importantly, I also reflect on my criticality and questions of 
representation, subalternity, and reflexivity in the context of conducting field work and 
in the phase of analysing research findings, while writing up the project itself.  
 




In pursuit of the exploration of my overarching research question, I am directing my 
attention to the situation for individuals on the external side of the UK border. As 
discussed in detail in the introductory chapter (section 1.6), I considered that an in-depth 
scholarly study of the UK-France border ought to be a noteworthy and important case 
beyond its own local context. Indeed, this borderzone constitutes a key contemporary 
example of the externalisation of border control between European states, allowing for 
an analysis of the technologies deployed as part of such externalised border enforcement. 
Moreover, the UK-France borderzone is a particularly fruitful location for field work on 
these issues, given the intensity with which many seemingly disparate border policing 
and migration management tactic are implemented, and made to converge, on a daily 
basis here.  
This assessment regarding the utility of selecting the UK-France border as my case study 
– combined with my pre-existing policy knowledge of UK-France migration cooperation, 
as well as my wide pre-existing contacts network among activists, volunteers and 
migrants with first-hand experience of the area – led me to select this as my chosen case 
study. 
In doing so, I wish to contribute to a heightened understanding of ‘border struggles’ and 
the dynamics when sovereign power, or ‘control,’ meets human mobility and migratory 
projects. As Vicki Squire (2011:3) highlights, public understanding of ‘irregular’ 
migration is limited, so while there is increased support for studies looking at numbers 
and impact on states of irregular migration (as well as in origins and routes), there is 
much less understanding of the actual experiences and expectations of the individuals 
themselves. I agree with Squire that ‘migrant strategies, experiences and claims […] are 
critical to our understanding of irregular migration’ (Ibid), and I have therefore sought a 
method which is largely based on these experiences and claims. Thus, the project does 
not engage in research around statistics and similar matters, but rather the political 
struggles (or border struggles) which are both unfolding and constituting the borderzone 
between the UK and France. As such, I seek to provide a ‘bottom-up’ or local perspective 
on one aspect of the global migration regime, selecting the UK borderzone as my ‘site of 
intervention’ where power relations and discourses meet with the lived experiences of 




3.2. Epistemological and ontological positioning  
Taking a constructivist perspective on the border, which, after all, is a relational space, I 
seek to explore the overarching research puzzle and three specific research questions. 
My starting point has thus been the lived realities and struggles on the ground and the 
effects of the bordering tactics, in an approach that borrows certain elements from 
Grounded Theory and privileges the voices and lived experiences of so-called ‘irregular 
migrants’ themselves. This allows me to produce work which sees matters ‘from the view 
of people on the move, from people who live in the borderlands, from people who make 
opportunities, not violence, at the edges of the state’ (Brambilla and Jones, 2020: 299). As 
such, I follow an articulated need ‘to shift the attention to ‘the geopolitical margins of the 
state’’ (Tazzioli 2019a: 9) and analyse how micro practices and administrative measures 
may impact the lives of migrants. In doing so, I am inspired by Cynthia Enloe, who 
suggested the following: 
To study the powerful is not autocratic, it is simply reasonable. Really? ... It 
presumes a priori that margins, silences and bottom rungs are so naturally 
marginal, silent and far from power that exactly how they are kept there could not 
possibly be of interest to the reasoning, reasonable explainer. (1996: 188, 
Emphasis in original)   
Based on this, I found that ethnographic field work would best allow me to privilege the 
lived realities and on-the-ground effects of violence in the UK border zone. Overall, I 
consider ethnography a central research method to conducting research about the world 
from the viewpoint of its social relations, and indeed in particular for a project such as 
this.  As such, I distance myself, through this work, from the classical paradigm of border 
studies and the theme of security. Rather, my work understands the border as a site of 
struggle, following Mezzadra and Neilson (2013: 18), who emphasise their use of the 
border as an epistemological viewpoint, because this allows for ‘an acute critical analysis, 
not only of how relations of domination, dispossession, and exploitation are being 
redefined presently, but also of the struggles that take shape around these changing 
relations.’ Along the same lines, I take the struggles in the UK-France border as my 
epistemological vantage point, and by selecting ethnography as the overarching 
methodological approach, I am able to see the border through the experiences of those 




I seek to draw upon the narrative and voice of people on the move to account for the 
everyday political agency of displaced people, and the ways in which this shapes politics 
of mobility. By doing so, I also challenge the realist and other mainstream narratives of 
the International Relations discipline by highlighting some of the individual and everyday 
acts which are often hidden or deprived of meanings and political implications, rather 
than ‘uncritically adopt a statist perspective conceptuali[zing] irregularity as a ‘problem’ 
related to the ‘illegitimate’ behaviour of migrants’ (Squire, 2011: 6). By focusing attention 
on the struggles of mobility in a borderzone, the project would, along the lines of Squire 
(2011: 5), also contribute to a shift which allows us to think about politics more 
dynamically. This approach showcases the experiences and voices of individuals who 
have somehow become the outcasts of globalisation. As Arundhati Roy writes,  
I think of globalisation like a light which shines brighter and brighter on a few 
people and the rest are in darkness, wiped out. They simply can’t be seen. Once 
you get used to not seeing something, then, slowly, it’s no longer possible to see it. 
(Roy, cited in Nixon, 2011: 1) 
This project seeks to shed light on those who have been ‘wiped out,’ and ultimately claims 
that a different approach to human mobility can, and must, be possible.  
In conducting my field research and analysing its findings, I am faced with the challenge 
of ensuring that I do not assimilate or contribute to the cementation of the fixed modern 
ontologies and claims of social relations which I initially set out to challenge. As discussed 
by Ansems de Vries et al (2017), even post-structuralist critique at times struggles to 
‘fracture modern framings,’ and despite questioning them, it often falls back again on 
more familiar ontological assumptions. This has been the case for me in this project, and 
although I have sought to adopt a critical ontological approach, there are times when I’ve 
fallen back into the familiar, and I see this work as a learning process to explore matters 
of fracturing fixed ontologies, which I will take with me on my continued journey.   
Inspired by a feminist sociological approach, I emphasise the importance of starting one’s 
analysis of power from individuals’ everyday lived experiences rather than by 
commencing with abstract categories (Smith, 1987). Along these lines, I believe that 
mobility must always be understood as embodied and relational, and therefore, following 
Jennifer Hyndman (2012: 243), I would seek to ‘displac[e] attention on borders to the 
crossers of borders themselves; and in a related vein [shift] focus from state-defined 
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subjects (as objects of analysis) to emerging techniques of governance and/or 
government(ality).’ 
3.3. Ethnography and its critics  
The methodological approach of this research project is hence ethnography-inspired field 
work, consisting of a triangulation of qualitative interviews and conversations with 
migrant interlocutors, interviews with key external interviewees, as well as participant 
observation. According to Karen O’Reilly (2005: 3), ethnography is:  
[…] iterative-inductive research (that evolves in design through the study), drawing 
on a family of methods, involving direct and sustained contact with human agents, 
within the context of their daily lives (and cultures), watching what happens, listening 
to what is said, asking questions, and producing a richly written account that respects 
the irreducibility of human experience, that acknowledges the role of theory, as well 
as the researcher’s own role, and that views humans as part objects/part subjects. 
 
By way of background, prior to the 2000s, there was an overall preference for 
quantitative research methods within the wider field of political science (Schatz, 2009: 
1). The theories upon which methods are based upon are grounded in a realist ontology 
where ‘the existence of a reality [is] external to the observer’ (Ibid: 3). From there 
onwards, however, a range of qualitative methods started entering the field of study, 
including ethnography (Ibid: 2), which allow for an exploration of the representations of 
migrants’ view points and self-reported experiences. According to Edward Schatz (2009), 
there are four main ways in which ethnographic work brings value to the study of political 
science. First off, the methodology allows the researcher to put into question 
‘generalizations produced or meanings assigned by other research traditions’ (10). 
Secondly, the micro-level evidence gathered through ethnographic work can enlarge our 
understanding of the ‘political’ (Ibid). Thirdly, the ethnographic methodology allows for 
‘epistemological innovations,’ where the researcher notices ‘constitutive processes that 
capture dynamism. And rather than concentrating on macro-structural factors, she seeks 
to carve out a space for human agency’ (Schatz, 2009: 110). Lastly, the researcher can 
remain grounded in the empirical findings rather than fleeting out into abstractions and 
disputes over theory; it ‘keep[s] the researcher in touch with the people affected by 
power relations’ (Schatz, 2009: 12).  
Bueger and Mireanu (2015: 119) similarly call for closeness to the empirical through 
‘proximity.’ Whilst not dismissing the importance of theoretical work, the authors rather 
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suggest that strong abstractions require empirical research (120). For Bueger and 
Mireanu (2015: 126), proximity brings ‘us closer to the problems and practices, and offer 
strengthened ties to the objects of research.’ It is through such an approach that my 
ethnographic-inspired field work allowed for an exploration of different notions of 
subjectivity, power, violence, and politics, through which alternative understandings 
have been possible.  
It should be acknowledged here that the ethnographic research and writing approach is 
not without its critics. Ethnography has been widely criticised as being structuralist, 
Orientalist, masculinist, and so on, above all due to its links with social and cultural 
anthropology. The latter has been widely critiqued for perpetuating the ‘same/other’ 
binary of the logocentric western tradition, or one that sees words and language as 
fundamental expressions of a given external reality. According to Nasrullah Mambrol 
(2017), anthropology does so by:  
[…] upholding a privileged position whereby the dominant codes of western 
culture, including patriarchy and imperialism, survey, classify, and govern the 
cultures of the east, the third world, of people of colour, women, and those of 
different sexual preferences. 
However, as Wanda Vrasti (2013: 61) argues, I believe that ethnography can equally be 
used as a critical research approach, and can allow the researcher to ‘correct the 
dehumanized (people-less, story-less, and emotionless) face of IR research and write 
user-friendly texts that transcend the boundaries of our profession’ (61). Indeed, it allows 
us to challenge some of the existing, unquestioned methods of ‘understanding’ the world. 
Vrasti further argues, based on insights from Allaine Cerwonka (2007), that when:  
[…] recognizing that this is a man-made translation of social reality with no claims 
to scientific reliability, ethnography can afford to travel back and forth between 
the part and the whole, experience and text, fieldwork and theory, certainty and 
epiphany in ways that other methods cannot and which, in the end, can only add 
to the credibility and authenticity of this genre. (Vrasti, 2013: 61) 
Moreover, anthropology itself, in which ethnography has its roots, seems to have 
undergone efforts to achieve distance from Eurocentric assumptions, which arguably 
informed previous ethnographic writing. Hence, using ethnography can be understood, 
as expressed by Ruth Behar (2003: 16), as being ‘conscious of the contradictions of such 
knowing and the history of shame that precedes and marks all of our efforts.’ Along these 
lines, ethnography is currently being re-written by feminist, postcolonial, and social 
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constructivist scholars, and my project seeks to be part of such efforts to draw on what 
aforementioned scholar Vrasti has referred to as ethnography’s ‘radical promise’ (Vrasti, 
2008: 281). As the same scholar further argues:  
[E]thnography [can be] a critique of the way in which knowledge is commonly 
produced and communicated within social science research. Rather than 
obsessing over questions of research design, ethnography is an exercise in being 
truthful about the distance we travel from research questions to finished 
manuscript, with all its doubts, epiphanies and improvisations. (Vrasti, 2010: 79)  
3.4. Bricolage and ‘embodied encounters’ 
In response to continued calls for critical methods and methodological frameworks, 
Claudia Aradau et al (2015) proposed a ‘performative and experimental approach to 
methods’ (2015: 15). Borrowing a few perspectives from critical security studies, they 
view methods not only as tools to bridge a gap between theory and practice, but rather 
to understand the practice of critical methods as ‘engaging in a more free and 
experimental interplay between theory, methods and practice’ (2015: xi). In accordance 
with this, through this research project, I am able to adopt the idea of method as an 
experiment, allowing me to intervene in complex and thorny situations of displacement, 
legal limbos, and violent state practices. Aradau et al depart from the rigidness of 
traditional separation of theory and method, from which ‘theory is the starting point 
where the epistemological, ontological and normative questions and perspectives are 
established,’ allowing for ‘a more experiential move to and from, of improvisation’ (2015: 
7). The scholars refer to this as a ‘bricolage,’ which ‘focuses on experimenting with 
combining theories, concepts, methods, and data in unfamiliar ways to bring out relations 
that otherwise remain largely invisible’ (Ibid: 8). Through this critique of classical 
methods, it is argued that methods should be understood as ‘active and particular rather 
than passive and universally applicable […] neither are they necessarily fixed to certain 
theoretical positions’ (Ibid: 8). Along similar lines, my methodology was not entirely 
fixed, but rather left room for some adaptation along the way. I did not separate theory, 
methodology, and methods entirely, but instead let them evolve and intertwine 
throughout the research. This allowed me to challenge the conventional, ‘top-down (from 
theory to methodology to method, or from abstract to concrete)’ approach to research 
with a more experimental ‘bricolage’ (2015: 7).  
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As McNevin (2013: 199) emphasises, theory production must be grounded in concrete 
migrant struggles if we are to make theoretical advances on existing gaps between 
analytics and subject formations. Through a grounded empirical inquiry, she argues,  
we may have a chance of glimpsing new iterations of the political. It is through this 
kind of reflexive research that we might, in turn, develop new concepts, registers, 
and maps that can better articulate the modalities of agency at stake in the political 
claims of irregular migrants and their relationship to existing normative orders. 
(2013: 199)  
This resonates with e.g. Scheel (2013b), who advocates for the study of ‘embodied 
encounters,’ which places migrants’ struggles at the centre of analysis. This, he argues, 
enables the researcher to ‘embrace a radical constructivism that highlights the dialogical 
and contested nature of the performances by which these phenomena are brought into 
being in the first place’ (2013b: 286). For Scheel (2013b), an embodied encounters 
approach is crucial not least because of individuals’ ‘varying access to resources, the 
different degrees of racist and sexist discrimination they have to endure, and, finally, the 
particular design and composition of the governmental regimes within and against which 
they struggle.’ This, he argues, requires a ‘situated reading of autonomy, as it implies the 
adoption of ‘politics and epistemologies of location, positioning, and situation’ […]’ 
(Scheel, 2013b: 283). This is precisely the approach that I have taken in this project, 
which has the potential to support the development of a political questioning of the 
current thinking and writing on migration (Ibid).  
3.5. Positionality, reflexivity, and representation 
The field work of this study inevitably required me to engage in reflexivity around 
questions of representation, subalternity, and privilege. I remained deeply conscious of 
the wider relational frameworks within which I was operating (racial, socio-economic, 
historical, post-colonial, etc.). This was not only in the context of conducting field work in 
the borderzone, but also in writing up the project itself. When starting this research 
project, I was fully conscious of my privileged position as an external observer, as a 
European passport holder, protected by my ‘Whiteness’ and my access to the justice 
system, with the means of travelling freely in and out of the borderzone without having 
to experience the most brutal forms of its violence. No matter how connected one feels to 
the cause of those trapped in European borderzones, and irrespective of the empathy that 
one develops for the individuals encountered, one has to acknowledge that one will 
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always remain an outsider, who may never truly be able to understand what others are 
experiencing.  
Moreover, as a researcher in a context such as this borderzone, I am aware that any action 
taken in solidarity as a co-participant shows that the risks are almost negligible compared 
to those facing structural border violence, racial discrimination, and other forms of 
injustice. An important motivator for my PhD study was the strong inclination I felt to 
instrumentalise the aforementioned privileged position and protection I inhabit, in times 
of profound injustice and disturbing forms of violence. I wanted to use all available 
strategies and channels to question and challenge borders and policies that produce 
unimaginable forms of violence, inhumane practices, and further injustices. I 
wholeheartedly wish that my exploration of the dynamics in the British borderzone will 
be received as an acceptable account by those who are trapped within its ceaseless 
violence, by means of the project’s attempted nuance, grounding, and relentlessness. 
Inevitably, I am also faced with reflections associated with the idea of speaking on behalf 
of ‘the other’ as part of the ‘crisis of representation.’ There is an undeniable danger that 
the discussion of matters such as ‘migrant agency’ within a privileged academic context 
risks disempowering, misrepresenting, and stereotyping ‘migrant voices.’ Postcolonial 
insights lend a helpful lens towards addressing this. As Edward Said (1978: 272) reminds 
us,  
The real issue is whether there can be a true representation of anything, or 
whether any and all representations, because they are representations, are 
embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political 
ambience of the representor. If the latter alternative is the correct one (as I 
believe), then we must be prepared to accept the fact that a representation is eo 
ipso implicated, intertwined, embedded, and interwoven with many other things 
besides the ‘truth,’ which is, in itself, a representation.  
I have done my best to allow my interviews with displaced people to lead the narrative 
of the ethnographic study. I do not claim to ‘represent or speak on behalf of’ any of my 
interlocutors. Instead, their accounts have given me unique insights and knowledge. This 
has allowed me to propose a new framework for the harmful technologies of border 
control in the context of Britain’s externalisation to France as part of this thesis, and to 
outline my understanding of migrant subjectivities produced, and the forms of violence 
in the borderzone. My interlocutors have offered a framework for thinking of sovereign 
power, border violence, and human agency. I believe that the act of anchoring my 
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research project primarily in the accounts of displaced individuals’ own experiences, 
based on self-reporting, is an inherently political act aimed at providing a space for 
participation in the debates and discussion. Any co-option performed by my project 
cannot undermine this. Overall, the project invites voices of ‘illegalised migrants’ to enter 
the sphere of academia, thus contributing in an incremental manner towards what (I 
hope) will become the democratisation of academic research in the future.  
That said, there are clearly questions and tensions between individuals’ voices and 
stories, the representation of such voices, and the eventual analysis thereof. As Victoria 
Canning (2017: 5) notes, the ‘portrayal of lives and experiences are, rightly, contentious 
ventures in the social sciences,’ and require us to deal with the questions of power which 
are inherent in academic research. Therefore, it is important that the position of the 
researcher, including my Whiteness, is also considered, and to allow the voices of my 
interviewees to lead the research in order to prevent this project from becoming a 
voyeuristic gaze into their realities, which, according to Canning (2017: 5), has ‘the 
capacity to objectify rather than empower.’ I have been aware from the outset that this is 
an inevitable risk, but considered the urgency of the situation and the lack of academic 
inquiries into the external violent aspects of the UK border with France as more 
necessary than ever to have allies amongst White people, those protected by citizenship 
rights, and other paperwork drawing the line between ‘legal’ and ‘illegalised’ human 
beings. Critical allies are perhaps now more important than ever. As Johnson (2014) 
highlights in her book, Borders, Asylum and Global Non-Citizenship: The Other Side of the 
Fence, it is common that observers of various types choose to discount or ignore the 
words and aims of displaced people and often view them as being overly subjective, 
biased, or manipulative stories for their own gains. Therefore, it is crucial to undertake 
this type of research and to be led by the views and voices of my interlocutors, thus 
addressing the asymmetry between the representatives of sovereign states, decision 
makers, and individuals who seek to navigate their rules.  
I do not wish for this project to become what Canning (2017: 6) refers to as a ‘springboard 
for voyeuristic sympathy,’ or something that would further strengthen the impression of 
irregular migrants as vulnerable, disempowered groups of people who need a ‘White 
saviour.’ I recognise and understand that there is a very fine line between highlighting 
the voices of my research interlocutors and my own academic and theoretical 
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interpretation, but I have achieved this balance to the best of my abilities and with the 
best of intentions. Over the years, I have also ensured in-depth exposure to the 
borderzone, its individuals, and related activist work. I am also keen to avoid what Squire 
(2014: 12) has referred to as the ‘lure of naïve humanism,’ where analyses of human 
agency risks being over or understated, and where migrants’ political acts are 
‘romanticised’ (Squire, 2014: 17) and migrants are depicted either as a type of idealised 
or supreme human on the one hand, or as an objectified powerless human on the other 
(Ibid.).  
Ultimately, what I have sought to do in this project is broaden the audience exposed to 
the voices of those trapped in the UK borderzone, and bring the concerns of activists and 
aid groups into a critique of the UK’s state response to human mobility. As such, this 
project explores and examines the effects of the UK’s outsourcing of border controls to 
France, and the forms of violence, harm, and suffering that this produces. I seek to avoid 
speaking through this project on behalf of the displaced individuals who are faced with 
such state violence, but rather serve as a means for silenced voices to be heard and a 
broader critique of the state to be put forward collectively. As such, in line with 
Alexandria Innes (2015), I am not claiming or hoping to ‘give a voice to the voiceless;’ 
rather, I am emphasising the importance of listening (Innes, 2015: 39-40). Indeed, agency 
and voice are not something you have only when these are given to you by Western 
scholars; rather, these are inherent in every human being.  
Lastly, the type of field research I undertook undeniably involved a level of ‘politicization’ 
of both myself as a researcher and my research work, because:  
In the course of the research, the boundary between participant observation and 
observant participation will inevitably blur. Ultimately, researchers will realize 
that the knowledge they produce and, consequently, they themselves are part of 
the struggles they investigate. (Scheel, 2013b: 286)  
I am hence not neutral to the struggles which unfold in the UK-France borderzone; my 
work might therefore be described as a militant investigation within critical scholarship, 
as I investigate the techniques of power and violence inherent in this border, as well as 
the human practices and struggles that unfold around it, with the view of proposing an 
alternative to the current situation.  
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3.6. Terminology  
The project explores the everyday lives of migrants at the UK’s doorstep, which includes 
a vast array of individuals, most of whom would currently be lacking any form of legal 
status or statutory protection. This includes refused asylum seekers; individuals having 
gone under the radar since entering Europe; ‘Dubliners’ (Picozza, 2017), that is to say 
individuals with an open asylum case in another country; and asylum seekers with an 
ongoing case in France, Germany, or elsewhere. For want of a better term, I refer 
interchangeably to these individuals as ‘individuals,’ ‘migrants,’ ‘displaced people,’ 
‘people on the move,’ or ‘interlocutors.’ I seek to refrain from state-centered 
terminologies as analytical categories (see Scheel, 2011). What my research interlocutors 
all have in common is that they have left their country of origin at some stage and are 
currently seeking sanctuary in Europe, most notably with the hope of reaching the UK 
while doing so. Many of the interlocutors would have been on the move for several 
months (if not years), completing unfathomable journeys to reach Europe and often being 
bounced around between European countries after that. Indeed, many would have 
experienced difficulties due to the Dublin Regulation, a system which means they would 
oftentimes be returned by one EU state to another, if they had given (or been forced to 
give) fingerprints, and thus being entered into the asylum system. While there is nothing 
in international law which requires a person to claim asylum in the ‘first safe country,’ 
the Dublin Regulation stipulates which EU member state is responsible for a claim.  
The mainstream definition of ‘irregular migration’ refers to ‘those who enter a nation-
state without authorization,’ whilst it can also be used to refer to ‘those who breach the 
terms of their residency within a nation-state, such as those who work without 
permission’ (Squire, 2011: 4). Meanwhile, I refuse the term ‘illegality’ when speaking of 
human mobility, as a state-centric concept which criminalises people on the move and 
inscribe on them ‘culpability’ (Ibid.; see also De Genova, 2002). At times, I may instead 
refer to ‘illegalised migrants’ (Tazzioli, 2019a; Kalir, 2019) to stress the process by which 
some individuals are given an illegal status by the state authorities and thereby become 
deportable (Kalir, 2019: 33), ‘undocumented migrants,’ or ‘individuals in legal limbo.’ 
When referring to the UK-France ‘borderzone,’ I refer broadly to what Squire (2011:14) 
defines as ‘physical or virtual sites marked by the intensification of political struggles 
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over the condition of irregularity;’ in this case, stretching from Calais in northern France 
to Brussels and Paris, if not further afield.    
Moreover, in the methodological ‘neutrality,’ migration becomes a ‘problem’ for state 
actors to handle as best they can. I argue that it is not, but rather a natural phenomenon, 
which has been framed as a problem challenging the remits and limits of state sovereignty 
and the nation state as the foundational political unit. Indeed, irregular migration is only 
‘a condition that is produced irregularly through the (re)bordering practices of national, 
international and/or transnational agencies,’ (Squire, 2011: 7) rather than a neutral 
phenomenon. 
The entirety of this project relates to the notion of ‘borders.’ However, it should be noted 
that it is not my aim to reach a definition of what ‘border’ means. Indeed, following Balibar 
(2002: 76), my project problematises the notion of ‘border’ and acknowledges the 
difficulty in defining the concept:  
The idea of a simple definition of what constitutes a border is, by definition, 
absurd: to mark out a border is precisely, to define a territory, to delimit it, and so 
to register the identity of that territory, or confer one upon it. Conversely, 
however, to define or identify in general is nothing other than to trace a border, to 
assign boundaries or borders. […] The theorist who attempts to define what a 
border is in danger of going round in circles, as the very representation of the 
border, is the precondition for any definition.  
 
3.7. Methods  
3.7.1. Overview of methods and locations  
In concrete terms, my PhD adopts a multi-methods approach based on extensive field 
research into, and exposure to, the dynamics of the UK-France border. In order to most 
adequately address the overall research puzzle and specific research questions, I have 
combined informal conversations and participant observations with more structured 
qualitative interviews, as outlined below in greater detail.  
 
In regards to the research locations, given that the thesis explores and analyses the 
struggles produced at the UK’s doorstep in northern France (with a particular focus on 
Calais), most of my interviews, conversations, and participant observation took place 
there. My choice to also conduct interviews in Brussels and Paris derived from my 
understanding that individuals circulate between these locations in their anticipation of 
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reaching the UK or finding sanctuary elsewhere. I wanted, on the one hand, to explore 
whether this was an accurate assumption, and I also anticipated that interlocutors in 
these locations would be able to provide a perspective not only on the situation in Calais 
itself, but also on the experiences which individuals encounter when circulating in the 
wider borderzone. This is part of the exploratory approach of bricolage that I adopted for 
the project. Symbolically, these three locations are also three ‘nodal points’ in the UK 
borderzone, given that these locations are hosting the UK’s juxtaposed border 
arrangements. 
 
While it is not realistic nor desirable to expect an ethnographic research project carried 
out from an interpretivist epistemological position to be guided by positivist measures of 
‘validity,’ ‘objectivity,’ and ‘reliability,’ it is nonetheless important to ensure that one’s 
research is guided by a framework to provide direction and ‘trustworthiness.’ Indeed, a 
project of interpretivist nature could not, and indeed is not designed to, achieve 
observational objectivity or produce a ‘single truth;’ rather, it acknowledges that the 
researcher is part of the production of knowledge in the first place. Nevertheless, an 
interpretivist research project must not assume that its epistemic positioning reduces the 
importance of rigour and using a systematic approach. Therefore, my project takes 
detailed measures to ensure such trustworthiness, in line with the framework proposed 
by Lincoln and Guba (1985: 290):  
How can an inquirer persuade his or her audiences (including self) that the 
findings of an inquiry are worth paying attention to, worth taking account of? 
Whilst positivist inquiries may be guided by the more conventional terms ‘internal 
validity,’ ‘external validity,’ ‘reliability,’ and ‘objectivity,’ my research project has instead 
been guided by notions of ‘credibility,’ ‘transferability,’ and ‘confirmability.’ Indeed, 
Decrop (1999) highlights that natural science-derived notions of ‘corroboration’ and 
‘validation’ need to be reassessed within qualitative research projects, with triangulation 
of sources serving as a useful method. He suggests that qualitative findings are 
strengthened when several sources converge on the given findings, ‘or at least, do not 
oppose them.’ (160) Accordingly, I designed my research project around the three 
aforementioned distinct and complementary types of field data: qualitative interviews 
and conversations with migrants; qualitative interviews with external interviewees; as 
well as participant observations. As such, the project draws its trustworthiness from the 
74 
 
method of ‘triangulation,’ which allows researchers to analyse and compare and discuss 
findings across sources (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 283). In line with what is proposed by 
Lincoln and Guba (1985), I moreover kept field journals, which included not only notes 
from interviews and observations, but also a log of day-to-day activities, as well as a 
personal log containing reflexive and introspective notes ‘about the state of one’s mind in 
relation to what is happening in the field,’ including ‘commentary on the perceived 
influence of one’s own biases,’ as well as a section for additional questions and ideas to 
follow up on. Lincoln and Guba (1985) moreover note that one must safeguard against 
‘going native,’ or in other words, over rapport. Furthermore, safeguards are needed 
against distortions arising from bias, such as ‘wrong first impressions’ or ‘slavish 
adherence to hypotheses formed earlier.’ The best way to safeguard against such is to be 
aware that such biases may arise, and to correct them when they do.   
 
3.7.2. Interviews 
My field research included 50 in-person interviews, group interviews, and conversations 
with ‘migrant interlocutors’. These interviews took place in person in London, Calais, 
Paris, Brussels (see Map 1), and over Skype with undocumented individuals trapped ‘on 
the other side’ of the UK border. As mentioned above, individuals seeking to reach the UK 
typically circulate between these three key locations during their transit; jumping on 
lorries in the Calais port and in parking lots in Belgium; and taking rest in Paris before 
coming back to Calais or Brussels again to try their chance. Therefore, it made sense for 
me to interview individuals across these locations, which also served as confirmation that 
the aforementioned circulation is indeed very common. However, it should be noted that 
it was not my intention to research the conditions in Brussels and Paris; the interviews 
and conversations with individuals based there were always focused on their experiences 
in Calais. Meanwhile, seven of the interviews took place in London with people who had 
previously spent time in displacement in Calais over the past few years. An overview of 
these interviews is provided in Appendix 1.  
Additionally, the research was complemented with 25 interviews with ‘other 
interviewees,’ namely volunteers, academics, activists, and NGO workers carrying 
extensive, immersive experiences of the situation among displaced people in the area; see 
also Appendix 1. These interviews took place in person in London, Calais, Paris, Brussels, 
and via Skype.  
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During my fieldwork, I was accompanied by interpreters who enabled me to conduct 
interviews in Amharic, Arabic, Persian, and Tigrinya. I also conducted additional 
interviews in English and French. This allowed me to include individuals from the main 
country groups present in the area: Afghan, Ethiopian (including Oromo), Eritrean, 
Iranian (including Kurdish), Iraqi (including Kurdish), and Sudanese.  
Given the need for interpreters to accompany me during parts of the research project, it 
was important to think about effective recruitment of interpreters, as well as ensuring 
their appropriate and ethical conduct as part of my research project team. I developed a 
code of conduct, which the interpreters signed prior to deployment and adhered to for 
the duration of the research project. This code of conduct included matters relating to 
risk mitigation and security matters, ensuring confidentiality, code of conduct in the field, 
data handling, and any other matters which the lead researcher required. Interpreters 
also had to familiarise themselves with the exact language and wording used to explain 
the aims and objectives of the study and not deviate from this language at any time. The 
interpreters were also required to abide by instructions from the lead researcher 
(myself) at all times and without exception. Such instructions could relate to the 
discontinuation of an interview due to psychological distress and harm experienced by a 
research subject, or other potential security risks identified by the lead researcher. They 
also had to agree to withdraw from any situation which appeared to escalate into 
aggression and/or topics that appeared to cause high levels of grief and/or anger. They 
were also required to not interfere with, or steer, the lead researcher’s recruitment of 
participants for the qualitative interviews with refugees.  
My knowledge and analysis of the (micro) practices and methods undertaken in northern 
France were also informed by, and benefited from, my longstanding engagement with the 
complex situation in the region as part of my role as Executive Director of Refugee Rights 
Europe, a human rights organisation created as a response to the hopelessness in Calais 
in January 2016. This has provided me with considerable knowledge and understanding 
of the situation at hand, whilst also signifying that I have a particular perspective on the 
matters. I have also drawn on some of the secondary sources published by Refugee Rights 
Europe and other civil society actors to illustrate some of the points made throughout 
this thesis. Undoubtedly, it also means that I have a specific perspective and come with 
my specific assumptions and prior understandings of matters.   
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Based on my brief prior encounters with individuals there, I was conscious of the raft of 
challenges that such field research would come to encompass. All interviews were 
anonymous, in order to protect the respondents’ anonymity and for confidentiality and 
safety purposes. All respondents gave informed oral consent (see Appendix 2) for their 
inclusion in the research, and were given the choice of whether a laptop would be used 
to take verbatum interview notes or not. Audio was not recorded for any of the 
interviews, in the interest of avoiding gathering biometric data of the respondents, who 
are in a very precarious situation. Firstly, I was aware that it would be a challenge to gain 
the trust of individuals in this level of precarity. I also knew that there was a certain 
degree of ‘interview fatigue’ and overall scepticism regarding the prospects for positive 
change, meaning that individuals might see very little point in taking part in my 
interviews. Moreover, I suspected from the outset that it would be very difficult to hold 
any lengthier types of interviews with people in such a desperate and fragmented 
situation, and that I would certainly not be able to bring a voice recorder. Therefore, I had 
to adapt my methods accordingly if I were to undertake this type of academic research. 
First of all, I would need to go beyond basic premises of ‘doing no harm’ (see Davies et al, 
2017), given the extremely precarious situation my interlocutors were in. Furthermore, 
I would need to adopt a flexible interview structure which I was able to memorise, and I 
would need to be adaptable in terms of note-taking, memorising, and other methods of 
recording answers. The interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions, 
and lasted between 20 minutes and an hour. Some interviews turned into group 
interviews, and it was not always entirely easy to discern ‘who said what’ within a group 
of interlocutors. Other interviews ended abruptly due to e.g. the arrival of police officers, 
the start of a food distribution, or other factors. Some interviews yet again turned into 
conversations instead. The interview and conversation notes were ‘triangulated’ with my 
field observation notes, as well as with my interviews with interviewees from civil society 
and activist groups (see below).  
At times, my interlocutors were more interested in discussing slightly different matters 
than the ones I had planned to explore through my research questions. In those cases, it 
was important to let my interlocutors primarily guide the discussion and ensure that the 
themes and issues that mattered most to them could take centre stage. I was flexible 
enough to make the research possible, without losing sight over the overarching research 
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questions and the importance of following a systematic approach in this type of academic 
research.  
Amongst such topics were conversations around the kinds of lives people had been in 
before (‘we used to have roof top parties on the weekend’ or ‘I was a successful interior 
designer’), their ethics and values (‘I am a good person, I never steal, and I don’t smoke’), 
and sometimes, their preoccupation with everyday hurdles rather than wanting to reflect 
on and discuss the systematic violence my research focused on (‘they started asking us 
for a ticket on the train; this makes it difficult to go to Paris, that’s the big problem here’).  
The semi-structured interview schedule which I adopted included the following 
questions:  
• Where are you from? When did you leave your country? 
• How long have you been here [in Calais]? Where were you just before this? Can 
you tell me about your journey here?  
• Are you happy to be in France? Have you applied for asylum here in France? 
When/why not?  
• Where are you staying at the moment? How is it there?  
• Are the French police officers helpful to refugees? How were they in Italy (and/or 
other countries)?  [Ask further follow up questions as required]  
• Can you tell me about the support you’ve received from the French state? Who has 
been most helpful to you here in France / during your journey?  
• How does the treatment by police and other authorities make you feel? How do 
you and your friends usually react when you see/meet police and other 
authorities here?  
• Do you feel safe here in France? Have you experienced any violence here in 
France? If yes, can you tell me a little more about this experience? Can you explain 
why you think this happened? [If no experiences of violence: Have you witnessed 
anyone else experience violence here? Etc]  
• Do you know why the European authorities wanted to take your fingerprints when 
you arrived in Europe [in Italy /Greece /Spain]? What do you think about that?  
• Where are you hoping to go from here, and why? What will be the next step of your 
journey? (How are you planning to reach your final destination?)  
• Do you know why the border to Britain is so difficult to cross? What do you think 
about that?  
• What things have you done to try to improve your own situation? Have you looked 
for help or advice from anyone? 
Furthermore, believing that activists and aid groups (whether voluntary or salaried) 
operating in the area would also have important contributions to make, I complemented 
the interviews with displaced people with qualitative interviews with such interviewees. 
I believed they would be well-placed to outline different manifestations of power in the 
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borderzone, where they operate on a daily basis, in close proximity to the displaced 
populations. Such qualitative interviews would also be somewhat easier to conduct, given 
their more secure, protected status and existence, compared to that of undocumented 
individuals. Initially, I had planned to carry out structured focus groups with volunteers 
and aid organisation representatives present in the area to be recruited through a 
structured outreach drive. I wanted to favour this method as focus groups allow for an 
organic exploration of issues for common understandings and points of disagreements 
within groups of actors.  
Thus, I drafted a focus group schedule which contained the following focus group 
questions relating to the first research question:  
• What are the main challenges facing refugees and migrants here?  
• Are there any challenges that are more applicable to certain demographic groups?  
• How do these challenges affect your work with aiding refugees in the area?  
• Have you attempted to speak to the authorities about these difficulties, and if so, 
was there an outcome?  
• What are your main concerns for the refugees and migrants here?  
• What effects do you think these aforementioned issues have on refugees and 
migrants in the area?  
• How do the authorities (e.g. police officers) usually interact with refugees and 
migrants in the area?  
• Do you think there is a differentiated approach vis-a-vis children and women? 
• What do you think the authorities are trying to achieve with their approach?  
• Do you think their approach is working towards achieving those aims?  
However, as I started to approach volunteers and aid groups, it became increasingly clear 
that it would be difficult to carry out these in an organised, planned and collective 
manner. I therefore adopted a ‘snowball method’ and conducted the interviews on an 
individual basis, rather than as a focus group. While some of the benefits and added value 
of focus groups were lost, most of the interviews went in-depth on the research questions 
and therefore resulted in rich research material.  
Through the project, I seek to understand not only how displaced individuals are exposed 
and subjected to violence through the sovereign states’ border control practices, but also 
whether and how their own actions, agency, and responses are co-constitutive of the 
same bordering tactics. This allows me to illustrate how displaced people negotiate the 
forces, structures, and practices that seek to control their mobility, building on the idea 
that individuals at Europe’s borders have their own voices, acting on resistance and 
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agency, but often go unheard amidst reports on their precarity, lack of human rights, and 
being subjected to violence and hardship. I aimed to explore the potential myriad of ways 
in which individuals, despite their challenges, engage in conscious and subconscious acts 
of subversion and resistance to control. In acts of defiance and agency, the latter is 
explored as meaningful and transformative in the everyday context. This research 
question is explored in the same set of interviews as the aforementioned research 
question, so I therefore added several questions to the interview structure.  
In relation to the second research question, I constructed the following questions for 
activists and aid groups:  
• How do refugees and migrants typically react to the authorities’ approach? 
• What impact does this approach appear to have on refugees in the area?  
• Do you think there is a difference in reactions between different demographic 
groups?  
• Have you ever spoken to refugees and migrants about their views on the French 
authorities? If so, what did you gather from that conversation?  
• Can you think of any examples where refugees and migrants have resisted state 
authorities?  
• Can you think of any examples where refugees and migrants have broken the 
law?  
• Do you have any concerns about the impact of refugees and migrants on the 
local community or the safety of volunteers or local people? 
 
3.7.3. Participant observation  
The aim of participant observation is two-fold, according to O’Reilly (2005: 96). Firstly, it 
allows the researcher to familiarise themselves with matters from the vantagepoint of 
those being researched. Secondly, over time, the participation of the researcher tends to 
make the people being researched to become more used to the presence of the 
researcher. James P. Spradley (1980: 58) outlines different levels of participation which 
are selected depending on the particular research questions and the context within which 
one operates: passive, moderate, active, or complete. The approach I took during my field 
work was a moderate approach to participant observation, whereby I struck a balance 
between observing and participating. At times, I was able to record in writing my 
observations, what I saw and heard in the various contexts. Other times, it was important 
not to take notes as an official researcher, but rather interact informally with the 
individuals in the borderzone. Such informal interactions included things such as 
spending time in the encampments and areas where individuals were staying, conversing 
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with people informally over a cup of tea in a café, joining individuals as they were going 
into shops to buy essentials, and so on. This moderate approach was very useful to my 
research, in that it gave me deeper insights and understandings which I wouldn’t have 
obtained through interviews only, or from an even further distance, whilst it also allowed 
me to remain relatively emotionally distant and able to engage in analytical reflectivity 
(O’Reilly, 2005: 54-55). At the same time, this kind of presence allowed me to interact 
informally with individuals and make them feel more comfortable with my presence, 
which subsequently aided me with the recruitment of participants for the informal and 
formal interviews.  
My field observations throughout the research period mainly took place in the following 
specific areas of each research location:  
• Calais: Rue de Moscou; Place de Norvège; Rue des Garennes, Rue des Huttes and 
the surrounding area; the site of the former ‘Jungle’ camp; the area around the 
Calais hospital; as well as an industrial area located east of the town centre.  
• Paris: Avenue de la Porte des Poissonniers; the area around Porte de la Chapelle; 
the area around Canal St Denis; Stalingrad; Jaurès.   
• Brussels: Parc Maximilien; Gare du Nord; and the nearby Canal side area.   
 
3.7.4. Ethics 
A wide range of ethical issues arise when conducting ethnographic studies within violent 
and complex situations at borders. When the main interlocutors are illegalised 
individuals without any form of legal status or protection, the ethical considerations are 
even more pertinent. In this section, I outline the key ethical considerations and steps 
which I took prior to, during, and after my field resarch.  
First, it was crucially important to ensure full and informed consent of everyone involved, 
and to also guarantee full anonymity. This was particularly important when interviewing 
displaced individuals in a state of limbo, and also when engaging volunteers and aid 
workers who could face repercussions in their work (should their views and opinions 
become publicly known). This led me, along with data protection experts and the Ethics 
Committee at the University of Westminster, to opt not to collect biometric data of 
individuals in the form of voice recordings and/or photos showing faces or eyes.  
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Secondly, I found that there were a number of ethical considerations linked to the idea of 
building trust with the interlocutors in an ethical way without raising expectations that I 
would be able to help with their individual cases. When trust is established, it is likely 
that researchers may hear or see things of deeply sensitive and confidential nature, and 
they typically become a ‘sounding board’ for some of the respondents who have very few 
alternative outlets for their grievances. John van Maanen (1988) describes ethnographers 
as ‘part spy, part voyeur, part fan, part member,’ and this inevitably raises several 
questions regarding ethics and integrity of the researcher. On multiple occasions, it was 
difficult to leave people behind after the interviews. Overall, it is a heart wrenching 
activity to ‘come and go’ and to leave people behind in their desperate predicament. This 
is illustrated by numerous notes from my field journal, such as the following illustrative 
example: ‘At the end of the interview, the respondent got really angry when I was about 
to leave, and said that people always just come and go.’ 
Thirdly, there is the related question of ‘giving back’ to the research site, which might 
prove difficult due to the transient and ever-changing nature of the locations under study. 
Undeniably, unconstructive feelings of recurring guilt plagued me throughout the 
research project. I have had to remind myself of the possible impact which could be 
generated through a strengthened body of evidence and analysis relating to the policies 
that lie at the root of the situation in the UK borderzone.   
Due to the multiple ethical issues which were identified ahead of the research study, I 
developed a risk register, participant information sheets, interview structures, and other 
tools. All of these items were cleared by the Ethics Committee at the University of 
Westminster.  
3.7.5. Use of illustrations  
Being acutely aware of the knowledge production inherent in the depiction of spaces and 
subjects through the act of drawing of a map, I chose to depict my research locations 
through very minimalistic charts. What one chooses to include or exclude from any given 
map can have significant ramifications upon knowledge production, representation and 
our interpretations of a particular phenomenon, event, or space. In particular, it should 
be noted that the map I had created of the former Calais ‘Jungle’ camp had a solitary aim 
of depicting the demolitions of space, rather than providing insights into the 
infrastructures and community phenomena which grew out of the camp, living spaces, 
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communal spaces, and manifestations of political subjectivities and human agency. There 
are a number of excellent projects dedicated solely to this. For instance, Sarah Shearman 
(2016), Project Fuel (2019), and Architecture for Refugees (2016), are notable projects 
that have undertaken in-depth cartographic and ethnographic work relating to the space 
of the former Calais ‘Jungle’ camp.   
A number of photos have been included throughout the thesis. Once again, I am acutely 
conscious of the production of meanings that comes with depicting spaces and 
phenomena through photography. It is not within the scope of this thesis to delve into 
this in any deep manner, but it should be noted that the photos I have carefully selected 
amongst an extremely vast bank of images available to my research project have been 
chosen at the end of the project to illustrate certain aspects contained within the analysis 
of my research findings. As such, the photos themselves have not informed the analysis, 
but rather the other way around; they were selected afterwards to further strengthen the 
illustration of some of the matters brought to light in the thesis.  
The photos were taken by a variety of actors, including individuals with real-life 
experience of displacement, people working with organisations to support migrants in 
the area, professional photographers, and myself. Hence, the photos are not, in any way, 
claiming to all-inclusively represent how migrants trapped in the borderzone are 
experiencing their situations. Others have carried out excellent projects aimed at 
precisely addressing these matters; see for instance Mohseni et al (2017) for an overview 
of a student-led research project hosted by the Migration Research Group at King’s 
College London in July 2016 in the former Calais ‘Jungle’ camp. The researchers provided 
residents of the camp with disposable cameras to record their daily lives in the camp from 
their own perspectives, which resulted in a research report, article, and public exhibition. 
See also Lequette and Le Vergos (2016) for an extensive photographic account of the 
Calais area accompanied by text narratives and a music disc.   
3.7.6. Limitations  
Matters of state violence and agency are, of course, highly complex concepts, and there 
are inevitable limits to what could be included within the scope of this research project. 
Firstly, while it is important to situate this thesis in relation to gendered violence due to 
the deeply deplorable and unacceptable fact that sexual and gender-based violence is part 
of the migratory experience for many women and girls, as well as for some men and boys, 
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this has not been the main focus of the research. In interviews, women were not asked 
specifically to narrate their experience of sexual and gender-based violence, primarily 
due to the fact that I do not have the ability to provide any form of meaningful follow-up 
support they may need following potential re-traumatisation, which such disclosures 
could provoke. Moreover, it is very likely that they would not want to divulge to me such 
highly sensitive and painful information. However, this is not to deny the extent to which 
women have been (and continue to be) targets of multiple forms of discrimination and 
violence throughout their time in displacement, and often in new host countries due to a 
lack of adequate protections and safeguards afforded to them.  
On a similar note, it is not possible for this project to encompass any extensive reflections 
on the potential changes that will result from the UK’s Brexit referendum and ultimate 
decision to leave the European Union as the final arrangements are yet to be confirmed 
at the time of writing. Inevitably, more changes will follow than what has been captured 
in this project, and this will undoubtedly have ramifications on the nature and extent of 
the violence produced throughout the UK border. It will be interesting to follow up with 
further research inquiries to explore the impact of the exit of the UK from the European 
Union and the realities of individuals in the borderzone, and of the politics of exhaustion.   
 
Importantly, I wish to elaborate here on why I chose not to include interviews with 
individuals representing governmental organisations and state bodies, including police 
officers operating on the ground in the borderzone as well as decision-makers serving 
the UK Government. First of all, within the scope of the PhD thesis, certain choices had to 
be made to ensure its feasibility. After careful consideration of how to best answer the 
research questions of this particular thesis (namely how the bordering tactics at the UK-
France border have moved beyond traditional control measures of spatial containment 
and into the sphere of everyday lives of migrants, and how these are contested by migrant 
subjects), I deemed it to be most important to ensure a very solid and credible 
engagement with migrants in the borderzone themselves. This is also an appropriate 
approach to take, in the vein of the autonomy of migration, and critical border and 
migration studies more broadly. Thus, I made a conscious methodological choice to 
privilege the voices of an often silenced/unheard and ‘illegalised’ group of people, by 
focusing my field work on gathering their perspectives and experiences in relation to the 
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impact of bordering tactics, and in relation to how they seek to contest the restriction of 
their mobility.  
 
Secondly, I deemed it to be outside the scope of this project to meaningfully engage with 
an additional group of interviewees, not least from an access-related perspective. I based 
this decision first of all on the fact that, over the years, I have been submitting countless 
‘Freedom of Information’ requests relating to the UK Government’s involvement in the 
policing and securitisation operations, funding and policies relating to northern France; 
nearly all of which have been rejected upon the basis of allegedly safeguarding ‘national 
security’ interests. This has led me to deem it somewhat unrealistic to be able to obtain 
fruitful exchanges with government officials regarding the underlying reasons for the 
UK’s bordering strategy and methods relating to its border with France. Indeed, I expect 
it to be implausible to obtain insights which go beyond what can be readily found in 
officially published government documents and similar sources.  
 
As regards French CRS and border police officers implementing the politics of exhaustion 
in northern France, I have indeed sought interactions and small conversations with them 
during my field research and participant observation, and I have been exposed first-hand 
to their tactics of intimidation and harassment not only of migrants but of aid groups and 
external observers like myself. I have found that there appears to be a strict reluctance, if 
not outright prohibition, on police officers releasing any meaningful information relating 
to their lines of command, instructions and accountability mechanisms. As part of a future 
research study, I would like to seek official permission to interview willing CRS and 
border police officers in order to explore these underlying aspects of the politics of 
exhaustion further (see also the concluding chapter for further reflections on future 
research agendas). This, in itself, would be a significant undertaking which I believe 
would require creative and persistent efforts to find the right ‘connections’ in order to 
secure such permission; requiring a longer time frame and more singular focus on the 
police than I could afford to dedicate during my field research period of the PhD.  
 
The methodological choices made within this PhD ought not to be misinterpreted as a 
disregard for the complexities facing police officers and policy making officials within the 
context of the border politics, nor is it my intention to ignore the perspectives of actors 
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serving the state authorities who are most certainly grappling with a challenging and 
deeply complex policy making environment and engrained policy lines relating to the 
UK’s seldom questioned juxtaposed border arrangements. That said, I am confident that 
my decision to conduct an in-depth ethnographic study amongst migrants themselves – 
a truly ‘embodied encounter’ – enabled me to produce an important piece of research 
which helps to move critical border and migration studies, and specifically the autonomy 
of migration scholarship, forward. This is where my key contribution lies. I have 
produced the largest anglophone academic field research study and counter-mapping of 
the UK-France borderzone to-date, where I found ways, against many ‘odds’ and 
transcending many hurdles, to speak to a total of 75 individuals who carry immersive 
experience of the borderzone. My underlying policy expertise relating to the juxtaposed 
border control arrangements between the UK and France, and UK-France cooperation on 
migration more broadly, has moreover enabled me to situate my field research study 
solidly into its broader policy context.  
 
There are a number of additional limitations, which arise specifically from the selected 
methodology. For instance, research participants/subjects may have an interest in giving 
certain answers over others, and that they may choose to withhold certain information 
due to the vulnerability of their situation. They may also alter their behaviour during field 
observations due to the presence of the research team if they wish to come across in a 
certain way; a phenomenon typically referred to as the Hawthorne Effect. Moreover, one 
must be cautious of the risk of the so-called ‘individualistic fallacy,’ bearing in mind the 
potential ‘logical error to draw conclusions about groups based on data gathered with the 




4. The politics of exhaustion in the UK-France borderzone: 
A (bio)political technology in the government of 
migration  
  
4.1. Introduction  
As outlined in the introductory chapter, the relatively widespread, if intermittent, 
political and media attention directed at the migratory situation at the UK-France border 
has been slower to take root within academia, albeit with some important exceptions 
discussed in a previous chapter. As mentioned, some academic literature based on 
ethnographic field research in northern France did of course pre-exist this thesis, being 
largely anchored in Francophone academia with academics such as Michel Agier, Philippe 
Wannesson, and Sophie Djigo. There have been important contributions also from critical 
border and migration scholars who have directed their gaze at Calais, alongside other 
research locations (Tazzioli, 2017; 2019a), including work looking through the lens of the 
autonomy of migration in the context of Calais (Rygiel, 2011). Others have highlighted 
human agency and resistance, such as Natasha King (2016; 2019) in her exploration of 
solidarity and No Borders movements in the area, or Elisa Sandri (2018) exploring the 
‘voluntarism’ which emerged out of the so-called Calais ‘Jungle’ camp in 2015-2016.  
Furthermore, Ibrahim and Howarth’s (2018) work is dedicated to analysing Calais and 
its border politics through multiple theoretical lenses. (See chapter 1 for a more extensive 
overview of academic literature relating to Calais and the borderzone).  In any event, little 
academic attention has been accorded to the specific nature of the political technologies 
(Foucault, 1977) and ‘tactics of bordering,’ (De Genova, 2017b) as well as the border 
struggles inherent in the externalisation of the British border, and the human impact 
thereof. This, precisely, is the focus of this chapter, in which I address the first research 
question regarding the nature of the bordering tactics performed at the UK-France 
border, how violence is produced within these tactics, and how well sovereign 
conceptions of power enable us to interrogate and understand the nature of the struggles 
here.   
In this chapter, I draw heavily on the analysis of the 75 field interviews and participant 
observations, as I focus on strategies of deterrence and exclusion. I diagnose the research 
findings from a perspective of violence and control, and outline technologies and tactics 
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aimed at ‘intent management,’ (Weber and Pickering, 2014) or what Nikolas Rose (2000: 
324) refers to as ‘technologies for the conduct of conduct.’ By tracing lines between 
harmful practices and the slow exhaustion of human lives, the chapter constructs the 
concept ‘politics of exhaustion’, consisting of seven broad categories of practices and 
methods that co-constitute and produce the control tactics in the borderzone: (1) 
recurrent and ritualised direct violence; (2) humiliation, dehumanisation, and 
racialisation; (3) withdrawal of care and the manufacturing of vulnerability; (4) 
dispossession; (5) shrinking and defoliation of living spaces; (6) forced (im)mobility; and 






Table 1 | Politics of exhaustion: A differentiation  
 
The administration of beatings, rubber bullets, tear gas exposure 
(including its indiscriminate use), and regular pepper spraying, to 
the extent that these practices could be considered ritualised 
violence. Moreover, recurrent direct violence includes traumatising 
events, such as the intentional and unnecessary destruction of 
mobile phones.  
Recurring verbal abuse, often including racial slurs, shouting, 
heckling, and otherwise abusive or degrading language. 
Dehumanisation is also experienced through acts such as shoe 
confiscation, shoving, and commanding of obedience during 
nonsensical evictions through manifestations of power. Additional 
dehumanising rituals include ruthless slashing of tents and 
confiscation of belongings in front of their dispossessed owners.
The withdrawal or denial of state care, coupled with the hampering 
of third sector alternatives, contribute directly to the production of 
preventable vulnerabilities among the displaced people in the area. 
Impunity for interpersonal violence, the free roaming of traffickers 
and smugglers, and an overall sense of ‘lawlessness,’ puts everyone 
at heightened risk; notably, minors and women.   
Regular destruction and confiscation of tents, sleeping bags, and 
blankets, as well as other basic necessities such as drinking water, 
mobile phones, and personal paperwork, risk taking their tolls on 
one’s mental (as well as physical) health and their ability to resort to 
internal coping mechanisms. Charitable supplies are depleted and 
require constant renewal, which also has an exhausting effect on 
volunteers and aid workers.  
The continual shrinking of people’s access to space is carried out 
through erecting fences, razor wire, and spikes, specifically targeting 
people’s resting spots and communal spaces. This form of ‘hostile 
architecture’ also includes the tactic of defoliation, where trees and 
other greenery is cut down to lay bare settlements, thus removing 
any pretence at privacy and community. 
On one hand, individuals are confined or detained when attempting 
to move forward, as authorities ensure their continued immobility, 
while on the other hand, forced mobility through dispersals, 
removals, and deportation is also used to exhaust people by 
convoluting their journeys and delaying recourse to an effective 
solution to their predicament. 
Sheer uncertainty and undercurrents of threat permeate people’s 
daily existence. Even in the absence of physical violence, individuals 
are waiting anxiously for violence to recur, leading to constant hiding 
and caution. The risk of death, and the lack of accountability in cases 




I shall then argue that this heterogenous array of technologies, which hold together under 
the term ‘politics of exhaustion’, would seem to have the potential of producing 
meaninglessness, emptiness of existence, loss of hope, and debilitation; thus constituting 
a plausible strategy aimed to deter, exclude, and control individuals at the UK’s doorstep. 
This new concepti sheds light on the gravity of the violence and harm produced through 
the external aspects of the UK border, and therefore arguably merits similarly high levels 
of scrutiny as the internal manifestations of this border, commonly referred to as the 
‘hostile environment.’ As such, the chapter contributes to an emerging body of academic 
literature, which explores ‘new forms of border governance are emerging that seek to 
shape individual decision-making to promote ‘voluntary’ compliance with migration 
management goals’ (Weber and Pickering, 2014: 17). This challenges the binary reading 
of biopolitics and helps us to better understand forms of biopolitical government 
techniques, which do not directly foster life nor directly kill, but rather insidiously grind 
down the autonomy, agency, and resilience of migrants in the borderzone. Moreover, the 
chapter lays the foundations for the analysis in chapter 6, where a deepened 
understanding of violence is sought and elaborated. Let us now delve into the chapter.  
4.2. Tracing techniques of government  
The following sub-sections outline technologies of biopolitical control through which 
migrants’ lives and movements are governed, and at first sight, appear to be disparate 
and isolated practices. However, when taken as a whole, under the concept politics of 
exhaustion, these techniques illustrate that the juxtaposed border arrangements 
between the UK and France have not only led to the localisation of UK border controls to 
an extraterritorial space, but also led to the development of corporeal and temporal 
technologies of bordering devised to gain a hold over mobility and life itself.   
4.2.1. Recurrent and ritualised direct violence  
Individuals in the borderzone experience beatings, tear gas exposure, and pepper 
spraying on a regular basis, to the extent that it could constitute ritualised violence. The 
sight of broken limbs, as well as scarred faces and hands, were commonplace during my 
field work. In other cases, broken teeth, smashed glasses, and runny eyes from tear gas 
were witnessed. Overtly violent forms of physical police brutality in the Calais area are 
relatively well-documented and known (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Refugee Rights 
Europe, 2016, 2017, 2018b; Human Rights Observers, 2020), and emerged consistently 
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throughout my interviews. Most migrant interlocutors and other interviewees spoke to 
me at length about various types of direct violence which they had experienced or 
witnessed, throughout the time of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp and in the years to follow. 
Indeed, nearly all of the interlocutors were able to share accounts of violence and abuse 
at the hands of state officials, such as national police, the general reserve (known as 
Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité, CRS), and the national gendarmerie, sometimes 
operating ‘undercover’ in civilian clothing in the area. While significant parts of this 
violence take place during episodes of trespassing and attempts at unauthorised border 
crossings, there are countless accounts of violence which take place in unrelated contexts 
in the area. A therapist working in Calais to support migrants’ resilience described the 
treatment by the CRS as ‘grotesque’ (Interviewee nr. 62b) and explained: 
People come here with so many layers of trauma, which are then compounded by 
the grotesque treatment by the CRS – indiscriminate violations of their basic 
human rights. People are shocked; some say it’s worse here than in Libya, because 
they had an expectation they’d be treated better here. (Ibid) 
The use of tear gas, pepper spray, or other agents has been a common feature throughout 
the years. One of the women I interviewed explained:  
Sometimes police would stand and talk to us normally, and suddenly take out the 
spray. Sometimes they would beat people randomly, it could be a boy or a girl. 
(Interlocutor nr. 51b) 
Another interlocutor interviewed in Calais also explained that the use of tear gas and 
pepper spray is sometimes randomised and ritualised, often used in contexts where it 
does not appear warranted: ‘If you are in a lorry, they can spray. But we don’t know why 
they are spraying here [by the food distribution].’ He added with emphasis: ‘We don’t 
want to stay here in France.’ During the time of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp, one long-term 
volunteer recounted the seemingly indiscriminate use of tear gas: 
I’ve seen people being tear gassed – during the south eviction, for example – and 
they were holding the tear gas cans - - they’re not supposed to shoot them straight 
at people, but I’ve seen them doing that. When they were trying to get people down 
from the roofs, they were five meters away and launching the tear gas cannister 
right at them. There was one time they held it at me as well. […] I’ve also seen them 
shooting tear gas grenades onto the top of plastic shelters, they were so hot they 
would melt through and would start directly. (Interviewee nr. 65)  
A former camp resident ironically recounted the authorities’ use of tear gas during the 




Tear gas…it was a lovely smell. We became so addicted. Every single night, we had 
to smell that. We didn’t know why. They don’t need to find an excuse to use tear 
gas, but they used the fights between people in the camp as their excuse. They also 
used rubber bullets. So many people got hurt by the rubber bullets. They had to go 
to the First Aid caravan, and the guy there was struggling with that kind of damage 
for a long time. (Interlocutor nr. 5)  
 
Respondents reflected on the various forms of violence experienced in the area. For 
instance, a Sudanese man in his late forties, whom I interviewed in December 2018, 
commented on the police behaviours:  
They enjoy doing that [being violent] to the migrants, especially when nobody is 
watching; no NGOs, no French people. They must be supported by high levels and 
know they are not going to be punished. When you have free power, you can do 
stupid things. I didn’t hear about any police being punished or prosecuted for 
anything or given a bad treatment. There is really bad treatment for migrants in 
Calais. People are afraid of speaking about it; they are not in a power position to 
speak against the police. (Interlocutor nr. 47) 
Meanwhile, a young woman from East Africa recounted an incident which had stuck with 
her and, in fact, made her vomit from anxiety at the time: 
They were beating someone really badly and it was a woman, so then she […] said 
‘I’m a woman, I’m a woman!’ They stopped beating her when they knew it’s a 
woman. French police are good with women, unless [they] think you’re a man. 
[When] it’s dark and we are all wearing the same things, they don’t know. 
(Interlocutor nr. 51b)  
Meanwhile, a Sudanese man in his late forties, whom I interviewed in December 2018, 
suggested:  
Police. Let me tell you the truth, [they are] very rude, and I am saying this with 
evidence. A young man, underage, they beat him badly and I took him to the 
hospital. That guy was very scared [of going] to hospital because he thought the 
police would come and take him. […] This is one of many circumstances. A lady 
said she was beaten very bad inside a [police van], after she tried to smuggle 
herself. They closed the door and started beating her very badly. (Interlocutor nr. 
47) 
A Sudanese interlocutor explained:  
We escaped from our country because of bad treatment, and suddenly, we find 
ourselves facing that again; and this has made us doubt whether we’re still in 
Africa or we’re in Europe, and what the difference is. Over there the police will 
treat you like that, because of corruption, and they are poor, but here in a civilized 
country, what do you have to offer… (Interlocutor nr. 5) 
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The deployment of police dogs was also brought up by several interlocutors. Allegedly, 
the dogs would sometimes be released on migrants without muzzles. One Afghan man 
had been bitten near his crotch, and an Egyptian minor who had been in the area for more 
than a year (at the time of the interview), showed me where he had been bitten on his 
thigh. The police had also beaten his knee during the same episode; the knee was bloody 
at the time of the interview. Moreover, the recurrent direct violence includes deeply 
upsetting, and potentially traumatising, events such as the brutal smashing of mobile 
phones. A mental health professional working in the area suggested: 
Smashing of phones severs people’s connections and disorientates – it’s a 
deliberate attack on people’s resources and sense of security – it’s a tool of war. 
We’re told things like, ‘I can’t speak to my mother anymore’… (Interviewee nr. 
62a)    
A recurring trend during my interviews was an expression of disbelief and shock 
regarding the police treatment in France. A Sudanese man in his late thirties, for instance, 
explained sarcastically:  
The first three days I wasn’t sure I am in France. The second day in Calais, I went 
with the guys to try [to reach the UK] and let’s just say the police wasn’t so friendly. 
They gave me a warm welcome by beating my back which made me unable to walk 
for a week. That is how they welcomed us. (Interlocutor nr. 5) 
 
During a group conversation with Iranians in December 2018, I was told that they had no 
idea why the police was being so violent towards them. An Eritrean teenager said that in 
Italy, he ‘knew what to expect,’ but in France, he was not expecting this level of violence. 
(Interlocutor nr. 18) Several interviewees suggested to me that it seems like the police 
violence is worse when no volunteers or aid groups are around. For instance, a long-term 
volunteer from the time of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp suggested:  
I don’t think volunteers see the worst of it. The worst incidents would happen 
when there was nobody else there, so when someone was trying to walk to the 
Eurotunnel for example, there is a huge stretch there where they are alone, no one 
around. There was a guy who had been beaten incredibly badly when there was 
no one around, it just changes a lot. Outside the main town centre, there’s lots of 
open space, lots of space and not many people around, so I guess that’s where the 
worst violence takes place. (Interviewee nr. 65)   
 
Another British volunteer similarly suggested: 
My hunch is that… the presence of [Europeans] is likely to moderate police 
behaviour and I have sensed this on occasion in Calais. […] I would go down and 
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see the guys under the bridges. The CRS frequently passed by, but didn’t approach 
us. They probably don’t want to be observed too closely. (Interviewee nr. 34)  
Yet another interviewee shared the following reflections: 
During the day, I don’t think […] the police are overtly hostile all the time, at some 
point it’s a case of people just doing their job. But at night, when nobody is 
watching, there seems to be a sense of exceptionalism, they feel they can get away 
with anything, that’s when the violence occurs, and that’s when they are taking 
people’s things. [On the one hand] there is a sense of the duty and the remit of 
power, that this is ‘the right thing to do’ - that happens during the day – but during 
the night it changes. (Interviewee nr. 39)  
 
The same interviewee also expressed a level of understanding for the difficulties facing 
individual police officers: ‘They are asked to deal with a challenging situation, I 
understand that’ (Ibid). Another interviewee recalled: ‘During the eviction of the south 
part of the camp, I remember seeing the police officers on the hill, and one was just crying. 
[…] It felt like he felt they weren’t going to do this…’ (Interviewee nr. 37) Similarly, a long-
term volunteer told me: 
I’ve definitely seen CRS being emotionally affected. I’ve seen them cry and seen 
them being punished for that. One guy during the south eviction was crying and 
he was taken by the collar and put into a van and not let out again. Also, they really 
avoid looking you in the eye. They are probably trained to do that, and sometimes 
you can see that they are quite shaken.  A lot of them are so young. There’s a bit of 
a joke in France that they’re not the sharpest knives in the drawer, and I think a 
lot of jokes could turn them into bullies. (Interviewee nr. 32)   
 
Returning now to the experiences of migrants in the area, a group of Sudanese men I 
spoke to told me with disbelief that a 70-year-old Sudanese man had recently been kicked 
so badly by the police, he had to be taken to the hospital. Thus, direct violence also affects 
older people, as well as underage children in the area. A young Afghan man brought up 
the latter during our interview in December 2018, saying that the police were very violent 
and that he had seen them kicking the refugees, even ‘the young ones.’ In the past, he 
recalled, if you told them you were a minor, they would let you go and not hurt you. ‘But 
not now. They even detain you, even if you’re a minor.’ (Interlocutor nr. 42) Another 
Afghan man said the police had recently hit his 16-year-old friend. A Sudanese minor 
recounted his experiences of police abuse and dangers in Calais:  
Calais… it was too bad… it was the worst of all. It was too difficult and the worst of 
all of them [European locations he had passed through]. I slept on the hill behind 
the gas station. The police arrived at 4am and they started to spray us, gas in our 
faces and sleeping bags, even if they found someone walking on their own, they 
could beat you even if you didn’t do anything specific […] The treatment by police 
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made me feel so upset and so disappointed. I hadn’t expected this in Europe at all. 
They don’t want any refugees in Calais […] When the police catch you, they take 
you. They would beat you if you try to resist. One time, I tried to resist them in 
Calais, and they took me from the group and took me to a room, very cold. There 
was nothing inside and they opened the window and left me like that for 24 hours. 
Nothing, no food or water, even the toilet was inside the room itself. (Interlocutor 
nr. 75) 
A former Calais ‘Jungle’ camp resident commented on the use of violence against women 
and children:  
They knew that, inside that camp, there were many children and women. And this 
is another question: those vulnerable people – do they not have a right to live? 
Unaccompanied minors, single mothers, and children themselves. Where are their 
rights? Human rights apply only for White people. (Interlocutor nr. 5) 
 
4.2.2. Humiliation, dehumanisation, racialisation  
My research findings suggest that individuals in the borderzone also face continuous 
verbal abuse, which includes racial slurs, shouting, heckling, and otherwise abusive or 
degrading language. Dehumanisation and humiliation are also experienced through acts 
such as shoe confiscation, shoving, and the commanding of nonsensical obedience during 
evictions as manifestations of power. Ruthless slashing of tents and confiscation of 
belongings in front of their dispossessed owners are additional dehumanising rituals 
deployed in the area, which is also further discussed in sub-chapter 1.2.4. A Sudanese 
interlocutor in his late thirties commented:  
They are trying to make us give up our goal. […] They [would do] everything they 
can - to make us give up. For example, beating people, taking their clothes off, 
putting the people in basements – naked – or taking shoes from people to make 
them walk for more than two hours without shoes in the winter. Threatening 
people they would deport them if they didn’t give their fingerprints there. Even 
though they were sure [we] didn’t want to stay in France. (Interlocutor nr. 6) 
Similar accounts of verbal abuse by the authorities was highlighted by a British social 
worker, who recounted: ‘We would see people being shoved, humiliated, insulted.’ 
(Interviewee nr. 66) Similarly, one of my interviewees, who had a longstanding 
engagement with the borderzone through academic and activist work, explained: 
What I first think of is the situation when the riot police came in to the camp – 
there were about 200 of them. I just remember how the officers were laughing – 
they were confiscating things in [the camp residents’] shops. While doing that, 
they would take a can of coke and drink in front of the shop owner; humiliating 
people. It made me so angry the way they were laughing in people’s faces […] It 
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felt like it was about power – the police showing the shop owner that he was not 
worth anything. (Interviewee nr. 31)   
Throughout my research, I have heard countless accounts of verbal abuse perpetrated by 
police officers against migrants. One Sudanese interlocutor explained: ‘They are so bad, 
so rude, especially to the migrants. They are joking when they [use violence].’ 
(Interlocutor nr. 47)  A 19-year-old Afghan youth interviewed by Refugee Rights Europe 
(2017: 21) also similarly reported: ‘At night time, two people came in a car and fought me 
and shouted bad things at me. Suddenly, they showed their ID cards, and they were 
actually police.’ Another Sudanese man, in his mid-thirties, explained:  
Inside the port of Calais, they caught me from one of the lorries and they [swore] 
at me and were saying bad words. I think they just sometimes try to torture you, 
even with their words – they assault you by words. (Interlocutor nr. 36)  
The research interviews suggest that the humiliating verbal abuse and rituals are having 
dehumanising and racialising effects upon individuals in the area. Along these lines, 
therapists working in the area reported from their many conversations with young 
people in the area, one of them recalling:  
They say ‘we’re not treated like humans here.’ They find that the violence here is 
very particular; this is unacceptable and worse than anywhere else, comparable 
to Libya. This has been spoken about many times. We don’t initiate those 
conversations, only if they initiate it themselves. It’s the sense of being treated like 
sub-humans: ‘How can we survive here? This is for animals.’ (Interviewee nr. 62b)  
A long-term volunteer working with women and children in particular, having also 
conducted interviews in the area, suggested: 
A lot of people normalise the abuse; many people use animal concepts, saying 
things like ‘they treat us like dogs’ and ‘we’re not animals.’ Yeah, I suppose the 
most common narrative I’ve heard is feeling degraded due to the lack of justice: 
police have said brutal things or been aggressive or violent, and then police would 
be laughing at them and there will be no follow-up. One guy had his phone stolen 
and was pepper sprayed, and reported this to the police but there was no follow 
up. People are made to feel a strong lack of power on a daily basis. They are 
detained in police stations and being denied food, water, access to a phone, and so 
on. They’re constantly being laughed at… so yeah, they usually wouldn’t describe 
it as psychological abuse themselves, but the feelings that come out of this seem 
like that. People feeling degraded, patronised, humiliated, dehumanised. 
(Interviewee nr. 74)   
 
Along similar lines, an Iranian interlocutor explained: ‘We’ve never lived like this before, 
this is not us! We’re starting to hate ourselves. All of us had very prestigious jobs back 
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home, we’re not animals.’ (Interlocutor nr. 13a) An Afghan man spoke about dignity, and 
how he had been treated with respect and dignity in Germany, but not here. He just 
wanted people to treat him like a human. (Interlocutor nr. 20) A Sudanese interlocutor, 
who had spent more than nine months in the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp in 2015-2016, 
summarised his views and experiences of various degrading treatment by state officials 
in the area. He explained how he had felt when the police insulted or hurt him, 
emphasising his views on the role of racism in the degrading practices: 
I felt weak, vulnerable, unwelcome, a victim. Not white. We don’t have the same 
rights. The rights that apply for them [white people] don’t apply for us. 
(Interlocutor nr. 6)  
Similarly, an Ethiopian man in his mid-twenties told me: ‘They are doing this because we 
are black. We are not white. That’s why we are sleeping on the ground here in Europe.’ 
(Interlocutor nr. 30) A support worker recounted an episode of racial abuse by police, 
directed at one of the minors he was supporting at the time: 
I remember one incident during Easter 2017. Six of the boys said they were going 
out to play football - one was 15 years old - and they didn’t come back for long. 
Gradually, they came back, the youngest with his eyes streaming. It was an 
incredible angel, he couldn’t understand why he had been beaten and tear gassed, 
and another boy had had to spend the night in the ‘urgence’ [A&E]. The police had 
called him a ‘black bastard.’ He had replied ‘I am black, and I’m proud to be black.’ 
(Interviewee nr. 34)  
In Brussels, the issue of racialisation also emerged from interviews. This is depicted in 
Figure A, showing a group of young migrants from African countries being lined up in 
deeply disturbing and dehumanising ways. These stark accounts are compounded with 
recurring racialised verbal abuse, intimidation and discriminatory treatment by civilians 
across research locations, as well as violent attacks by groups of racist and fascist groups 
coming to the Calais area in particular. There are reportedly national xenophobic 
movements operating (Agier et al, 2019: 117), and strong support for Front National in 
Calais, with the emergence of anti-migrant groups including Sauvons Calais, Calais Libre, 
and Calaisiens en Colere (King, 2016: 106), and in parallel, widespread reports of far-
right aggression against the displaced people in the area. One Sudanese interlocutor, who 
resided in the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp in 2015-2016, claimed:  
More than 20 people got killed [during my time in the Calais Camp] and no one 
tried to figure out by who. There were groups of fascists around the Jungle and we 
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think the police knew about them very well, but they were saying they didn’t know 
anything about that. (Interlocutor nr. 6)  
A human rights report from Calais in October 2017 tells the experience of an Eritrean 
teenager who had seen a group of French citizens moving around the area with a lug 
wrench in order to frighten displaced people in the area. His 17-year-old peer had 
allegedly been abducted by a similar group who forced him onto a van, drove for 
approximately one hour, then beat him and left him there on his own (Refugee Rights 
Europe, 2017). One of my interlocutors, an Iranian artist, recounted:  
Once there were about 15 people near the [Jungle] camp, they kicked us and one 
of my ribs broke. I went to legal centre and complained, and then went to police 
station. I recognised one of the men; the people who had kicked us was police 
dressed up in civil clothing – that’s what we think at least. There are so many other 
refugees that were treated this way but they don’t go to complain because they 
don’t have the paperwork. They think they would be arrested and they would have 
fingerprints in France, so no one else did that […] There was also a big racist group 
quite active around December 2015, and January or February 2016, they would 
go around the camp. Us refugees would move in groups to stay safe. I made a 
mistake being on my own one night, and was beaten. They were always there, I 
knew that […] What was the goal of the racists? It’s hard to think what was going 
on in their head. But they might think people are taking over the city and maybe 
they’re unhappy with how the system works in the city. Unwanted guests. 
(Interlocutor nr. 43)    
Widespread accounts of racialised violence have been reported by human rights groups, 
including in the aforementioned Refugee Rights Europe report from October 2017, which 
stated that physical and verbal abuse was common amongst respondents. Verbal abuse 
would typically include animal sounds, shouting of racial slurs, and giving the finger. One 
29-year-old Eritrean woman explained to the research team: ‘On the road, they always 
make monkey chants whenever they pass me by’ (Refugee Rights Europe, 2017).  A 29-
year-old Eritrean man reported separately: ‘They shout monkey noises at me and give me 
the middle finger.’ (Ibid)  
In addition to racial and verbal abuse, the report moreover outlines incidents of physical 
violence, such as the throwing of glass bottles from moving vehicles, spitting, and 
throwing objects from houses. A 20-year-old male respondent from Afghanistan is cited 
in the report as follows: ‘They throw stuff at us from the window. Once, someone threw 
a flower pot at me’ (Ibid). A Sudanese minor recounted a similar experience of racial 
abuse during one of my field interviews: ‘Even the people living there are racist. 
Sometimes, when we were walking in the city centre, some people would throw water on 
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you.’ (Interlocutor nr. 75) One Pakistani interlocutor recounted one time when a woman 
in a car almost ran him over on the road; he thought it was done on purpose, as she didn’t 
stop by the zebra crossing and had also shouted, ‘Go back to your country.’ My 
interlocutor himself had then put his hand on his chest, bowed, and said, ‘Thank you, 
ma’am,’ and crossed the road (Interlocutor nr. 49). The same phenomenon has been 
reported by human rights groups, where there are documented attempts on running into 
refugees with cars on the main road. Interviewed by Refugee Rights Europe, one 19-year 
old male from Eritrea explained that some people had tried to hit him with a car, and one 
time captured him, put him in their van, and drove him to the police station, where he 
was detained for four days (Refugee Rights Europe, 2017).  
The racialised abused perpetrated in the UK-France borderzone inevitably brings to mind 
Mbembe’s (2017) Critique of Black Reason, in which he theorises Black reason as 
discourses and practices, which equate Blackness with ‘nonhuman,’ as a means to uphold 
forms of oppression. It moreover resonates with Alexander G. Weheliye (2014), who 
develops ‘racializing assemblages’ and draws attention to the centrality of race within 
notions of the human. The convergence of race, racialisation, white supremacy, and 
dehumanisation in the UK-France borderzone is an area which requires further research 
in relation to the UK-France borderzone, and I encourage scholars to direct further 
attention to this as part of a forthcoming research agenda.  
Thus, as seen in this section, dehumanisation is an inherent feature in the politics of 
exhaustion, and one which would recur in my conversations with the interlocutors and 
interviewees over time.  In order to engage in dehumanising activities, it has been 
suggested during interviews that officers should distance themselves from the realities 
of the displaced people in the area in order to carry out these dehumanising practices. 
Three interviewees suggested that this is ensured through the rotation of CRS fleets. One 
interviewee, who was present as a long-term volunteer for the entire period of the Calais 
‘Jungle’ camp, explained: 
The CRS fleet would rotate every three weeks, or at least they are there for – I  
would say – no longer than a month at any time. People ask how they can go home 
to their families at night after what they’ve done – but in fact, they all stay in one 
hotel together. They are in the hotel and don’t interact with anyone else. I think 
they are rotated like that so they won’t get too emotional. (Interviewee nr. 32)  
Another British interviewee similarly outlined this issue:  
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Something I remember was that the police was on rotation, at least the CRS, there 
were different groups from different department, and they would treat people in 
different ways. Someone said to me, ‘These are from Marseilles and they are not 
as bad as the Calais ones.’ It seems that they took a different approach; some would 
even say hello, while others would be much more hostile in their appearance and 
basic interactions. (Interviewee nr. 39) 
 
Figure A | Dehumanisation in Maximilian Park, Brussels (Anonymous)  
 
 
4.2.3. Withdrawal of care and the manufacturing of vulnerability  
The withdrawal of state care, coupled with the hampering of third sector alternatives, is 
an inherent component of the politics of exhaustion, and one which contributes directly 
to the production of additional vulnerabilities among the displaced people in the area. 
These deliberately abject conditions resonate with the notion of ‘active neglect,’ 
elaborated by Claire Loughnan (2019a) in the context of Australian externalisation. 
‘Active neglect’ is defined by Loughnan (2019a) as the removal of government support 
services combined with the erosion of hope and wellbeing amongst refugees and asylum 
seekers, through unfulfilled promises and refusals. In a similar vein, Thom Davies et al 
(2017) write about the violent consequences of state (in)action (2017:1) in informal 
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makeshift camps in Europe, including the camp in Calais in 2015, and argue that inaction 
can be used as a means of control through the infliction of suffering. Thus, in line with 
Loughnan (2019a) and Davies et al (2017), the ‘active neglect’ or ‘violent state inaction’ 
in the context of northern France can be understood as a strategic practice, through which 
the state intends to produce suffering and/or control people. It plays a critical role within 
the wider government technology of the politics of exhaustion. The extremely precarious 
conditions in the borderzone have surprised and shocked many who arrived in Europe 
with the hope of finding sanctuary. One of my Sudanese interlocutors recalled: 
When I first arrived, I was like, so surprised, because how can people live in a place 
like this in Europe! We don’t even have this in Africa, and France is a country 
[where] there is everything available, electricity and everything, why don’t they 
have a nice place to keep people in? I guess they don’t want them to stay here, so 
they make them go by making life hard. No one cares for them. (Interlocutor nr. 
64)  
Another Sudanese man, in his late thirties, similarly explained how he felt strong disbelief 
upon arriving in Calais from Paris, one day in late 2015:  
 
I had been staying under a bridge in Paris. The police advised me to go to Calais: 
‘Go to Calais, you can find a camp there’. And that’s how I found out about Calais. 
Then I went to Calais. I thought that maybe I would be very surprised by an 
amazing place. But instead, I became so shocked; I was thinking, ‘Is that really 
Europe?’ Then, Europe showed us the other face of Europe. We didn’t see a 
civilised developed country; we were somewhere worse than Africa itself. 
(Interlocutor nr. 6) 
 
In the following sub-sections, research findings have been analysed and shed light on 
various aspects of the withdrawal of care and manufacturing of vulnerability through 
appalling possibilities for shelter and living conditions, the denial of medical care, 
hampering of aid and volunteer activities, and the co-production of a ‘lawless land,’ where 
sexual and gender-based violence, as well as other forms of abuse and harm, are prone to 
thrive.  
 
4.2.3.1. Safety, shelter and living conditions during the Calais ‘Jungle’ era 
 
During the existence of the so-called Calais ‘Jungle’ camp in 2015-2016, which, at its peak, 
hosted nearly 10,000 individuals, the effects felt from the denial of adequate state care 
were countered (to some degree) as camp residents, volunteers, and activists came 
together to build communal spaces, ranging from restaurants and cafes to places of 
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worship, schools, and libraries, and barber shops. The camp residents had access to 
regular distribution of hot and cold food items, clothing, tents, sleeping bags, phone 
charging facilities, and Wi-Fi. The vacuum left by the state’s ‘active neglect’ (Loughnan, 
2019a) was thus partially filled by an immense influx of donations, financial aid, and 
grassroots volunteerism (see e.g. Sandri, 2018). The semi-permanent shelters and 
community sphere provided some form of place to rest and recover, while the 
successively growing grassroots aid structures provided the beginnings of a foundation 
for solidarity and support.  
The Calais ‘Jungle’ camp therefore symbolised the antidote of the absence of state 
services. Understood within the framework of the politics of exhaustion, it is unsurprising 
that the camp had to go, as it acted as a counter-weight to any aims of exhausting 
individuals in the area, both mentally and physically. This will be further explored in the 
next chapter. That said, it is certainly not my intention to romanticise the Calais ‘Jungle’ 
camp, which was a wholly inadequate place for individuals to reside. Largely a ‘lawless 
land,’ it was a dangerous place in many respects. Women and children in particular were 
exposed to immense safety risks in the absence of any safeguarding structures, left largely 
unprotected from sexual and gender-based violence. Overall, it was also far from 
adequate in terms of living standards, water and sanitation, medical care, safety, and 
security for every camp resident who found themselves there. Indeed, looking back at the 
time of the big Jungle camp, one British long-term volunteer suggested:  
These were really appalling living conditions; they were just so astronomically 
below the ‘Sphere standards.’ When I first arrived, the toilets were just 
overflowing from day one, and it wasn’t until Médecins du Monde sued the state 
that they put some toilets in and started emptying them. (Interviewee nr. 65)   
 
A research study by Surindar Dhesi et al (2017) from the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp similarly 
details the acute lack of sanitation facilities, safe food provision, water and shelter, thus 
illustrating the extreme shortfall of agreed international standards for refugee camps. 
The scholars thus emphasise the ‘hidden materiality of bodily injury’ caused by these 
exceptionally poor conditions. The safety and security were also a main issue which 
emerged from my interviews with former camp residents. One of my Sudanese 
interlocutors, who spent time in the Calais camp in 2016, explained: 
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I didn’t feel safe, there was fire in some places and at night, and people would fight. 
It wasn’t safe. Inside the camp, they don’t have any police; they are not responsible 
for the camp. In the city, you could call the police if you needed help, but when fire 
started in some place, it takes long time for fire fighters to come. Why? I don’t 
know. The fire fighters would need the police to check the place before they could 
come in, so it took too long. (Interlocutor nr. 64) 
Interlocutors have also likened their situation to one of war and conflict. A Sudanese 
interlocutor looked back at his time in the Jungle and suggested: 
How could I feel safe? When the authorities don’t care about the children and 
women, vulnerable people, older people, how I could I trust that they would treat 
us well? So many people came to the Jungle and had been in the hospital: a leg 
broken, an arm broken, or some head problem. Some of them were beaten by 
police, and others in the city centre by the fascist groups. And others were injured 
under the train. I felt like we were in a battle. It is not normal life for the human 
beings. Like someone who was fighting for his freedom. We are in the 21st Century 
and we are still looking for freedom. (Interlocutor nr. 5)  
 
4.2.3.2. Safety, shelter and living conditions post-‘Jungle’  
Following the dramatic final demolition of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp in October 2016, as 
outlined in the introductory chapter of this thesis, living conditions deteriorated rapidly. 
Individuals who had been dispersed across France to reception centres started returning 
soon after the demolition, and went into hiding in the woodlands and forests nearby the 
old camp site. Some would also go to Paris and Brussels, whilst others joined other small 
camps in the northern France area.  
Overall, individuals were relying on grassroots distributions of tents, blankets, and 
sleeping bags, as well as the distribution of regular meals. Sheltering options made 
available by the French state through the ‘115’ emergency number for destitute 
individuals in France, is (in principle) also available for undocumented migrants. 
However, the service has been described by French civil society as oversaturated and far 
beyond capacity (in the winter time in particular) (see e.g. FEANTSA, 2017). Several of 
my interlocutors explained that they had tried calling, but were denied a place to stay. 
One Afghan man told me that he had tried using the service, but had been asked to leave 
again:  
I was ill and called 115 and was put into the accommodation, in a shared room. 
There was a bunk bed with a Kurdish guy at the bottom, but I didn’t feel 
comfortable sleeping on the top bunk. So, I went to a different room. There was a 
security person there; a tall guy who said I had to leave the room. I said I was ill 
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and needed to sleep. He said offensive words and then four security guards came 
and threw me out at 2 or 3 o’clock in the morning. (Interlocutor nr. 60)  
Another interlocutor, an Iranian man, confirmed that the emergency shelter was indeed 
open for people to stay at night, but with very limited capacity, and couldn’t see any point 
in going there, because if he did, his tent might get confiscated overnight, which he 
wouldn’t want to risk by going to the shelter. (Interlocutor nr. 44a) Others would seek 
shelter in abandoned buildings, or squats, but did not necessarily find sanctuary there for 
long, as illustrated through this statement by a young Pakistani man:  
Sleeping in jungle [woodlands around Calais], it’s not good, it’s so cold. Many 
people go to a broken house where there are many mice and bacteria, but at least 
it’s open. Yesterday I was sleeping there, but then security came and closed it off. 
(Interlocutor nr. 49) 
In December 2018, an Iranian interlocutor commented with disbelief on the improvised 
living space in which he was inhabiting (see also Figure B):  
Women, children, sick… there are families with children here… That poor woman 
with a 3 or 4-year-old child, how can they tolerate this? We have people here who 
have a broken leg, who have a cold, or don’t feel well and can’t walk… they will 
freeze from the cold. Illness, sickness… (Interlocutor nr. 45a) 
 




On a different occasion, as part of a group interview, an Iranian man said:   
The cold is coming, the winter is coming, what do you think they [the authorities] 
will do? Will they continue to take our tents and sleeping bags? I’m someone who 
doesn’t want to be negative, but I can’t stop thinking about the winter coming. I 
might not be here, but for the people coming after. There are quite a lot of young 
people who have been rejected elsewhere. (Interlocutor nr. 13b)  
Water and sanitation in the area is largely inadequate, and reports of CRS police spraying 
water tanks with pepper spray and slashing plastic containers have been reported. In 
Brussels and Paris, two locations to which migrants from the Calais area tend to go for 
‘rest,’ the manufacturing of vulnerabilities is particularly striking as well. One of my 
interlocutors, a Sudanese man in his early thirties, told me when I asked about his time 
in Paris:  
I did not [feel] very safe, actually. Because even sometimes under la Chapelle 
bridge when you leave your stuff, you never find it again. If you want to go to the 
toilet, you can [lose] your things. Even the police in the early morning, sometimes 
they came and like told you ‘go from here,’ even though we were just sleeping 
under the bridge in la Chapelle. They would arrest some people, sometimes people 
run, sometimes police [would take] our sleeping bag and tell us to go. (Interlocutor 
nr. 5)  
 
During one of my fieldwork visits, as I approached Porte de la Chapelle, an area where 
undocumented individuals are concentrated, either being pushed there by the authorities 
or by following in the footsteps of their peers, I noticed a large semi-permanent 
settlement which I had not seen before during previous visits. Tarps were attached to 
tree branches and propped up by improvised pillars. I was surprised that the authorities 
would let these structures remain and be left untouched during their regular evictions. 
As I came a little closer, however, I understood that this was not a settlement of migrants; 
it was a homeless community of French ‘sans-abri.’ Thick smoke was rising from a man’s 
crack pipe, syringes and needles scattered on the ground, and a few women with frail 
physique were clad in short skirts and high boots, signalling passing cars to sell their 
bodies. This is the environment in which displaced individuals are finding themselves in 
Paris, living right next to another scene of human tragedy, being pushed to the fringes of 
society where the delineation between the two communities is sometimes blurred and 
fragile, not least in the public imaginary.  
An activist in Paris for several years highlights how the presence of drugs threatens the 
safety of the undocumented migrants in the area. She explained how dealers would offer 
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the first hit free of charge, then increase the cost to some five euros, and by the time the 
individuals is hooked, the price has multiplied, depleting the now-desperate individual of 
any money they had saved for their continued journey in Europe, or far worse, pushing 
them into illicit activity, sex work, or human trafficking.  (Interviewee nr. 4)  
4.2.3.3. Medical care and impact of Covid-19  
The access to medical care for individuals in the area is a complex matter. Many of the 
people I spoke to over the years were reluctant to seek care at the local hospital as they 
feared they might be forced to have their fingerprints taken or even be handed over to 
the police. Others allegedly had tried to seek help but had not been well received at the 
hospital. One Afghan man, for instance, explained to me that as a result of having been 
shot in his knee back home, with subsequent surgery in India, the knee was now acting 
up but he had not been able to receive care at the hospital. He also said that he was 
experiencing stomach problems, and waved a doctor’s prescription at us which he said 
he could not afford to collect at the pharmacy due to the high cost. (Interlocutor nr. 23a) 
Another Afghan man in the same group explained that he suspected that he had bladder 
stone, but he just got a tablet of paracetamol when he presented himself at the hospital, 
so he had given up on trying to access medical care. (Interlocutor nr. 23b) Meanwhile, a 
member of a team of therapists operating in the area highlighted the issues related to the 
lack of access to psychiatric support for undocumented individuals: 
The hospital won’t accept anyone if they don’t claim [asylum] here, so the state 
psychiatric support is not accessible. […] Lack of access to specialist support for 
this population has reached critical levels. (Interviewee nr. 62b) 
 
The manufacturing of vulnerability has become particularly tangible during the period of 
the Covid-19 pandemic, which is of course plaguing the camps and settlements in 
northern France since the spring of 2020. In this context, the struggles for displaced 
people in the borderzone have only worsened. As many of the volunteer and aid groups 
on the ground have had to pause or cease their operations due to the health crisis, and in 
the absence of adequate state-led alternatives, large numbers of displaced people have 
seen their support being reduced drastically (BBC, 2020). The migrants in the area are 
exposed to an insanitary climate, coupled with stress and exhaustion caused by the 
ongoing uncertainty and daily police raids aimed at evicting informal living spaces. From 
mid-April 2020 onwards, the French authorities intermittently took a number of steps to 
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address the Covid-19 situation in the area, including daily buses taking people to 
accommodation centres, some provision of water and soap, Covid-19 information sheets, 
and so on. However, organisations operating on the ground report that the measures are 
largely inadequate, and included forced dispersals without adequate information, which 
led individuals to continue to return to the informal settlements after having stayed in 
state accommodation for a couple of nights. 
4.2.3.4. Hampering aid, protection and volunteer support  
Over time, aid and food distribution activities have been hampered intermittently, and in 
the striking absence of state care, this leaves individuals in the area in an incredibly 
vulnerabilised form of existence. Food distribution areas have regularly been fenced off 
or blocked off with boulders, while volunteers and activists have faced harassment, fines, 
and overall hampering of their activities. A British church minister with longstanding 
engagement in the Calais area provided an example to illustrate this:  
We’ve been at food distributions where the CRS [police] have turned up and 
forbidden the distribution from taking place. We had a box of ready meals and 
started walking towards the line of CRS wearing our official vests marking that we 
belong to an association. They started beating our hands until we dropped the box 
with food. (Interviewee nr. 50) 
Another interviewee, a British social worker employed by a youth organisation in Calais 
explained: 
I have experienced violence, and witnessed it, I have been shoved. A police officer 
raised his baton and went to swing and I said, ‘Stop it, fucker’. […] The 
criminalisation in France of the same type of work I would do at home is hard to 
get - going from having been an agent of the state in the UK protecting people from 
harm, to suddenly being criminalised for protecting children from harm of agents 
of the state in France. (Interviewee nr. 66) 
The Human Rights Observers in northern France are continuously documenting 
harassment of volunteers and activists in the area, evidencing the high levels of 
criminalisation of solidarity. Figure C depicts a standard, recurring type of stand-off at a 
food distribution point between volunteers and aid groups on the one hand, and CRS riot 






Figure C | Stand-off in Calais, October 2017 (Author’s photo)  
 
 
4.2.3.5. Co-producing a ‘lawless land’  
The approach to human mobility in the UK-France borderzone is one of criminalisation 
and securitisation. Paradoxically, however, this place is also largely a ‘lawless land’, as far 
as the human security of migrants is concerned. Within this, there are certain groups who 
are at particularly heightened risk when exposed to the dangers presented by organised 
mafia activities, sexual violence, trafficking, and fascist abuse. Minors are largely left to 
fend for themselves, despite relentless work of organisations on the ground, such as the 
Refugee Youth Service amongst others. Sexual violence and exploitation of male youth 
was reported by several interlocutors and interviewees. For instance, during an 
interview with a Pakistani man, it was revealed that ‘two gay European men, one Italian 
and one French, would come and take guys [from the informal settlements] and pay them 
50 euros for a night. They would come with a van.’ (Interlocutor nr. 49) 
One Sudanese minor recounted some very different experiences highlighting the dangers 
involved in spending time in this lawless land of the border zone where mafia operates:  
Sometimes when we tried to get inside the truck we found Kurdish people and 
they would threaten with knife or gun to get off the truck. I didn’t see anyone 
getting killed but I have seen so many getting stabbed by knife by Kurdish. They 




One of the long-term volunteers involved in a major shelter building project similarly 
explained the impact of lawlessness during the time of the big Jungle camp:  
For volunteers – well, there were basically gangs in the camp as well, and yeah, 
I’ve had a knife pulled on me before and there’s been situations where female 
volunteers have felt physically threatened or being in an awkward situation. […] 
Someone also tried to throw a rock at my head once. It was a side effect of the 
police surrounding the camp but never coming in and not enforcing the law in that 
stretch of the land. People might have their things stolen but didn’t go to the police; 
they wouldn’t do. It meant that the worst people sometimes had the most power 
there. (Interviewee nr. 65)  
 
During many interviews and conversations with volunteers and aid workers in the area, 
it transpired that the situation with mafia in the nearby Grande-Synthe was very 
complicated. Groups would be worried about handing out information and supporting 
people, so some groups would turn to information dissemination via Facebook instead of 
operating on the ground. Evidently, there is a vast problem with organised crime, and no 
resolve. The absence of safety structures and meaningful intervention has moreover 
produced a context in which gender-based violence is widespread, and nearly always left 
unreported and with full impunity for the perpetrators whilst the French and British 
authorities remain focused on the securitisation of borders. A long-term volunteer 
explained that: 
A primary problem for women was sexual violence. […] I remember a woman was 
asked to do sexual favours for a smuggler to get to the UK, I’m pretty certain that 
was the type of thing that was going on. (Interviewee nr. 65)  
The same has been corroborated by other interviewees and interlocutors, including the 
following statement hesitantly shared by a former long-term volunteer in the Calais 
‘Jungle’ camp:  
There was sexual violence and rape in the camp, that women and transgender 
women faced, and where intervening was very, very difficult because it was 
[linked to] mafia structures and you were dealing with easily explosive situations 
and you would put yourself in danger as well. (Interviewee nr. 35) 
The safety concerns in the camp were heightened due to the absence of formal refugee 
assistance by UNHCR and large NGOs or state protection. There was an ‘unofficial’ women 
and children’s centre, spearheaded by an extraordinary woman and former fire fighter 
named Liz Clegg, alongside a number of other volunteer-led initiatives in Calais where 
young volunteers would work tirelessly with the women and girls in the camp. However, 
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due to the lack of formal safeguarding structures, it was overwhelmingly challenging, and 
women and girls faced heightened risks and exposure to violence as a result. As such, the 
state approach to the human beings in the border zone create conditions of possibility for 
the proliferation of sexual and gender-based violence.  
Among the women I interviewed during my field work, it became clear that some amongst 
them were deeply traumatised by their experiences in the borderzone. During the time 
of the camp, some of them had stayed at the official Jules Ferry centre operated by La Vie 
Active and which housed up to 400 women and children in Calais. La vie Active aimed to 
provide a safe and secure space for women and children (see e.g. La Vie Active, 2020). 
The women explained to me that they were scared of going outside the Jules Ferry area 
because of fear of ‘rape, robbing, beating or taking our stuff.’ Meanwhile, they also 
struggled to sleep in their tents at night because intrusion and attempted rape were so 
common that it was simply not an option.  
My interlocuters explained that there was security at the gate to the Jules Ferry area, but 
according to the women ‘they did nothing’ when men trespassed. On a couple of 
occasions, the women themselves had challenged the police and said they ‘have to stop 
these boys from entering’. In response, a police car came and circulated at night, and the 
police also brought dogs. But the women stayed awake all night to protect themselves, as 
they found this the best method for staying safe. Most nights, they would tend to stay out 
until around 5am and ‘go for chance’, i.e. attempt to board UK-bound lorries, and then try 
to sleep during the day when the risk of rape was lower. My women interlocutors spoke 
of the Ethiopian and Eritrean women who usually lived inside the camp rather than the 
Jules Ferry centre. One of them said:   
They were raped and beaten and they still kept trying. Sometimes they came to 
[Jules Ferry] to cook and shower. Sometimes we ‘went for chance’ together. We 
would meet in the forest. (Interlocutor nr. 51a) 
But even whilst ‘going for chance,’ my interlocutors reported that women might be raped 
in the forests. They explained that they would usually ensure to find a group of boys they 
trusted, and only follow those boys. But they recounted what had happened to other 
women and girls at the time:  
Sometimes the Eritrean girls were raped by [unknown] men if they didn’t have 
enough boys with them to protect them. The other men would beat the boys and 
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chase them away and then rape the girls. These are human beings, oh my God. 
(Interlocutor nr. 51a) 
My interlocutors continued on the same topic and explained that some of the women and 
girls became pregnant and some went to hospital when they miscarried.  One of them 
exclaimed: ‘Some of the boys seem like they treat the girls like a piece of meat. And this is 
during the day, imagine the night!’. (Interlocutor nr. 51a) As the conversation continued, 
one of the younger women started crying and shaking: 
I still have nightmares about the dark forest and what could happen to me there. 
When I am alone, I think about this and it makes me so scared. (Interlocutor nr. 
51b)  
Another woman in the group added: ‘But for us, we always stayed with nice boys who 
protected us.’ (Interlocutor nr. 51a) Meanwhile, one of my French interviewees told me 
horrific accounts from another small camp in the northern France area: 
We had rape cases. It was the smugglers. At that time in June 2016 there were 
about 250 people in the camp there, and women, yes, we had accounts of women 
rape. […] I was with a translator, she had a nervous breakdown due to what she 
had heard from the women, and when she got back to the hotel she had to leave. 
She had a breakdown. It was very violent with the smugglers coming at night 
raping women and they could not protect themselves. She couldn’t even translate 
at that time. It’s a form of state violence because they let it happen. (Interlocutor 
nr. 63) 
The experience of women travelling with a husband or family member appears to be 
somewhat different, but nonetheless deeply traumatising in different ways. In a report 
based on qualitative interviews with Kurdish women in the Dunkirk area, Frances 
Timberlake (2019) reports that the women she interviewed ‘unanimously felt the most 
prevalent threat to be the police’ which indicated a reversal of the state’s role from being 
a protector to that of an aggressor (Timberlake, 2019).  
This sub-section has analysed what I call the manufacturing of vulnerabilities, and the 
production of deliberately abject conditions. This resonates with what Squire (2015) 
refers to as the ‘abjectification’ of migrant ‘others’, and moreover brings to mind what 
Mbembe (2003: 21) refers to as spaces of ‘death-in-life’ and ‘state of injury’, and what Jill 
M. Williams (2015: 18) identifies as a ‘bionecro enforcement machine’ in the context of 
the US-Mexico border. Also drawing on Mbembe’s necropolitics, Elizabeth Lee and 
Geraldine Pratt (2012: 891) discuss how abject conditions can be produced through 
mundane practices and take the shape of what Berlant (2007: 745) refers to as slow 
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death, namely a ‘a physical wearing out of a population and the deterioration of people in 
that population’ in everyday life. What also springs to mind is Jasbir K. Puar’s (2017) 
theorisation of how the state of Israel brings Palestinians into biopolitical being by 
making them ‘available for injury’.  All of this resonates with the production of 
vulnerability in the UK-France borderzone, which is indeed one of the components of the 
politics of exhaustion.   
In discussing vulnerability, I refer to the work of Tyner and Rice (2015: 3) who outline 
three ‘coordinates’ of vulnerability: ‘the risk of exposure to crisis, the risk of inadequate 
capacity to cope with crisis, and the risk of severe consequences’ (see also Watts and 
Bohle, 1993; Bohle et al, 1994). Based on these three coordinates, the authors conclude 
that, where exposure is high and coping capacity decreases, and there are serious risks 
for harm, populations are most vulnerable (Ibid). From this standpoint, I argue that the 
withdrawal of care in an already precarious situation amongst individuals with already 
compromised coping structures in the UK-France borderzone, high levels of vulnerability 
are co-produced. As such, the withdrawal of the state, according to the logics of the 
politics of exhaustion, is not merely a lack of willingness to intervene, provide support, 
and bring ‘order’ to the situation. Rather, it must be understood as producing 
vulnerabilities part of a wider strategy to exhaust.  
As discussed in the theory chapter, there has been a tendency to pursue a theoretical 
separation of ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’. Our analysis of the ways in which the politics of 
exhaustion produces vulnerability has shed light on the inadequacy of viewing the two as 
a binary opposition. The forms of harm discussed in this sub-section are all, to some 
degree, avoidable. Moreover, there can be no doubt that the authorities are aware of 
these, and would have the resources to prevent large degrees of this suffering. Hence, this 
suggests that the politics of exhaustion comprises an intentional production of avoidable 
vulnerabilities and serious forms of harm which such vulnerability facilitates. Through 
the conceptualisation of the politics of exhaustion, and its key aspect found in the 
‘manufacturing of vulnerabilities’, I would also argue in favour of a non-binary 
understanding of violence, seen from a non-traditional empiricist epistemological 
position which does not separate ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ forms of violence. This will be 




4.2.4. Dispossession  
According to my field research findings, dispossession in the area comes in various forms. 
The regular destruction of living spaces entails the confiscation and/or slashing of tents 
and sleeping bags as well as blankets, along with other basic necessities such as drinking 
water, mobile phones, and paperwork, or anything else that may have been left behind in 
the shelters. It is clear that such acts of dispossession are taking their toll on people’s 
mental as well as physical health whilst challenging individuals’ internal coping 
mechanisms further. Indeed, beyond the production of physical vulnerability which this 
creates, violent acts of dispossession also appear to be experienced as taking a hard 
mental and emotional toll on the individuals in the area.  
The most tangible and dramatic form of dispossession is found in the regular evictions of 
living spaces, which, ever since the demolition of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp, have emerged 
as a routine practice conducted at regular intervals, often every 48 hours or so. The 
activist group Human Rights Observers reported that the number of evictions doubled in 
Calais in 2019, increasing from 452 for the duration of 2018, to 805 in the first 10 months 
of 2019 (Amnesty International, 2019: 2). During these raids, living spaces of vulnerable 
individuals in Calais and Dunkirk are evicted by heavily geared CRS officers, who use tear 
gas or pepper spray whilst confiscating tents, sleeping bags, and other personal 
belongings. Whilst some individuals are seemingly randomly detained during this ritual, 
others would be allowed to return to the same living space hours later, only to face the 
same process again, some 48 hours later. An Iranian interlocutor discussed the police 
treatment during these evictions in December 2018: 
The French police treat us really badly - if we want to go [somewhere], they hit us 
[…] whatever we do, they catch us, collect our tents, they tear our tents, when we 
want to go somewhere, they harass us. They have gathered us in one place, and as 
soon as we want to just move away from where we are, they catch us […] Police 
hit and kick the tents with a baton [during the evictions] and one guy got hurt on 
the head; some have kids in the tents. (Interlocutor nr. 45a)  
Another Iranian man, interviewed on the same occasion, further elaborated:  
They come out from here [points to the dirt road], and first they chase the African 
guys, so the Africans take their tents and come over here, then we pack up our 
tents, we stand in a line here on the street, and the police looks at our faces. If they 
see any new faces, they take them to the detention centre. They stay in detention 
for a few days and then they are released again. It doesn’t make any sense. The 
rest of us have to stand in a row and not move. They walk around and take tents 
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that no one had time to [rescue]. If you don’t pack it up, the police would take it 
and destroy it, but if you manage to pack up first, you can just put it back. So, it 
doesn’t make any sense.  […] If they don’t want us here, why don’t they just get rid 
of us once and for all? I think they’re trying to make us tired so we choose to return 
home or choose to go somewhere else. Otherwise, it wouldn’t make any sense for 
them to be doing what they are doing. (Interlocutor nr. 45b)  
 
Evictions have continued to be carried out in a ritualised manner over the years. In a 
report published by grassroots groups in Calais, the groups reported that 822 evictions 
had been carried out in Calais and 71 in Grande-Synthe from January-November 2020. 
The report moreover outlines the details of a large-scale eviction which took place in late 
September 2020 as follows: 
On the 29th of September 2020 from 5:30 a.m. until the late afternoon, French 
police forces evicted over 800 displaced people living in one of the informal camps 
in Calais. More than 30 police vehicles were present and around 40 buses, bound 
for centres throughout France. Almost as many were already back on the streets 
just 48 hours later: without shelter, without tents and without sleeping bags, as 
their living quarters had been destroyed during the eviction operation. This 
operation was described by the Prefect as the biggest eviction since the eviction 
of the former Calais Jungle camp in 2016. Evictions such as this are a recurring 
reality at the Franco-British border. (Project Play, 2020: 2).  
 
Research findings gathered over the years clearly suggest that authorities are not 
necessarily trying to capture individuals per se, or force them to register in France.ii 
Rather, in accordance with the supposed logic of the politics of exhaustion, these tactics 
are devised to prevent stabilisation and settlement, prevent access to a resting place, 
community spaces, and in general, spaces where human dignity and well-being can take 
root. That said, the routine evictions are not the sole occasions when acts of dispossession 
and confiscation occur. The confiscation of personal belongings is a topic that emerged 
consistently throughout my years of field research. One interlocutor explained to me: 
Some [police] are taking stuff off the guys, they took 300 euros from a guy as well 
as his two mobile phones. He is still here […] I saw a lot of things done wrong by 
the police, […] this is why I don’t want to stay here […]. (Interlocutor nr. 47) 
This kind of confiscation is not only affecting individuals in a material way; it also appears 
to reduce people’s sense of dignity and sense of self-worth, making daily life seem 
increasingly hopeless. In this sense, acts of dispossession and confiscation converges with 
the previously discussed notion of dehumanisation. Mental health experts who specialise 
in this area explained:  
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[…] disruption of sleep, destruction of tents, and confiscation of basic necessities, 
even drinking water, is taking its toll on people’s mental as well as physical health, 
in worrying ways, appearing to have tipped many people beyond their ability to 
draw upon their own coping mechanisms, into mental health conditions which can 
lead to long-lasting damage. (Lloyd et al., 2018)   
On a separate occasion, these professionals suggested that the act of dispossession are 
designed to break people down, noting that it represents a loss of agency when things, 
which have been looked after so carefully all along the journey, are suddenly treated as 
disposable, and can be taken away from you at the blink of an eye through a brutal 
manifestation of power. In the same vein, there have been countless stories of individuals 
being dispossessed of their shoes. The aforementioned mental health professionals called 
this act ‘the ultimate degradation, because without shoes, you can’t even walk without 
being reminded of your pain.’ A British church authority, who has been active in Calais 
since October 2015, recounted an incident which took place during the period of the 
Calais ‘Jungle’ camp:  
One morning, we saw a group, about a hundred yards from the flyover where you 
came into the camp. They had been stopped by the CRS and stripped off their shoes 
and made to walk back into the camp. The guys had been on their way to the 
supermarket, but had to turn back to the camp when their footwear was 
confiscated. Of course, you can’t go and shop in socks – and this was not in great 
weather – it must have been late winter or early spring. We saw countless men 
coming into the camp in their socks. (Interviewee nr. 50)  
A former Calais ‘Jungle’ camp resident, reflecting on the same practice of shoe 
confiscation, suggested:  
They take off the shoes to make them suffer and struggle. They mean to make the 
people suffer and struggle more. Maybe they [think it would make people] go away 
from the border and keep that border safe […] Is there anything in the law that 
allows the police to take the clothes off, [as well as] people’s dignity? Same 
[treatment] as for the animals. They want to make them feel like animals, not 
human beings. (Interlocutor nr. 5)  
A French interviewee also brought up a similar memory from the time of the Jungle camp:  
Police would remove people’s shoes, and throw them outside the camp […] And 
some said they were being beaten up inside the police vans in the forest, then they 
would just tell them to find their way back. I don’t think this has changed much, 
because I heard about it again now [in late 2019]. This is a recurring thing – the 
police violence. (Interviewee nr. 63) 
In response to the continued acts of dispossession and confiscation, which are thus an 
inherent part of the politics of exhaustion, aid groups on the ground are working 
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ceaselessly to counteract the damage by providing tents, sleeping bags, mobile phones, 
and other essentials to the individuals in the area, and in the process, they are constantly 
being stretched to their limits. The charitable supplies are continuously depleted and 
require constantly renewed donations to survive. One Afghan man told human rights 
researchers on the ground in Calais this April: ‘The police take the tents away all the time 
and the volunteers don’t even have time to replace the tents as fast as the police takes 
them.’ (Interlocutor nr. 60) A young Pakistani man similarly expressed disbelief in 
relation to the continuous confiscation of tents:  
It’s not good. Every two days, [police] come to the jungle [settlements] and take 
tents, breaking everything, hitting people, with their foot. Police is working here 
for British people. Police coming and hurting us too much. Why are they taking the 
tents, why taking everything? One day police is taking tents, and then again I am 
asking for a new tent. (Interlocutor nr. 49)    
 
Shoes and clothing items would also at times be depleted. One of my French interviewees 
reported in the winter of 2019 from her latest visit to Calais: 
My God, my heart was bleeding when I saw this guy, he was Sudanese, and he was 
wearing flip flops in the middle of winter and when he asked for shoes and clothes, 
he was told they don’t have any more. (Interviewee nr. 63)  
This process inevitably also has an exhausting effect on volunteers, among whom the 
notion of exhaustion would come up recurringly in many interviews and conversations. 
One of the long-term volunteers I interviewed described the general sense of exhaustion 
felt during her engagement in the area: ‘We were all burned out at the end of summer.’ 
(Interviewee nr. 35) Another long-term volunteer similarly explained:  
There were times when exhaustion was the norm, where everybody was so 
overworked that we stopped seeing it in each other, before we realised that this 
might happen. People were just becoming less and less efficient to the point of not 
being able to function. Some became unstable, emotionally, and realised that they 
needed a lot of help as well. Exhaustion has many faces. (Interviewee nr. 32) 
While the forms of dispossession and confiscation discussed in this sub-chapter are 
clearly very closely linked with the production of vulnerability which was discussed in 
section 1.2.3, I argue here that cruel acts of dispossession, carried out right in front of the 
victims, constitute their own category within the politics of exhaustion, for these are 
brutal acts which reportedly have mental and emotional effects on migrants and 
volunteers in the area, serving as a form of degradation and abuse. Similar tacit state 
violence has been reported elsewhere in Europe, with a particularly striking example in 
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Greece, where prospective asylum seekers had their clothes stripped off before they were 
sent back across the border to Turkey (Brazelle, 2020). In Belgium, displaced people have 
reported their mobile phones stolen by police (Refugee Rights Europe, 2018a; RTBF, 
2018), while at the Croatian border, prospective asylum seekers are reportedly being 
stripped and having their documents burned (Geddie et al, 2020). In northern France, 
however, the dispossession is often experienced repeatedly, and alongside other 
exhausting practices over a period of time, for as long as individuals remain in the area.  
 
4.2.5. Shrinkage of access to space and defoliation of privacy  
As part of state actors’ attempts to ensure an uprooting of individuals from the area 
through evictions, they also continuously seek to shrink people’s access to space in the 
first place. This was extremely tangible during the gradual shrinking of space during the 
time of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp. At first, a so called ‘safety zone’ along the motorway was 
carved out in January 2016, which meant that camp residents and volunteers had to work 
relentlessly to move shelters away before the bulldozers moved in to clear the land (see 
Figure D). Subsequently, a court ruling authorised the French state authorities to proceed 
and demolish the southern part of the camp, which was home to several hundred 
individuals, including many family units. This inevitably led to the containment of all 
camp residents within a much more confined space, the northern part, which sparked 
heightened tensions and allowed for fires to spread more quickly and generally created 
an increasingly difficult and exhausting daily existence in the camp. See Map 2 for an 
illustration of the gradual demolition of the camp.  
The final destruction of the camp, and its flattening to the ground in October 2016 (BBC 
News, 2016; Ansems De Vries and Welander, 2016b; The Guardian, 2016) sent a clear 
message that the space for people to stay in the area was now completely closed and 
sealed off. One long-term volunteer explained to me:  
1,500 kids were left on their own unsupervised, like in the ‘Lord of the Flies’. They 
were walking around their burned homes; the people who were looking after 






Figure D | Moving shelters prior to demolition (Rob Pinney) 
 
Following the demolition of the camp, settlements and encampments would soon start to 
crop up across the area, only to be closed down again by the authorities weeks or months 
later. However, rather than pushing people out of the area, this merely led to individuals 
going into further hiding and moving to alternative spots. This futile cycle of closing of 
spaces has continued to be reproduced ever since the demolition of the camp until the 
time of writing, in November 2020.  
As such, fences, razor wire, and spikes have been erected across Calais, targeting people’s 
preferred resting spots and communal spaces such as food distribution points, sending a 
clear signal that these spaces are no longer inhabitable (see e.g. Help Refugees, 2019). 
The use of spikes to make a space inhabitable has also been seen in the so called ‘hostile 
architecture’, an urban design strategy often used to make a space impossible for 
homeless individuals to use (see e.g. Kerrigan, 2018).  
A further development was reported to me in 2019, when state actions aimed at shrinking 
access to space started to also be accompanied by defoliation. The woodlands where 
migrants were setting up tents and shelters, were largely cut down or trimmed, laying 
bare the settlements and providing even less of a pretence at privacy and possibility for 
118 
 
community space to grow. The narrowing of space and the tactic of defoliation are part 
of the politics of exhaustion in northern France and would arguably contribute to a 
further sense of hopelessness and impossibility over time. 




4.2.6. Forced (im)mobility  
The politics of exhaustion at the UK-France border moreover comprises the technologies 
of immobility and confinement, as well as the tactic of forced mobility. Looking firstly at 
the various situations of immobility in which migrants are trapped, the first mode of this 
technology takes the shape of capture during attempted border crossings, to prevent 
individuals’ access to UK territory, in line with the juxtaposed border arrangements. 
Immobility is also enforced through arrests and detention; often taking the shape of short 
periods spent in detention in the police station or in the short-term holding facility in 
Coquelles, followed by the release of the individuals shortly thereafter. The detention of 
individuals has been described as oftentimes being done at random during evictions, or 
other encounters between police and migrants. During my field work in April 2019, I 
visited a Sudanese man held in detention in the Centre Administratif De Rétention in 
Coquelles, Calais, who explained that several individuals in the centre had recently gone 
on hunger strike protesting their detention, with a number of detainees having attempted 
suicide just a few days prior to our conversation. He furthermore explained his own 
predicament of forced (im)mobility:  
They want me to give my fingerprints and ask for asylum in France but I think they 
just want to have a fast process and send me back to Sudan. But I want to go to the 
UK where I have family members. […] I have not eaten for several days. I am 
exhausted and my morale is going down every day.  
The situation of my interlocutor sheds light on the two interlinked notions of immobility 
and forced mobility all at once. On the one hand, he was at the time of the interview 
deprived of his liberty and clearly immobile. However, on the other hand, what he was 
trying to resist was the act of forced mobility, through deportation back to his country of 
origin. That is to say, individuals in the area are both regularly confined or detained when 
attempting to move forward towards their intended destination or simply to move 
around, as authorities ensure their continued immobility, while at the same time, many 
face acts of forced mobility which prevents access to territory, asylum systems, and 
stability.  
Looking further at the notion of forced mobility, many interlocutors whom I interviewed 
during the period 2016-2019 spoke of being caught by the police and then driven to 
remote locations where they would be released, left to cover the way back on foot. Others 
explained that they had been removed to other European countries under the Dublin 
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Regulation following their capture and short period of detention, only to jump on a train 
or other forms of transport to make their way back to the Calais area (see also Ansems de 
Vries and Welander, 2016b). Amongst the countless examples, an Eritrean youth in his 
early twenties explained that he had been on the move for four years, and within this time 
he had been sent back to Italy from France several times, because he has fingerprints 
there. (Interlocutor nr. 18) A man from Sudan in his late forties, whom I interview in 
December 2018, commented on the forced mobility caused by the Dublin Regulation and 
related processes:  
Some guys came [to Calais] from Italy and asked for asylum in France, and [the 
authorities] sent them back to Italy, and Italy gave them no assistance and asked 
them to leave Italy. After that, they [came] back to France. France won’t give them 
papers, so now they try to go to the UK but they are stuck. […] If the authorities 
say they don’t know this - it is impossible to not know. They don’t care. 
(Interlocutor nr. 47)  
This resonates with the extensive work of Tazzioli (2017, 2019a), whose concept of 
mobility as a technology of government in the contemporary European context of 
migration is extremely relevant to this notion of the politics of exhaustion. For Tazzioli, 
migrants across Europe are facing containment through forced mobility; their 
geographies are ‘diverted and decelerated’ (2017: 30) and thus they are controlled and 
excluded. Tazzioli highlights how displaced individuals’ movements are ‘controlled, 
disrupted and diverted not (only) through detention and immobility but by generating 
effects of containment keeping migrants on the move and forcing them to engage in 
convoluted geography’ (Tazzioli, 2019a: 1). Ansems de Vries and Guild (2018: 1) have 
followed down a similar path, as they refer to the notion of ‘forced, obstructed and 
circulatory mobility’ being used as a common migration management tactic across 
Europe; something which is indeed clearly identifiable in the context of northern France. 
Gazzotti and Hagan (2020: 3) similarly report an absurd use of dispersals in the context 
of Morocco, where migrants would be dispersed to the south of the country only to then 
make their way back in a few days or even hours. Similarly, Picozza (2017: 239) highlights 
the common phenomenon of ‘Dublined’ migrants who experience being stuck in transit 
‘spending between five and ten years struggling to settle’.  
The result of being subjected to repeated dispersals are, according to Gazzotti and Hagan 
(2020: 8), ‘not only geographically disorienting, but dispossesses those who experience 
it in many intimate ways. Dispersal not only depletes migrants’ time and energy, but also 
121 
 
deprives and dispossesses them materially and financially […]’. This is of course directly 
relevant to the practices of forced mobility in northern France, where individuals are 
constantly uprooted, forced to move, dispersed and driven out of the area, only to make 
it back to the same locations a few days later. Such forced mobility also takes place in a 
smaller scale, through the uprooting and evictions which force migrants to move around 
and circulate in the Calais area itself, and find new sleeping spots when old ones are 
closed off or regularly patrolled by CRS police. Combined with the other control tactics 
mobilised in the area, forced (im)mobility is an effective method which appears to 
contribute to both physical and psychological exhaustion among people on the move; 
exhausting people by convoluting their journeys and delaying their recourse to a solution 
to their predicament.  
4.2.7. Uncertainty, undercurrents of threat, and the omnipresence of death  
Migrants’ daily life in the UK-France borderzone is permeated by a constant sense of 
uncertainty, confusing and contradictory police routines, and undercurrents of threat and 
violence. Even in the absence of physical violence, individuals are waiting anxiously for 
the violence to come, leading to a sense of uncertainty, constant hiding and caution. One 
of my interviewees, who has been carrying out academic and arts-related projects with 
displaced people in Calais since 2016, brought up the notion of ‘undercurrents of 
violence’, shedding light on this phenomenon:  
Even when there was no physical violence, there was the waiting for the violence 
to come. Always hiding, hiding stuff, themselves, their true identity. […] It must be 
draining and exhausting, it’s insidious violence. Uncertainty is a form of violence 
in this context. People seem really stressed in times where everything seems calm. 
(Interviewee nr. 25)  
During the time of the existence of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp, uncertainty was also ever-
present amongst its residents. A Sudanese interlocutor explained to me: 
During the first-time eviction [of the 100-metre safety strip], they were saying if 
there is no problem here and people are more calm in the Jungle, no one is going 
to get evicted. But suddenly they came at 5 or 6 in the morning and we found more 
than 35 French police officers telling everyone to leave. They didn’t even explain 
to anyone why they had to leave. If you didn’t follow, then they might arrest you 
or beat you and put you in the jail. We know we are illegal there; we are not stupid. 
(Interlocutor nr. 6)   
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Further down the line, a Sudanese youth explained to me on a morning in August 2018 
that he had been caught off guard earlier that morning because a sudden police raid did 
not follow the usual pattern: 
The police came [unexpectedly] today. They took everything, my tent, and clothes. 
My friend had brought me that tent from Belgium. I was away to have breakfast 
[at La Vie Active] and brush my teeth because I didn’t think they would come 
today. The police come all the time, but for two days they didn’t come, so I thought 
it would be OK. And then everything was gone, my bag, everything. We cannot 
trust any person here. (Interlocutor nr. 8) 
These examples show that, while the previously discussed acts of dispossession and 
evictions of living spaces are two key tactics utilised by the authorities to produce 
exhaustion, there is another layer to these practices, namely the sheer uncertainty and 
undercurrents of threat which permeate people’s daily existence in the area and 
exacerbate suffering further. A group of Iranian men in their twenties and thirties 
discussed the same phenomenon during a group interview in December 2018, with one 
of them telling me that:  
We are in constant fear not knowing when they will take [our tents]; if you go to 
the town it’s 50-50 certainty you will get caught or not, so you are always unsure. 
They take people to detention for a few days and then release them again; it 
doesn’t make any sense. (Interlocutor nr. 45c) 
Also in connection to the evictions, seemingly randomised arrests and detention would 
unfold as well. None of the individuals I have interviewed over the years have appeared 
to have had any idea of what the actual criteria or immediate reasons were for such 
arrest; the police appear to be following a random practice. A Sudanese interlocutor 
discussed these rituals with me in Calais in August 2018:  
Blue and white cars come and catch you. You spend 2-4 days in prison, then you 
might be sent to a big prison and then to a lawyer. They ask ‘Why are you here…’ 
You will stay maybe 7 days sometimes 2-3 weeks in that prison. Then they release 
you, give you a paper to leave France and let you out. (Interlocutor nr. 8)  
A long-volunteer brought up the sense of uncertainty and unpredictability experienced 
in the area, sharing his interpretation of it as follows: 
I imagine one thing [the authorities] were trying to achieve with people in the 
camp was to make us feel confused and tired. Like the point was to make things 
completely unpredictable, and this really wears you down. I did live in the camp 
as well, so I did see [unexpected police behaviours] happening and at night it 
would be very different than during the day. And yeah, they drove us into 
exhaustion. (Interviewee nr. 65)  
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The prevailing sense of uncertainty appears to also have been severely exacerbated by 
the lack of information and guidance. As the same long-term volunteer noted: 
There was an incredible lack of information; I know that OFII [l’Office Français de 
l’Immigration et de l’Intégration] would occasionally come to the camp and tell 
people about their options and tell them how to go to CAOs but overwhelmingly, 
there was such a lack of information, such a void. People would just be relying on 
rumours and sometimes they were wildly inaccurate rumours that were 
spreading. There was a rumour that they might open the border at some point, so 
we’d have to tell people there’s no way they’re going to do that. With the south 
eviction there was a moment where 15-year-old kids, who were going to CAOs, 
thought they were going to England. It also happened with kids going to CAOMIEs 
but there wouldn’t be a translator with them so they would just assume that it 
might be that they were going to England. (Interviewee nr. 65) 
 
A Sudanese interlocutor similarly highlighted the lack of understanding of one’s rights, 
possibilities and potential solutions:  
There is very poor information about the situation. They need someone with 
experience in law, and it is not clear for us when they give us documents in French 
– the information is very poor. (Interlocutor nr. 47)   
 
Another prevalent underlying threat is the omni-presence of potential death. At least 197 
deaths took place at the border between 1999 and 2017 (Agier et al, 2019: 139), while 
the Institute of Race Relations (2020) report that nearly 300 border-related deaths in and 
around the English Channel occurred since 1999. However, these numbers were likely 
much more elevated, given that deaths of undocumented individuals tend to go 
unreported. In March 2019, a 19-year-old Ethiopian boy named Kiyar lost his life in a 
lorry in Calais, having tried desperately to go to the UK where he had family 
members. One of the grassroots groups wrote on their Facebook page at the time, along 
with a close-up photo of Kiyar’s face:  
This is Kiar. He was 19 years old and the first person to die at the Calais border 
this year [2019]. His name joins the list of countless others who have died here 
trying to reach safety. […] Last week, volunteers and Kiar's friends gathered to 
hold a vigil [that] was held to commemorate his life. […] Please take a moment to 
look at his face. To think about the injustice of an avoidable political situation. An 
unfair circumstance that forced him to take such a risk with his own life, in the 
pursuit of seeing family and friends, community and protection. 
Other reports highlight deaths in roadside accidents, drowning in the port, and deaths 
due to suffocation or being crushed to death inside lorries. In the winter of 2019, a 
Nigerian man died of suffocation in his tent, having lit a fire inside the tent to keep warm 
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at night. In 2020, when increased attention was directed at the crossing of small boats 
from northern France to the UK, at least five individuals tragically drowned whilst 
attempting to make the crossing: a young Sudanese man and a Kurdish-Iranian family 
whose lives were tragically lost on separate occasions whilst crossing the channel. 
(InfoMigrants, 2020; BBC News, 2020) An Ethiopian interlocutor in his mid-twenties told 
me in October 2018 that one of the boys from their group had been found dead in the port 
only a week earlier. The interlocutor was horrified that no one was able to tell them what 
had happened. ‘It’s because we’re black. They don’t care,’ he speculated. (Interlocutor nr. 
30) Meanwhile, a long-term volunteer who served in the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp recalled:  
I can remember a few times where camp residents died trying to get to the UK. 
Sometimes it was a ‘hit and run’ accident, and it was never…I can’t remember a 
single time where they were hit by car or lorry and the person was found or held 
responsible, ever. [...] There’s the graveyard where people who’d died would be 
buried and there would be services, there would be vigils in the town centre. It’s 
one of those things, whenever it got colder the likelihood increased and increased 
and increased, it felt it was hanging over the place; there was always another death 
around the corner. People took tremendous risks and the more the border is 
militarised and the more the British and French governments spend on security, 
the more people took risks and more people died trying. Also, someone fell in the 
water in the port. They didn’t identify the body until 3 months later. (Interviewee 
nr. 65)  
 
Based on these research findings, it is therefore unsurprising that many of my 
interlocutors appeared to feel the omnipresence of death, as well as a strong sense of 
uncertainty and undercurrents of threat in their day-to-day existence. This, one could 
plausibly assume, would be contributing to further mental and emotional exhaustion and 
disillusionment. A British interviewee, who has been active in the area since 2016, 
suggested:  
As a result of the police violence, refugees there are constantly on edge. You’re 
supposed to feel safe with authorities, but it’s the total opposite; they are 
constantly hiding, on the move, carrying their stuff around. There’s no normality 
in it, as a result of how they’re treated by the authorities – but it’s actually not just 
how they’re being moved around but also how the NGOs are not getting 
permission to bring food, and their living condition and stuff being taken away. It’s 
all negative really. (Interviewee nr. 70)   




Whenever there [are] more challenges to [reach the UK], people will be more 
desperate. They will do more things to try [to reach the UK]. We will find more 
people dying. English don’t care, French don’t care, Europe don’t care. 
(Interlocutor nr. 45c)  
 
Another Sudanese man discussed the occurrence of death during the time of the Calais 
camp, and suggested: 
You can say, according to estimates while we were in the Jungle, more than 25-30 
people died under the train. And 30-35 they froze on a truck. What happened? 
Nothing. Because they were not white. So many people get killed between the 
Calais centre and the camp and they drop them in the sea and no one knows how 
they died. In the lake, in the forest. For example, a young Afghan guy, they found 
him in the forest. His body. What did the police do – nothing! The strange thing is, 
during that time, we heard that in Paris, a police officer had pushed a French girl 
and all the media was talking about that. You can look at the difference – the young 
Afghan guy was killed and no one mentioned it; he just wasted his life and no one 
even investigated how he died, but they did investigate the police who pushed that 
girl. (Interlocutor nr. 6)  
 
4.3. Theorising the politics of exhaustion as biopolitical technology of 
government  
In this chapter, I have traced how bordering practices, or political technologies, have 
converged in the UK-France borderzone over space and time. Seen from the perspectives 
and collective experiences over several years’ time through the voices of my 
interlocutors, the contours of a politics of exhaustion takes shape as a set of temporal, 
corporeal, and spatial tactic aimed to deter, control, and exclude, which stretches the UK 
border far beyond its spatial arrangements.  
While many of the methods and practices outlined in these sections are echoed as 
migration control practices in migratory contexts across Europe, my field research 
suggests that these have all been caused to converge in the context of northern France, 
and sustained over time, they are therefore best understood collectively as constituting 
an entire strategic state approach, rather than constituting isolated and ad hoc 
undertakings by state actors. This mode of biopolitical governing of migration, in that it 
neither serves to foster life nor directly kills or permits killings, demonstrates that a 
binary reading of biopolitics (‘making live/letting die’) is insufficient when theorising the 
biopolitical migration governance unfolding in the UK-France borderzone. Neither is 
Mbembe’s notion of negative biopolitics, that of necropolitics, sufficient to make sense of 
the politics of exhaustion, which does not amount to death, but rather, constitutes an 
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exploratory approach to governmentality. In fact, this insidiously seeks to render life 
pliable and human mobilities governable, in order to re-gain a hold over ‘unruly’ 
autonomous migration.    
Through the voices of my interlocutors, it has become clear that the accumulation of these 
practices, as experienced by displaced individuals in the area, contribute toward the 
production not only of physical ailments, and what Puar (2017) refers to as the ‘mass 
debilitation of bodies,’ but also emotional and psychological harm, which can have 
powerful effects on a person’s capacity to resist. Indeed, the field research findings 
analysed in this chapter have illustrated how the politics of exhaustion eliminate many 
possibilities for wellbeing, rest, and stability. It risks producing a sense of 
meaninglessness and emptiness of existence (Johansen, 2013: 265) through (micro) 
practices and methods designed to debilitate. Regarding precisely the effects of the 
politics of exhaustion, I heard countless accounts of the detrimental impact this approach 
has on migrants in the area. For instance, one of my interviewees, who was working in 
the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp for nearly its entire duration, suggested:  
There was a really rapid deterioration of mental health of displaced people who 
are forced to live in those conditions. Infinite numbers of mental health problems 
[…] I saw it more than people told me. When they talk about it, it’s in a jokey way 
- - in terms of witnessing it, you see it in [manifestations of] anger, hostility, self-
harm, substance abuse. You see it in people who are clearly very depressed; you 
see it when they have become apathetic and have lost hope. Self-destructive 
behaviours. It’s so shocking there, people have made really horrendous journeys, 
but when they get to Europe, the bedrock of human rights, tolerance and 
acceptance – you get here [and you’re faced with] neglect and abuse, which is 
deliberate from the European governments. (Interviewee nr. 32) 
Another example is the following account shared with me by a British social worker, who 
has extensive experience working with the youth in the area:  
[Some of the youth] would normalise the abuse they were experiencing [in the 
borderzone] and tolerate it and blame themselves. There were destructive 
behaviours - - someone in a situation without control can tend to start asserting 
‘control on themselves’ through destructive behaviour. The Afghan kids were 
more prone to self-harming, burning cigarettes on their skin, to handle the pain 
inside. Eritreans and Ethiopians would refer to alcohol more. Drinking, fights - 
drink quite serious amounts - and get into fights where they would be beaten up, 
indirectly inflicting pain on themselves. (Interviewee nr. 66) 
Indeed, the accumulation of the practices experienced by migrants in northern France, 
often repeatedly and for extended periods of time, are radically malignant in their 
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outcomes. In a parallel context of refused asylum seekers in Norway, Johansen (2013) 
argues that when the state finds it difficult to remove or deport individuals, authorities 
instead seek to confine them to miserable conditions as part of a ‘funnel of expulsion,’ 
with the hope that they will eventually break and decide to leave Norway voluntarily. 
Similarly, in the context of the border zone in northern France, the politics of exhaustion 
appears to be designed to attack people’s resilience and ability to persist and survive the 
most adverse of situations. This also calls to mind Weber and Pickering’s (2014) work on 
technologies of ‘intent management’ in the context of Australian border controls, and 
what Rose (2000:324) refers to as ‘technologies for the conduct of conduct’. Weber and 
Pickering argue that ‘new forms of border governance are emerging that seek to shape 
individual decision-making to promote ‘voluntary’ compliance with migration 
management goals’ (2014: 17).  
Along similar lines, Behrouz Boochani, a renowned Kurdish scholar and writer who was 
held in detention in the Australian-run detention centre on Manus Island for years, noted 
that ‘the system in these prisons has been created so that incarcerated refugees 
experience an unbearable amount of pressure, reach the point of hopelessness, and 
finally decide to return to their country of origin’ (Boochani, cited in Loughnan, 2019a). 
The same logic of ‘intent management’ (Weber and Pickering, 2014) could indeed be 
assumed to constitute an underlying purpose and intention of the politics of exhaustion. 
Eric Fassin et al (2014) have theorised the notion of ‘auto-expulsion,’ by which Roma 
individuals are met with conditions that make life unbearable, and which makes them so 
worn out, that they remove themselves. This resonates strongly with the notion of the 
politics of exhaustion at the UK-France border. It is noteworthy in this context that the 
practices comprising the politics of exhaustion are oftentimes anticipatory of 
transgression, rather than applied as punishment, for unauthorised border crossings.  
Thus, I have demonstrated how the juxtaposed border arrangements between the UK and 
France have not merely led to the localisation of the UK’s physical border controls to an 
extraterritorial space; the ‘border’ has also entered into spaces of everyday life in the 
borderzone. Traditional spatial interdictions and restrictions emerging from non-entrée 
policies, reliant on tactics such as confinement, bordering fences, and deportation, have 
been successively complemented by more insidious, temporal and corporeal biopolitical 
technologies of bordering. However, far from being a homogenous bordering technology 
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or fully coherent strategy, the politics of exhaustion is a fragmented approach in which 
disparate tactics and (micro) practices converge and intersect in the production of 
exhaustion of migrants’ bodies and minds. This biopolitical migration government 
technology thus seeks to curb autonomous migratory movements, influence decisions, 
and manage intent through the physical, mental, and emotional exhaustion of its subjects. 
In this sense, exhaustion can be understood as constitutive of bordering processes, and 
of the ‘border’ itself. In brief, this array of tactics has produced an embodied experience 
of the border, whereby the border is inscribed on the bodies and minds of migrants so 
that they carry it with them.  All of this therefore suggests a re-thinking of Foucauldian 
biopolitics beyond the binary of making live/letting die, in order to allow for an 
understanding of technologies deployed within the government of migration, which 
makes little sense from a reductive reading of governmentality.  
4.4. Conclusion  
In summary, this chapter has built and drawn on literature that examines new 
technologies for border control and externalised border enforcement, focusing not only 
on overt forms of exclusion through traditional border security measures, but also by 
influencing the intent or conduct. In doing so, the chapter has contributed first of all to an 
emerging body of scholarship that examines the manner in which states are resorting to 
increasingly sophisticated (micro) practices and policies to deter, exclude, and control, 
by influencing the choices and intention of people on the move. Far more seldom 
acknowledged than the internal dimensions of British immigration control, the external 
dimensions found in the politics of exhaustion constitute a detrimental approach to 
mobility governance and merit the same levels of scrutiny and critique as the domestic 
British ‘hostile environment.’  
Moreover, it should be emphasised that the UK border manifests both as formal 
expressions of sovereign power through visible juxtaposed controls and border walls, but 
also as biopolitical technologies through the influencing and persuasion techniques 
which are, according to Leanne Weber et al (2019: 16), ‘typical of contemporary 
democratic governance in other spheres.’ Therefore, it appears as though there is a 
convergence of sovereign power and governmentality of biopower here, or what 
Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) refer to as an ‘assemblage of power.’ To take this further, 
the next chapter explores how such assemblages of power, characterised by a high degree 
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of heterogeneity, interact with the forces of autonomous migration, and indeed, explores 
the processual dialogue between the two.  Indeed, the politics of exhaustion will be 
further problematised in the next chapter, as we direct our gaze at migrant subjectivities, 
acts of resistance, and agency within this site of border struggles, where the seemingly 
antithetical notions of state power and migrant subjectivities are understood as being 




5. Capture, escape, exhaust, persist: Production of migrant 
subjectivities in the UK-France borderzone  
5.1. Introduction  
An East African woman whom I interviewed in London in the spring of 2019 spoke to me 
at length about the exhaustion brought on by the border practices in northern France. 
Upon arriving in the UK, following several years in displacement (including a lengthy 
period of time in the UK-France borderzone), the exhaustion caught up with her. She 
stated the following:  
I just slept and slept and [the detention centre staff] thought I was dead. I slept all 
day and night. They came and woke me up, because they thought I was dead. I 
couldn’t eat for three days, so the doctor came to examine me […] I was sleeping 
or daydreaming, so the breakfast, lunch, and dinner was just sitting there waiting 
for me. I was so exhausted. (Interlocutor nr. 51b)   
Evidently, she had nonetheless persisted the emotional, psychological, and physical 
effects of the politics of exhaustion, and is today living a relatively safe and stable life in 
the UK, having been granted refugee status, or ‘Leave to Remain.’ Her story, amongst 
many others, is testament to the strength of migrant subjectivities and capacity for 
resilience that is evident in spite of the harsh deterrence policies, and the gravity of the 
harm produced through the externalisation of the UK border. It is precisely these aspects 
which this chapter will be addressing, through an analysis of further field research 
findings.  
Indeed, the situation at the UK’s border with France, and the longstanding struggle 
between ‘mobility projects’ and ‘border control’ which converge there, inevitably raises 
critical questions relating to the relationship between state power and individual agency. 
To merely provide a representation of migrants in the borderzone as being fully 
entrapped within the grip of the politics of exhaustion, or within sovereign and 
biopolitical control, is to overemphasise, if not sensationalise, the situation and to 
oversimplify migrants’ diverse experiences. In doing so, I would moreover risk falling into 
the Agambenian approach to biopolitical border security, where the strongly articulated 
‘control bias’ has been described by Vaughan-Williams (2015: 8) as ‘empirically and 
politically problematic, because it privileges sovereign power and control over political 
struggle and contestation, [and] fails to account for the role of migrant agency in shaping 
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and resisting contemporary border regimes.’ This shortcoming, the scholar argues, ‘tends 
to flatten and generalize across diverse border sites and migrants’ experience’ (Ibid). 
Therefore, and in line with my second research question, this chapter turns to examining 
how migrant subjectivities in this borderzone are performed, and how they give shape to 
a form of counter-exhaustion by subverting, resisting and challenging the control 
methods. Through the field research findings, I explore the resilience, motivations, 
understandings, and tactics of people trapped at the UK-France border, and examine how 
the bordering tactics, referred to as the ‘politics of exhaustion’ in the previous chapter, 
are also resisted, contested, and (re)appropriated in the borderzone through displaced 
individuals’ struggles for mobility and survival. As such, I trace here the contours of 
political subjectivities and forms of human agency in the borderzone, through the 
experiences recounted by my interlocutors and interviewees (see Table 2). I then discuss 
the complex interrelationship and co-constituent nature of bordering technologies and 
migrant subjectivities, as well as the relationship between the politics of exhaustion and 
the autonomy of migration; between control and resistance. Through such theoretical 
engagement with my research findings, I am able to argue that neither control or agency 
(‘escape’) should be privileged as our level of analysis, as state power and migrant 
subjectivities are best understood as mutually constitutive and not dichotomous. 
This chapter thus uses the ‘gaze of autonomy’ (Mezzadra, 2011) and seeks a relational 
understanding of power, as well as of the role played by mobility movements in the 
constitution and transformation of borders and border regimes. As discussed in chapter 
2, which provided a journey through theoretical approaches within critical border and 
migration studies, the autonomy of migration scholarship suggests that the sovereign 
order can indeed be undermined by everyday acts of resistance among migrants. As seen, 
migrant imperceptibility ‘is made up of everyday, singular, unpretentious acts of 
subverting subjectification and betraying representation’ (Papadopoulos et al, 2008: 61), 
meaning that irregular migration is constituted by conflicts and actors which ‘cannot be 
conceived within the existing framework of citizenship’ (Ibid: 14). Therefore, in 
addressing the agency-control dichotomy, which is often found within academic 
literature relating to critical border and migration studies, I also draw on theorisations 
from scholarly work dedicated to exploring forms of performative migrant citizenship 
and (political) subjectivities beyond formal citizenship.  
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Table 2 | Forms of resistance in border struggles: A differentiation  
 
5.2. Pretence at stability, normality, and dignity  
The first manifestation of migrant subjectivities, resistance, and defiance to emerge 
clearly from the research interviews with my interlocutors and interviewees, was the act 
of creating spaces where everyday life can temporarily play out with some pretence at 
‘normality.’ Moreover, the act of building community relations and friendships, with 
fellow migrants or volunteers, is another aspect of this, as are the reliance on routines, 
opportunities to learn and develop, exercising humour, and taking part in performative 
and expressive arts projects. Acts aimed at producing a space where a pretence at 
The creation of spaces where ‘everyday life’ can temporarily be 
anchored, with some pretence at ‘normality.’ This includes the 
creation of community spaces, where community relations and 
friendships can take root. Reliance on daily or weekly routines, 
including anything faith-based, creating or seizing opportunities to 
learn and develop, and participating in performative and expressive 
arts projects, are all classified under this category. 
Both conscious and mundane processes of ‘everyday resistance’ can 
be understood as an enactment of political subjectivity outside of 
formal citizenship. These include acts of refusal of state provisions, 
appropriation of destruction prior to demolitions, going off the radar 
and into hiding, deciphering and avoiding police routines, navigating 
the ‘system’ strategically, and creating strategic interpersonal 
relationships with volunteers and police officers.   
To counter dehumanisation and racialisation processes, counter-
narratives and self-portrayal are of significant importance. This 
includes caring for one’s physical appearance, such as clothing and 
hair, challenging prejudices held by volunteers and police, both 
through acts and speech, including by assuming leading or 
supporting roles within humanitarian work, and the exercising of 
humour and playfulness within seemingly damned situations. It also 
involves mourning and honouring the deceased.   
Forms of (overtly) political mobilisations, through which subjects 
constitute themselves as citizens, irrespective of their legal status, 
include public protests and manifestations, meetings or other forms 
of communications with policy makers and political leaders, media 





stability, normality, and dignity can emerge are hence a recurring theme in the UK-France 
borderzone, and this is precisely the focus of this sub-section.   
5.2.1. ‘Lieux de vie’: where life can be temporarily anchored  
As seen in the previous chapter, which explored the politics of exhaustion, the living 
conditions in northern France have been consistently extremely precarious in the 
absence of formal sheltering arrangements. Nonetheless, over the years, informal living 
arrangements in defiance of evictions and demolitions by the state authorities have 
emerged and re-emerged; where migrants have created their own living spaces in the 
absence of formal UN or state-run camps or centres, sometimes with the solidarity from 
activists and grassroots groups. The most noteworthy example of this phenomenon, 
albeit not the only one, was the so-called Calais ‘Jungle’ camp of 2015-2016, which 
stretched across a vast piece of industrial wasteland in the La Lande area of Calais, 
sometimes now referred to as ‘the big Jungle’ to distinguish it from the smaller informal 
camps and settlements, or ‘jungles,’ which cropped up in the area before and after its 
existence. As outlined in the previous chapter, the camp, which, at its peak, is estimated 
to have hosted nearly 10,000 individuals, saw the emergence of countless communal 
spaces, restaurants, cafes, churches and mosques, schools, libraries, and several busy 
barber shops where one could get a haircut, hot shower, or a neatly maintained beard.  
As such, an overwhelming array of ‘lieux de vie’ (directly translated as ‘places of life’ and 
understood as ‘living spaces’) cropped up with relentless energy and determination 
across the wasteland. (see Figures E and F) Despite its precarity and inadequacy in terms 
of standards and its sheer lack of safety and protection for certain groups, as seen in the 
previous chapter, many of its former residents have spoken very highly of their time in 
the camp to me, because this godforsaken place also provided many with a space where 
solidarity and unexpected manifestations of dignity could take root. One of the Sudanese 
interlocutors who took part in my research summarised the forms of life in the camp as 
follows:  
We would invite people we didn’t even know to have a talk and chat with a simple 
cup of tea or coffee. [We’d] make our own food and cook together. We would cook 
our normal food belonging to our culture to try to adopt the life [we had] before, 
when we were in our own country. We would build shelter and pretend that 
shelter was a bedroom. We would have another tent as a living room, and then 
have a place [where we could] eat and talk and the place we could sleep. 
(Interlocutor nr. 6)   
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Another former camp resident, also from Sudan, similarly recalled:  
When I was in the Jungle, we were a group, a community, and we had our own 
kitchen and our own tents. One of us had organised the kitchen stuff and we could 
register with him. It made me feel better. I also spent time in the Jungle books 
library, where they would teach, and there were volunteers. (Interlocutor nr. 64)   
A French academic interviewee suggested: 
I think, maybe, the community, it calms people down, and many have strong faith 
and I think that helps people, too. To have community, to have fun, to have people 
to talk to, it all helps. (Interviewee nr. 63)  
Throughout and during the camp, there was also a possibility for communities to thrive 
and for friendships to take root. As one interviewee put it: 
We had happy times, we received everyone [in our shelters] and smiled without 
complaining about the muddy environment and the misery [we were] living in. 
We were staying there to build friendships, invite [each other] for cups of tea. We 
could have really strong friendships, and that’s what’s not normal about that place, 
the Jungle, and you can’t find that anywhere else. (Interlocutor nr. 5)   
A long-term volunteer had observed something similar, and suggested the following:  
It seemed like friendships were so crucial. It’s so unlikely, for example, between 
people speaking so many different languages, to make friends. Some Afghan guys 
had never seen black people before, and yet you had a lot of friendships that 
crossed those barriers quite easily because there was this great thing, they had 
this thing in common – wherever they were coming from, they’re now here and 
this is how everyone is living here […] I never actually thought about it as a 
survival strategy, but making that human connection is probably a survival 
strategy. Isolation, in general, kills the spirit a lot more than we probably realise. 

















Figure E | Lieux de vie in the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp, 2016 (Natalie Stanton) 
 




Within this context, there was seemingly also a strong desire to ensure one’s living space 
was dignified and one’s own. In relation to this topic, the same long-term volunteer, 
suggested:  
People would do things like personalising their shelters and tents; making a home. 
I saw that everywhere. I think that really matters when you live in a place like that. 
When everyone lives in the same box made of plastic and wood, making little 
gardens and fences and making it your own space is important. (Interviewee nr. 
32) 
Within the logics of the politics of exhaustion, which was explored in the previous 
chapter, it is no surprise that a space like the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp had to go, and was 
therefore successively shrunk with its complete flattening to the ground in October 2016. 
However, according to my interlocutors and interviewees, the creation of spaces where 
communal life can take root have continued to be carved out by migrants over the years, 
which followed the final demolition of the camp. Indeed, the research interviews seem to 
indicate that individuals tend to come together and form loose communities, even whilst 
in transit and extreme precarity. Very few individuals interviewed had left their country 
of origin with a travel companion; they would usually have met somewhere along the 
journey and stuck together, forming strong bonds with one another. In relation to this 
topic, one long-term volunteer suggested:  
Thinking of community… I don’t know if we recognised it enough – the really 
strong importance of community links – friendships, advice, food, sharing clothes, 
and stuff like that. That’s probably the biggest form of support for people in the 
area. During evictions [in Grande-Synthe], a family would be moved to an 
accommodation centre two hours away, but they […] would come back straight 
away, because they felt isolated and far from people who could support them – 
people here survive by having other people around. (Interviewee nr. 74)   
Another long-term volunteer described the strong space of community relations among 
Eritreans he was working with in Calais during the years after the demolition of the Calais 
‘Jungle’ camp:  
I went down an evening under the bridges. ‘We’re about to eat,’ they told me. [They 
were in] an area where you can’t stand up, it’s only 1.5 metres high, so we sat 
round in a circle eating and they were sharing the food they’d brought from the 
food distribution. There’s an incredible sense of community there […] Someone 
will be washing their hair while someone else is pouring water for their friend so 
they can wash their hair. You have people sitting around fires. There’s mutual 
supporting […] What depresses me is people walking around on their own, and 
there will always be some. It always saddens me seeing people on their own. 
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The same interviewee added, ‘I think it’s the community thing that sustains people, and 
the incredible support of the associations.’ (Interviewee nr 34) Similarly, a Sudanese man 
who spent several months in Calais prior to his arrival in the UK, recalled the ways in 
which he had sought to resist feelings of despair: 
 
It is horrible, actually, but you have no choice. What can you do? You have to just 
keep the hope and keep wishing to go to a better place. Sometimes there were 
volunteer people– ‘normal people’ – who came with food and drink and gave you 
hope. Sometimes they came and brought tea and biscuits in the morning, and they 
came and brought it and sat and talked to you, and sometimes I felt okay. It was 
good to sit and talk to them, so you could feel okay. You feel you get more energy 
to carry on towards your goals. Without that, I think… I don’t know. (Interlocutor 
nr. 38)   
 
In August 2018 during my field work, my Eritrean interpreter was invited to ‘hang out’ 
with a group of Eritrean youth who had created an improvised ‘living room’ for 
themselves in some bushes in the industrial area. They had found an abandoned sofa and 
an armchair, and had brought cans of beer. ‘Get comfortable, grab a beer,’ they had said 
to their unknown guest. ‘They seemed to be a lot happier by being close to each other,’ 
my interpreter commented afterwards. A British long-term volunteer and researcher 
specialising in support for youth and children also spoke of the strong sense of 
community and solidarity between boys and young men as follows: 
Young people are often very affectionate and caring with each other in Calais. 
Maybe it’s a sense that they’ve been through a lot together, they might have 
travelled on a boat together or been in Libya together, and that comes out in the 
way they look after each other. (Interviewee nr. 33)  
Other external observers have specifically used the term ‘tenderness’ when commenting 
on the community relations and friendships witnessed in the area:   
They care for each other and show tenderness, they care of each other’s interests 
[…] If someone new comes along, they invite them [to join the group]. There is a 
sense of relational wellbeing. (Interviewee nr. 62a) 
Another interviewee explained what happens when someone goes to the hospital after a 
serious accident:  
Usually several of their friends are already there [when I arrive]. They’re sending 
the message that ‘We’re not going to forget you, you’re in hospital and we’re 
coming to see you.’ […] One of them took the other’s hand, and started combing 
his hair and putting oil onto his head […] The other day we went to see another 
guy; he’s now out of psychiatric hospital, as he had a breakdown. It was wonderful 
138 
 
seeing [another boy] taking his hand. These are some very human gestures that I 
see all the time; emptying water over people’s head, visiting hospital. […] People 
are looking out for each other in very human ways. (Interviewee nr. 34) 
 
During one of my field visits, my interpreter and I were interviewing an Iranian father. In 
the meantime, he left his 5-year-old son to play with some of the young African guys 
outside. He commented: ‘They’re so amazing, so kind, and really look after [the child] and 
keep an eye on him.’ We watched them playing football and noticed that their behaviour 
was particularly gentle and caring with the child, also seemingly making efforts to make 
him feel special; pretending that he scored goals, and putting on a whole spectacle for 
him. When he left with his father, they shouted, ‘Bye Ronaldo!’ as he skipped away.  
As Squire (2011: 11) writes elsewhere, ‘acts of solidarity and collective mobilization are 
all diverging dimensions of a politics of migration that constitute irregularity as an 
ambivalent and contested condition, but which can be appropriated or re-appropriated 
in various ways.’ This moreover resonates with Sigona’s (2015) concept of ‘campzenship,’ 
which captures a ‘situated form of political membership’ within refugee camps (2015: 1), 
showing that the Agambenian ‘space of exception’ lens is certainly an unsatisfactory 
analytical tool for grasping the complexities of migrant subjectivities in the UK-France 
borderzone.  
5.2.2. Routines and creative manifestations 
A significant number of community spaces sprung up in the Calais Camp. For instance, 
there was the ‘Jungle Books’ library, and various schools, a youth space for play and 
creativity, and various projects giving space for creative manifestations. In relation to 
these topics, an academic-activist interviewee suggested to me that:  
During the camp, people were living a daily life, their narrative was almost 
completely focused on their humanity – they would talk about lessons, learning, 
they would build shops, restaurants, do something that makes sense for them. The 
situation or circumstances were far from ideal but they were making the best of it. 
People were holding on to hope by creating a life by doing things that all human 
beings are doing, like cooking food, washing clothes, all of those things, in a 
different context of course. […] People were also playing instruments, playing 
sports. (Interviewee nr. 31) 
Recalling the role of the ‘Jungle Books’ library, one of the former Sudanese camp residents 
reflected as follows: 
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In my opinion, it was a [source of] light for all of the jungle. It was the place [where] 
you [could] find promises in the books; to read a story or learn a new language. 
This means hope and light in the dark. That is where people tried to spend time 
for themselves. We tried to have entertainment through reading or learning, or 
discussing with each other. (Interlocutor nr. 5)  
 
The act of creating and performing daily routines was also an issue that emerged from 
many of my interviews and conversations with migrant interlocutors. This would include 
taking up roles within the camp (which is discussed in greater detail under sub-section 
5.4.4. below), keeping to regular meal habits and religious routines, and participating in 
arts activities. For some, it also involved doing exercise. A long-term volunteer explained 
to me:  
There was a gym as well – from July 2016, so for the last few months. That was a 
really cool place. You know, often boxing is used to get through to young people 
who might have frustrations and going through difficult times, as a way to vent 
anger and frustration. […] The gym was a really good example of using those same 
ideas in a refugee camp. A really helpful way to express frustration, I think. 
(Interviewee nr. 65) 
Meanwhile, music and theatre were a recurring element in the Calais ‘Jungle’. Sometimes 
this would just take the shape of camp residents coming together, often alongside 
activitists and volunteers, to listen to music and throw a party. Other times, formal music 
projects would visit the camp and invite participation in more structured activities. One 
of the former residents recalled: 
A [music] group came because they believed the music could change something, 
even though music cannot change political opinion. They did mention they were 
going to try and make an album. It was nice entertainment. Even the theatre dome 
was entertaining the people and getting the stress out of the people to be honest. 
(Interlocutor nr. 5) 
One of the individuals behind the theatre dome and its related activities suggested:  
The assumption that people were solely in need of help - this was something we 
tried to alter as a perception. People need necessities to survive but in order to 
feel like a person you need more than that, something that allows you to reflect, 
demonstrate awareness of yourself… an expression of what you’ve been through 
[…] We wanted to provide a space for people to feel like people and not just give 
them things to survive until the next day. […] We hoped to help build the notion of 
agency, freedom of expression […]. (Interviewee nr. 37)  
 
Similarly, a team member of a group of art therapists working in the camp and during its 
aftermath shared her perspective:  
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There’s theory of art making along with dreaming, community, family, rituals, 
faith, spirituality, and the arts within the same ‘body of coping’. […] People making 
music together, also spontaneously, not just formally. […] Dancing…all these 
things are about coping and resilience; we saw huge amounts in the camp… 
Imagination, imagining something other than the camp. (Interviewee nr. 62a)  
With the destruction of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp, fewer spaces for creative projects and 
daily routines are possible, but not entirely absent. Individuals in the area would find 
their own ways of accessing books and continue to learn English or French via their 
phones or books, even in the absence of a home. (See figure G)  
 




Groups would continue to work relentlessly to create a space of calm through youth 
activities, sports, weekend excursions, and art therapy activities, both outside nearby the 
informal settlements and also within an indoors space provided by the Secours 
Catholique day centre. During one of my visits to the latter, I interviewed an Iranian man 
who suggested that the arts activities there had some positive effects on people: 
It’s not really about doing art, and not necessarily about becoming an artist. But 
about leaving the violent situation [they] are in. Having tents taken away, police 
violence, and so on. Coming here, people can feel some dignity. (Interlocutor nr. 
43) 
In the same space of the day centre, a fashion show was staged in December 2018, where 
the dehumanising narratives surrounding migrants in the area were challenged. This is 
examined further in another section below.  
5.2.3. Keeping the faith  
For many of my interlocutors, although of course not all, religion and faith appear to 
constitute a key factor driving the creation of a sense of stability and normality. During 
the time of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp, in the absence of official structures for worship, 
Christians from East Africa built a church in the southern part of the camp, where people 
could join together in a community and worship. By the same token, several mosques 
sprung up throughout the camp, which again served as both community spaces and a 
place for prayer. A French academic interviewee recalled: 
During my time in the camp it was Ramadan, we had ‘iftar’ [breaking of fast] there, 
it was amazing. Fasting was so hard there, but people managed to do it, despite 
everything. It was really nice during Ramadan because you had the mosque. And 
the Eritrean community, they had the church in the camp where they could go and 
pray. (Interviewee nr. 63) 
In the aftermath of the demolition of the camp, which saw the destruction of places of 
worship, individuals have continued to find ways to join together in faith communities. 
For instance, East African individuals have now set up a space where they meet for 
worship, a space originally intended for playing boules. (See Figure H) A British support 
worker told me during his interview that they meet there on Sundays to worship 
together:  
I like to join the community there for worship on a Sunday. Sometimes there have 
been 90 or more people there. (Interviewee nr. 34) 
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Figure H | Place of worship in Calais, October 2018 (Alex Holmes)  
 
 
An art therapist similarly noted about the aftermath of the camp: ‘We’ve found that 
people’s spirituality and faith is huge, faith in humanity.’ The same interlocutor spoke of 
how individuals would hold on tight to pieces of cardboard and fold them up and hide 
them during evictions; these were improvised prayer mats. (Interviewee nr. 62a) A 
Sudanese minor, whom I interviewed in London, explained to me that his time in the 
borderzone (in the aftermath of the camp) was characterised by strong religious faith:  
How I stayed strong? After Allah, my friends were always supporting me and told 
me, now, you’re struggling, but once you reach UK, you will find a good way to live. 
I would be praying, and be with my friends. (Interlocutor nr. 75)  
 
Another illustration of the role of faith for many in the borderzone was when a young 
man from Libya entered the day centre in Calais, dressed up and wearing perfume, ready 
for the Friday prayers. He told me he was just about to walk three kilometres to a mosque 
and he seemed peaceful and purposeful, despite having been given a notice by the French 
state that he needed to leave French territory immediately. This was moreover after 13 
hours in detention. An interlocutor with longstanding engagement in the area also 
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recalled strong religious faith as seemingly fundamental to some individuals’ coping 
strategies: 
Someone I know well has been ‘trying’ [to reach the UK] for several months. Last 
week after returning from Belgium with his cousin – who has been refused asylum 
by the Swiss – they found themselves on a lorry going the wrong way. When I next 
saw him, he told me that he would only succeed in getting to the UK when God 
decided it was the right time for him to succeed. ‘My time to succeed is already 
written in the book... it is not yet my time.’ (Interviewee nr. 34)   
 
Based on the above analysis of research findings, I understand the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp as 
a poignant example of the power of migrant subjectivities and human agency. The camp 
was built as an informal shantytown where life and agency were suddenly possible, in 
defiance of state efforts to force individuals in a space of precarity, and allowed 
individuals to subvert official rules of the state. This sub-section has suggested that the 
emergence of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp enabled an imagining of agency and inclusion 
outside of the framework of rights and citizenship. In setting up the camp and all of its 
detailed social functions, political agency outside the realm of official status or citizenship 
started to take shape.  
Migrant subjectivities have also been further enabled through creative grassroots 
projects, which have sprung up in the area over time. As McGee and Pelham (2017: 22) 
suggest, in their work analysing ‘sports and play’ projects with migrant youth in the Calais 
area, such grassroots efforts ‘not only stand in tension with the violent border 
sovereignties of neoliberal states, but open up the inchoate possibility for political 
struggle and refugee-centred claims-making over the right to inhabit the ‘exceptional’ 
space of the camp.’ Indeed, the dynamics highlighted in this sub-section clearly rebut the 
notion of ‘bare life’ and refuse the reading of migrants in the area as some form of ‘homo 
sacer,’ who are excluded from political life. I would here also refer to McNevin (2007: 
670), who argues that irregular migrants’ ‘assertion of entitlement as right-bearing 
subjects, despite irregular status, contests the exclusivity of citizenship as a measure of 
political inclusion.’ While I wouldn’t advocate for the discounting of the value of struggles 
for citizenship by any means, the focus on migrant struggles and migrant subjectivities 
draws our attention to potential for rights-based struggles which go beyond citizenship.  
Within this context, Dimitris Papadopoulos and Vassilis S. Tsianos (2013) propose the 
concept of ‘mobile commons,’ which describes the ‘world of knowledge, of information, 
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of tricks for survival, of mutual care, of social relations, of services exchange, of solidarity 
and sociability that can be shared, used and where people contribute to sustain and 
expand it’ (2013: 190). As Nyers (2015: 32) comments, this might constitute a different 
world from that of citizens, but importantly, it is not separated from it. Here, we would 
ask how migrant subjects constitute themselves as citizens, irrespective of their legal 
status. At the same time, however, I have shed light on a state of ambivalence and an 
interplay of control and agency, as many of the actions taken in the borderzone are both 
produced and productive of both agency and control. The destruction of the Calais ‘Jungle’ 
camp (see Figure I) was a stark reminder of this entanglement of agency and control, and 
the processual fragility of acts of defiance and resistance within asymmetrical power 
relationships.   
Figure I | Eviction of the Calais ‘Jungle’ Continues (Rob Pinney)  
 
5.3. Everyday acts of resistance  
Mezzadra and Neilson (2013: 13) highlight the importance of ‘the set of everyday 
practices by which migrants continually come to terms with the pervasive effects of the 
border, subtracting themselves from them or negotiating them through the construction 
of networks and transnational social spaces’ (see also Rodriguez, 1996). The field 
research has discovered a range of ways in which individuals in the borderzone are 
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resisting, contesting, appropriating, and co-producing the border struggles there. As seen 
in the earlier theoretical chapter, Johnson (2014) was among those who argued that 
agency must not only be conceived of as the realisation of a certain desired end goal, as 
this definition would be too limiting, in particular from a starting point of ‘agency that 
begins from the exceptional space of the subaltern’ (2014: 29).  
 
Similarly, Lee and Pratt (2012: 900) analyse everyday politics and subjectivity as 
‘moments that have the potential to destabilise sovereign or state determinations of 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion and produce new solidarities and ways of living 
with others.’ Based on this, smaller acts of agency and resistance can be seen to constitute 
contestation of ‘the shape and meaning of the space of the border, even if this is to 
produce a greater degree of restriction, a firmer politics of closure or a more steadfast 
refusal’ (Ibid). This sub-section looks at both conscious and mundane processes of 
‘everyday resistance,’ which, as Hall (2015: 856) rightly asserts, are concepts that are well 
encapsulated in the work of Lefebvre and de Certeau, and also gained traction with the 
work of Scott (1985). In his book Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of 
Resistance, Scott (1985) looks at how peasant and enslaved societies are responding to 
domination, and argues that oppression and resistance are in constant flux, and that due 
to the focus of political scientists and other analysts on major, visible ‘events’ or collective 
action, we risk missing more subtle and invisible, albeit also very powerful, forms of 
‘everyday resistance’ such as foot-dragging, evasion, false compliance, feigned ignorance, 
and sabotage (Ibid.).   
 
Within the context of border struggles, small everyday acts of refusal, negotiation, and 
denial could, in this sense, be understood as an enactment of political subjectivity outside 
of formal citizenship, shedding light on performative notions of agency and migrant 
defiance of state control. I now will proceed in highlighting some noteworthy instances 
of precisely everyday resistance in the below sub-sections.  
 
5.3.1. Refusing state provisions, appropriating destruction  
An example which could be interpreted as a form of ‘everyday resistance’ in the UK-
France borderzone is the refusal of migrants to eat food provided by state authorities. It 
was highlighted to me that, in March 2018, when the French government first took over 
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food distribution activities in Calais from grassroots groups and volunteers through the 
contractor La Vie Active, many migrants chose to actively refuse the government-funded 
food. Some of my interlocutors told me that this was because they did not want to accept 
food from the same hands that were abusing them. Others said they refused to take the 
food, because they were worried this would make the grassroots volunteers’ work 
redundant, and they feared that life in the borderzone would be so much worse without 
the presence of the volunteers. Here, we can understand ‘migrant struggles’ as referring 
to daily strategies, refusals, and resistances through which migrants enact their 
(contested) presence – even if they are not expressed or manifested as ‘political’ battles 
demanding something in particular (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008). 
These two meanings highlight the heterogeneity of migrant conditions and the diverse 
ways in which migrant subjectivity is manifested.  
Perhaps in a similar spirit, during the various stages of demolition of the Calais ‘Jungle’ 
camp throughout 2016 (in January, March, and October), some individuals chose to burn 
down their own shelters rather than allowing the French state to demolish them. An 
interviewee elaborated on this by stating the following: 
When you had a demolition with a police line moving in, and they [were] 
destroying shelters, someone would burn down their shelter rather than letting 
the police destroy it. That’s why people set their own shelters on fire. (Interviewee 
nr. 32) 
Another interviewee similarly recalled: 
People began setting their houses on fire. I think it was a weird kind of ownership 
[along the lines of]: ‘My house is going to be destroyed, but if anyone is going to 
destroy it, I’ll fucking destroy it myself’ […] There was also a man standing on the 
roof of his shelter with a sign saying, ‘I’m searching for freedom in Europe but I 
found none.’ He was standing like a statue on his roof. He must have thought, ‘What 
have I got left – a piece of paper and a pen – I’ll stand on my roof.’ (Interviewee nr. 
37)  
 
Other forms of symbolic, silent resistance took the shape of hunger strikes and the sewing 
of lips. However, this will be discussed further down in a subsequent section, as I believe 
these could be interpreted as a more active form of resistance and direct political 
activism. For now, I would argue that these forms of actions lead us to see migrants in the 
borderzone as agents whose (non)utterances need to be taken into account for our 
theorising of migrant subjectivities, resistance, and agency. In theorising ‘escape routes,’ 
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Papadopoulos et al (2008) emphasise that these are not only routes taken across deserts, 
seas, and escaping detention centres, but also: 
[T]he everyday lived experience of moving: migrants’ strategic and off-the-radar 
efforts at locating new paths for their journeys and for living; attempts at 
developing contacts for jobs, housing, health care; the affective responses 
migrants have to their denigration and exploitation; their experience of the lived 
spaced, of work, of the streets […] It is within the rich density of their lives – lives 
that are of their making – that escape routes are found and traversed.’ (cited in 
Sharma, 2009: 470)  
This appears to be of high relevance to the types of ‘off-the-radar’ efforts and everyday 
resistance highlighted in this section. Here, I also refer to McNevin (2007), to argue that 
the forms of migrant subjectivity and claims made by individuals in the UK-France border 
zone ‘represent key contemporary sites of the political, challenging long-standing 
assumptions about who belongs and to what they belong.’ (2007: 658)   
5.3.2. Navigating the system    
Another dimension which emerged from the research was ways in which migrants 
asserted their agency by strategically navigating the system and certain components of 
the politics of exhaustion. For instance, people would learn and memorise the routines of 
the police and evictions, so that they could make sure to take down their tents and grab 
their belongings early in the morning before an eviction would be due to start. Therefore, 
they would either hide their belongings in the woodlands, or as many would do, carry 
everything around in bags during the day. One of my interviewees suggested that the act 
of hiding was not restricted to belongings only; people would also strategically hide their 
own presence, only to re-emerge when deemed strategically sound to do so:  
People are always hiding, hiding their stuff, themselves, their true identity. They 
would be living in that kind of way, but still enact strategic visibility when there 
was, for instance, food distribution. (Interviewee nr. 25)  
An Ethiopian man explained how he would use the ‘weapon of silence’ (albeit he did not 
use this term himself) when caught and interrogated by the police: he would simply 
refuse to utter a single word, even when they brought in one translator after the other to 
try and make him speak. Eventually, they would release him again. (Interlocutor nr. 30) 
Others explained to me that upon arrival in Europe, they had destroyed the skin on their 
fingertips by drenching them in alcohol and then rubbing them against the concrete 
ground until they were bleeding and the skin came off. This, they thought, would help 
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ensure they could circumvent the Dublin system and make their journey to the UK easier. 
These examples resonate with Nyers (2015), who argues that ‘these identities, 
communities, and practices of escape strive to be ‘imperceptible’ to sovereign powers’ 
(30). Meanwhile, some of the Eritrean interlocutors who took part in a group interview 
in August 2018 explained how they had sought to afford themselves some protection by 
creating positive relationships with individual police officers, who would then be more 
likely to leave them alone, and with volunteers, who might give them an extra advantage 
here and there. Regarding the police officers, one of them explained: 
There’s a difference between the police [officers] – the black police treat us a bit 
better, and one of them I got to know, she’s a lady […] The police is now seeing us 
differently. They know we are here getting away - trying to escape from danger [in 
Eritrea] – the police have asked about what Eritrea is like and trying to know about 
our culture. We are peaceful [in Calais] and there’s an established relationship – 
they will not bother us anymore.  (Interlocutor nr. 24a) 
Another interviewee explained that some individuals would agree to be transferred to 
French reception and accommodation centres, ‘Centres d'Accueil et d'Orientation (CAO),’ 
as they knew they would be given three weeks of rest during the statutory period of 
deciding whether they wanted to apply for asylum in France or not (which, generally, 
they knew they wouldn’t do): 
They would take the three weeks [of rest in the centre] and then go back to Calais, 
navigating the system in a way that benefited them, but not signing for asylum in 
France. (Interviewee nr. 31) 
This could be understood as a manner in which individuals are utilising the system that 
oppresses them; to serve their own needs and ultimately support them in their aims. 
Along similar (albeit more drastic) lines, one interlocutor from Sudan told me that he and 
his friends sometimes found it appealing to be put under arrest in the police station in 
Coquelles for a night, because it meant they would receive food and a dry place to sleep 
before being released again. (Interlocutor nr. 6) While I would caution against 
generalising this view, and against romanticising individual agency as this arguably 
carries limited meaning unless it is accompanied by long-terms struggles for structural 
change, it is nonetheless clear that the dynamics in the borderzone are far from a situation 
of ‘bare life’ where migrants are under a totalistic grip of the state’s control. Rather, the 
borderzone ought to be understood as a space of contestation, subversion, and co-
production of the border control tactics. As such, this sub-section has demonstrated ways 
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in which the borderzone can act as a space of politics and performative subjectivities. 
Migrants’ acts should therefore not be misunderstood as passive compliance, but in fact 
are better understood as ‘self-interested acts of survival’ (Gajparia, 2016: 158) or subtle 
forms of ‘everyday resistance’ (Scott, 1985).  
Relatedly, there is a topic which I chose not to proactively explore with my interlocutors; 
namely, their ways of seeking new ways to try to cross the border. Suffice it here to say 
that this would likely include acts such as seeking new parking lots where UK-bound 
lorries were suspected to be taking a pit stop, travelling to other parts of France and 
Belgium to ‘try’ from there, opening a small section in a fence to access areas that have 
been closed off, and in some extreme cases, individuals tried swimming across the 
channel. This suggests that presumptions that hardened borders and increasingly harsh 
control measures would halt mobility and smuggling would appear misguided; instead, 
such approaches have proven to merely ‘alter the spatiality […] in terms of routes, tactics, 
danger, cost’ (Mountz and Hiemstra, 2012: 459).  
5.3.3. Women’s everyday resistance, in spite of all   
In the previous chapter, the despicable levels of violence, abuse, and harm facing women 
within the context of the lawlessness of the UK-France borderzone were examined 
briefly. Meanwhile, the research interviews also uncovered staggering levels of resilience 
and defiance among the women I had the privilege to interact with. Very few of the 
women portrayed themselves as victims, but rather highlighted how they had navigated 
different situations. For instance, one of my interlocutors recounted having resisted a 
rape attempt alongside one of her friends: 
We were going behind the fence [of Jules Ferry] to [relieve ourselves]. One time, 
there was a man there who tried to rape us, but my friend and I beat him up and 
pressed his face down onto the ground where we had urinated. That’s what he 
deserved. I am so lucky I was not on my own, because it would have been difficult 
to fight him. (Interlocutor nr. 51a)  
One of my interviewees, who works specifically with women in the area, explained that 
there were several ways in which migrant women can resist or get support which men 
don’t have access to. For instance, she explained that women will be able to get support 
from aid organisations and be treated a bit better by the police than men would. She 
continued to explain that: 
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[There was] a more subtle form of coping strategies seen among women by 
making use of their awareness that they could get access to more material support 
through the grassroots groups’ assumption that they are more vulnerable [than 
men], and they would make use of this to get the necessary level of support for 
their families. (Interviewee nr. 74)   
The women I interviewed during the field research told me about other subtle ways in 
which they exercised acts of defiance against risks of sexual and gender-based violence 
(although they did not express these acts in such terms). Two women told me they would 
usually wear adults’ incontinence pads so that they wouldn’t have to relieve themselves 
outside, where risks of an attack were higher. Although, sometimes, they explained, they 
couldn’t change it for a very long time, so it would give them a very bad rash. They 
moreover relied on what they referred to as ‘nice guys’ from their country of origin, who 
would help shield them with a large blanket while they changed their incontinence pad 
or went to relieve themselves (Interlocutor nr. 51a). Women interviewed by an aid 
worker in Dunkirk expressed additional forms of arrangements with previously 
unknown men in order to secure some level of protection:  
I met him through a friend on my journey. He offered to accompany me and act as 
my husband. I couldn’t travel alone […] We pretend that we’re married. When 
people ask why we don’t sleep close next to each other, I just say it’s because we’re 
not in a private place, we don’t have privacy. (Timberlake, 2019) 
As demonstrated through the various illustrations drawn from this study of embodied 
encounters, migrant subjectivities manifests ‘in a series of mostly silent struggles’ 
(Scheel, 2013b: 282). Here, I also come to think of Naila Kabeer’s (1999) assertion that 
agency is ‘not only acquired through decision-making, but can be acquired through 
bargaining and negotiation, deception, manipulation, subversion, and resistance,’ 
shedding light on the truly diverse nature of migrants’ forms of everyday resistance in 
the UK-France borderzone.  
5.4. Re-humanisation and counter-narratives  
In the previous chapter, which theorised the ‘politics of exhaustion,’ I argued that a key 
component of this bordering technology are acts of de-humanisation and racialisation. In 
defiance of such processes, migrant subjectivities in the borderzone are seen to resist and 
refuse in various ways, striving for their own re-humanisation through powerful counter-




5.4.1. The ‘Halaq’ and a dignified appearance   
When clothes and personal belongings are confiscated through police raids and other 
moments of ‘capture,’ most individuals have few other choices than to rely on oftentimes 
ill-fitting, discarded hand-me-downs which once belonged to a European counterpart. 
This has been reported to contribute to a decreased sense of dignity and sense of 
individuality. Therefore, many of my interlocutors emphasised the different ways in 
which they would look after their favourite pieces of clothing, and other ways to ‘feel 
good’ about themselves. One would often observe individuals hand-washing their clothes 
and sitting for several hours to wait for the clothes to dry, draped over a fence in Calais, 
or on park bench in Paris. Keeping up a dignified appearance was arguably easier at the 
time of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp. One of my Sudanese interlocutors commented on ways 
in which camp residents would do so:  
We would cut our hair, showering every day; wearing nice clothes and look smart. 
And we would be pretending we are not there anymore. We made that life 
[resemble] normal life. To escape through your mind and think you are not there 
anymore. The imagination has no border. (Interlocutor nr. 5)   
A long-term volunteer similarly recalled something similar from the time of the camp: 
In summer 2016, you would see people walking around the camp, fresh and 
washed. People took a lot of pride in their own appearance and the appearance of 
their space in general. That probably made them feel normal in an abnormal 
setting. There were lots of barbers, everyone had very manicured beards. The 
barbers were busy. Everybody had great hair. (Interviewee nr. 32)  
Even in the aftermath of the camp, individuals have found ways of maintaining a dignified 
appearance. One of my interviewees recalled a time when she was visiting migrants in 
the woodlands:  
One day we were sitting around the fire and talking and a young teenager comes. 
He steps on a cardboard and brings out his completely white sneakers. One guy 
explained he had had a shower in the lake and wanted to put on his super white 
sneakers [for the occasion]. There are no showers; they shower in the lakes which 
is of course not ideal but they had to do it somewhere so they would use the lake. 
And how they would still manage to keep their belongings so clean, I don’t 
understand; it’s more than I can myself. (Interviewee nr. 31) 
When visiting a day centre in Calais, one encounters an improvised barber shop: two 
chairs in front of mirrors nailed to the wall, a sign saying ‘Halaq’ (Arabic for ‘barber’), and 
a table holding razor machines, scissors, an assortment of different combs, as well as 
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perfume and aftershaves. Some of the young men would self-identify as suitable for the 
barbering job, put on an apron and cut or shave other people’s hair. The men would look 
themselves closely in the mirror while having their hair styled, seemingly very conscious 
of their looks and external façade. On one of my visits, there was new equipment in the 
barber corner; thus, there was a long queue, and one could smell the perfume in the air. 
One of the guys told me he was cutting his friend’s hair like the North Korean leader. 
During the same visit, a seemingly inebriated young man suddenly took off his cap and 
asked me, ‘Do you think I should get a new haircut? I have been thinking about it, what 
do you think?’ Later that day, another man in his late 20s similarly asked me, seemingly 
out of the blue, ‘Do you think I should get a haircut? What do you think would look better, 
like this – or like that?’ These matters seemed to be of significant importance to the 
interlocutors; perhaps it was a way to normalise an entirely abnormal form of existence. 
One of the art therapists I interviewed reported: ‘They do their hair with huge love and 
attention; they really seem to care what they look like.’ (Interviewee nr. 62a) Along the 
same lines, one of my interviewees who has spent ample time working with young 
migrants in the borderzone and in the UK suggested: 
There would be attempts to maintain and change their hairstyle; so, there was a 
sense of dignity in that. They were attempting to normalise their situation and 
continuing to grow and be teenagers in an environment that is really inhibiting. 
(Interviewee nr. 33) 
5.4.2. Portrayals and perceptions   
Individuals would keep their appearances up, and also send photos back home, 
portraying their lives as a seemingly normalised existence. This is something I have 
witnessed several times during my participant observations, where individuals would 
pose in front of the Calais town hall or with friends or volunteers and then send off the 
photos to family or post on Facebook to get new ‘likes.’ This was also an observation 
raised by one of my interviewees:  
When they take pictures of themselves in Calais, they do it with a nice landscape, 
and nice clothes and smiling. ‘I will send it to my family, I don’t want them to see 
how I am living,’ they’ve explained to me. The mobile is very important, and the 
way they show themselves. (Interviewee nr. 63) 
Others, however, said they would not do so until they were in a better place. An Iranian 
man, for instance, said: ‘We don’t even tell our family about the way we live here […] What 
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picture am I supposed to send them?! I don’t want my family to be worried about me.’ 
(Interlocutor nr. 45d) There were also many other ways in which migrants in the area 
sought to construct a dignified portrayal of themselves, other than just through physical 
appearance. During the time of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp, parts of the community sought to 
bend the police officers’ view of them as criminals. One long-term volunteer recalled:  
There was one amazing moment in the southern part [of the camp], when camp 
residents were inviting police in for tea while they were intimidating people and 
trying to make them leave their shelters. Especially the Sudanese community did 
this, it was amazing to see. It de-escalated the situation. If that’s what it’s intended 
to do, then it worked. (Interviewee nr. 65) 
Countless times during my field work, individuals would highlight to me and my 
interpreters that they were worth more than the precarious situation in which we 
encountered one another. I remember in particular, during a group interview with five 
Iranian men, my interpreter said discretely to me: ‘They are very concerned that we 
would see them as different to us; they don’t want us to think that they are always [living] 
like this.’ For the remainder of the interview, and our encounter, for that matter, the men 
kept bringing up details about their jobs in Iran, and the fact that one of them had a 
rooftop on their house where they would host parties on the weekend. One of them said: 
After a while, you forget who you are and the civilisation you had; you move 
backwards. We had expertise, education, jobs. When we are hungry and walk past 
the restaurant, we don’t steal or take anything from anyone. We respect everyone. 
(Interlocutor nr. 45d)   
 
They also went out of their way to serve us food and drink underneath their improvised 
tarp in minus degrees. They lit up a fire in the fire pit and offered to heat up milk to drink, 
while toasting a dry baguette over the fire. When we declined the offer to have a banana, 
one of them smiled and said: ‘It’s food for refugees, right?’ When they learned I am 
Swedish, one of them started talking about the football player Zlatan Ibrahimović, 
emphasising that ‘his father wasn’t Swedish – they were refugees,’ and he smiled. By the 
time we left, they appeared relatively happy that we had obtained a good impression of 
them, and asked us to come back again for food another time. It was very tangible that 
they had gone to lengths to try and reverse the dehumanising portrayal they were 
experiencing whilst sleeping rough in the woodlands of Calais, accompanied by near-
daily police harassment. Another Iranian interlocutor explained to me on a different 
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occasion, that during his time in the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp, he also felt the need to challenge 
the perceptions which he thought volunteers were holding about camp residents:   
Generally, the western perception of refugees and people in the Jungle [seems to 
be one of] uncivilised people needing some help and they felt they needed to help 
and give us food; it was a patronising and top-down approach […] It hurts being 
looked down on, especially when it comes from the volunteers. (Interlocutor nr. 
46)   
In order to challenge what he perceived as a negative portrayal of migrants amongst some 
volunteers, my interlocutor had joined the Jungle Books library, which allowed him to do 
‘human activities.’ He explained further:  
It makes you feel civilised when you are part of this kind of art and education 
projects […] And for anyone to feel equal, it helps when someone comes to just be 
your friend, rather than coming to help. This is better. (Interlocutor nr. 46)    
In another more formalised endeavour to challenge perceptions of migrants in the area, 
local Calaisians, volunteers, and other interested individuals were invited to a ‘fashion 
show’ at the Secours Catholique day centre in December 2018. Titled ‘Humans in the 
Jungle Style,’ the event started off with a welcome address from one of the day centre 
managers, during which he explained:  
It’s a way to think differently about these men and women who are often 
stigmatised. We want to show that these are human beings. They can be a wealth 
for our society if we let them stay. We told ourselves we would work with a 
seamstress to work with abandoned clothing with complementary textiles from 
exiles’ countries of origin. It’s an opportunity to speak about Calais, because these 
people are often - always - forgotten since the demolition of the bidonville [Calais 
‘Jungle’ camp]. We mustn’t forget them. 
The day centre manager projected a photo onto a screen in the hall, depicting a couple of 
migrant youth wearing shorts over long trousers. He continued to recall: 
We, with our prejudices, thought they wore their clothes like this for practical 
reasons – we thought it might help them run after the lorries faster, or keep them 
warm at night. But the guys simply told us, ‘It’s our style!’ And it is with these guys 
in mind, that we invite you here today. They are not necessarily with us, but it was 
thanks of them that we are here; their story, their creativity and their idea. 
Remember them. (Dec 2018, freely translated from French) 
This also brings to mind Cigdem Esin and Aura Lounasmaa’s (2020) perspective on a 
series of projects run in the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp between November 2015 and September 
2016, under the University of East London civic engagement and impact schemes. The 
projects sought to open a relational space with camp residents through a space in which 
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migrants themselves were the storytellers who’d ‘negotiate their positioning within 
racialised power imbalances’ and enable them to challenge migrant representation. This, 
the scholars argue, enables migrant agency and can empower and facilitate social change 
and spaces of resistance: ‘When refugees are denied their right to claim/speak/act, the 
act of narrating becomes a vehicle for social change’ (2020: 391).  
 
5.4.3. Humour and the ‘Game’  
 
Another oft-cited way in which individuals in the borderzone might find resilience is 
through the use of humour. One longterm support worker suggested: 
 
Every single individual has their own coping or resilience strategy – the most 
striking for me was humour. People would be mocking of the system, mocking of 
the police, even mocking of themselves as a way to lessen the gravity of it or the 
seriousness of the situation. [They’d be] distancing [themselves] from it, laughing 
at the control dogs - laughing about ‘who puts off the sniffer dogs’, stuff like that. 
They’d be laughing at living in the jungle, making animal related jokes. It always 
struck me that it [might have been] a way to distance oneself from the reality of it. 
(Interviewee nr. 74) 
 
As such, humour might have been one way through which individuals refused their 
designation as ‘illegal’, or as ‘animals.’ Another support worker similarly found that that: 
‘there were huge amounts of humour, even when you didn’t understand each other. There 
was a bit of clowning here and there.’ (Interviewee nr. 62b) In addition, some would 
speak about their efforts to cross the UK border as a ‘Game.’  One interviewee explained: 
‘[People were] making it into a game. That’s why people would try five times a night.’ The 
same interviewee continued to explain: ‘We had people caught by the same police several 
times, and it would become a joke with the police officers. […] People therefore called it 
the Game. It was a game. A territorial struggle.’ (Interviewee nr. 37)  
One of the Sudanese minors I interviewed also joked about similar scenarios, saying that 
he did no sports during his time in Calais, ‘but I ran from the police, yeah, that was my 






5.4.4. We’ll take the lead, we know better  
Within the context of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp in 2015-2016, unorthodox forms of ‘aid’ 
developed. Many of the grassroots initiatives became entangled with migrants’ self-
organising and self-help as several distribution points and services such as first aid and 
the point of first arrival were taken over by camp residents themselves. A group of 
community leaders from different country groups also emerged within these dynamics. 
A longterm volunteer recalled:  
People were making businesses, working in them, working in general. They were 
doing all kinds of stuff, basically volunteering alongside [the rest of us]. Camp 
residents were taking care of things like the library, churches, mosques; they 
would take on responsibilities, looking after their community in their own way. 
(Interviewee nr. 32)  
One interlocutor from Sudan shared his views on how these types of initiatives came to 
life:  
People started deciding what they needed and not just take what was given to 
them. […] We built a barber shop, a mosque and church to respect everyone’s 
religion and we had our own restaurants, and also, we had our own ‘shower 
things’. Then [we wouldn’t have to] wait anymore for the White guys to offer 
[these things] to us. Those things we can do on our own; we don’t need others to 
clean our body because we can do it. And then we started to make our own food, 
cooking. We were inviting White people to eat with us. (Interlocutor nr. 5)  
The importance of migrant agency appears to also have influenced many of the grassroots 
initiatives in the area to a significant degree. One longterm volunteer suggested to me:  
[The aid in the camp] used to be so undignified and so [patronising], so starting 
the static distribution points involving members of the community as volunteers 
was so important. The mobile distribution of food was also important; you’d take 
orders and it comes as an order [to people’s homes]. (Interviewee nr. 32) 
Similarly, a long-term volunteer who was in charge of significant segments of the food 
distribution in the camp explained: 
We developed a line-free distribution method early on, to avoid escalating 
frustrations, and to make sure that we also avoided feeding into mafia structures 
and [other] power structures. We did it face-to-face, in a more humane way. And 
we did surveys asking people what they would prefer to eat, making it more 
engaging. (Interviewee nr. 35) 
Another interviewee also highlighted the importance in migrant-led working, to counter 
some of the dehumanisation experiences by people in the area:   
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Constant race-based dehumanisation obviously gets you down, so you need to mix 
it up with things that reinforce your identity. This included things like 
participation within voluntary projects or groups, like the fire-fighting team, and 
when people who took on civil society roles as you would call it. So, they were 
taking responsibility for fires, first aid, shelter building, these kinds of altruistic 
acts. (Interviewee nr. 39) 
As such, we have seen that struggles in the borderzone refer ‘not only to organized 
movements and political actions but also to social practices and behaviors that can be 
fundamental preconditions for such movements and actions but are often assigned to the 
realm of the prepolitical’ (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013: 265). This will be discussed 
further in the final section of this chapter.  
 
5.4.5. Grievable lives  
In the previous thesis chapter, a constant and underlying threat of potential death was 
highlighted as an important factor impacting negatively on the minds of migrants in the 
area, as part of the politics of exhaustion. While the Institute of Race Relations (2020) 
report that nearly 300 border-related deaths in and around the English Channel occurred 
since 1999 until November 2020, these numbers are likely to be much higher, given that 
deaths of undocumented individuals tend to go unreported. These deaths, and their wider 
circumstances, bring to mind Butler’s (2006: 20) oft-cited question regarding the 
grievability of life:  
The question that preoccupies me in the light of recent global violence is, Who 
counts as human? Whose lives count as lives? And, finally, What makes for a 
grievable life?  
In the UK-France borderzone, just like elsewhere across Europe’s borderlands, there is a 
ticking death toll which continues to unsettle the fragile notion of Europe as a land of 
rights, democracy and freedom. Racialised migrant bodies continue to be inscribed with 
otherness, dispensability and what Butler might so have referred to as precisely 
‘ungrievability’. Lives lost become mere numbers, a means to an end, and an alleged 
measure of effective migration management. Within this context, I find it highly relevant 
to emphasise another aspect which emerged from the field research interviews; namely 
individuals’’ collective acts of grieving lost lives.   
Indeed, in response to the deaths in the UK-France borderzone, efforts to collectively 
grieve, bury, or repatriate bodies to their families have emerged over the years. In the 
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‘Cimetière du Nord’ in Calais, there is a specific section for unidentified individuals and 
those who were unable to be repatriated for different reasons. Some of them carry the 
names of those who left us behind, whilst others are marked merely by numbers. (See 
Figure J). A long term volunteer spoke to me about what happens when a person dies at 
the border, and the ways in which non-governmental organisations support the families 
and friends of those who deceased, to enable their dignified mourning, burial or 
repatriation:  
The procedure for when a migrant is killed at the border for the most part doesn't 
involve French officials. Organisations such as Médecins du Monde and Secours 
Catholique help to make practical arrangements for burial or repatriation, after 
contacting the relevant embassy. The family is usually contacted by friends of the 
deceased who are then put in touch with embassy officials and NGOs in Calais 
about their wishes. The cost for either process is shared between NGOs, and a 
small sum is usually raised for the family as well. There are certain cultural 
mediators or community elders through whom this is done, such as Imams. 
(Interviewee nr. 32) 
The same interviewee continues explaining what the burial ceremony may look like:  
A varied community gathers at a funeral, people of many faiths and nationalities, 
both migrants as well as volunteers and other NGO workers. Sometimes poems 
are read, with the funeral often being in the local press. (Ibid.)  
A collective of organisations operating in northern France have thus come together to 
form the ‘Groupe décès’ (décès meaning ‘death’ or ‘passing’), which gathers each time 
there is a fatality, in order to organise funerals, potential repatriation of the body, 
fundraising for related costs, and ensure appropriate communications around the 
tragedy. Mourning and grieving also takes place at the individual level, and in more 
informal ways in the borderzone. For instance, a longterm support worker shared some 
of the ways in which this can occur:  
This year I have been caught up with the deaths of two young people; both 
Eritrean. I guess I probably had the most poignant good Friday of my life. I drove 
and spent the afternoon in the moratory to see the dead boy and his friends. […] 
Earlier this year, in January, [another] boy was killed and his friends came to [see 
us]. […] The guy had a brother living in Germany, so the friends went to meet the 
brother coming off the train [in Calais]. Eventually we found him, and I had three 
Eritreans in our mini bus with me. As soon as they saw [the bother] they started 
wailing. That was how they dealt with the death, they were just wailing in the back 
of the car. They went into the house, and when they met other friends, the wailing 
started again. […] It was probably a very healthy way of dealing with a death, 
especially driving through the dark Calaisian streets. (Interviewee nr. 34) 
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Figure J | Calais North Cemetery (Author’s photo) 
 
 
In memory of the tragic death of a boy named Kiyar, highlighted in the previous chapter, 
a group of migrants, also joined by activists, organised a public manifestation during 
which they mourned those who have been killed at the border, combined with a political 
call to action to stop future deaths. See figures K and L. Overall, the different forms of 
collective and individual acts of grieving and mourning the dead in the UK-France 
borderzone can be understood as important migrant subjectivities, which serve to re-
appropriate the humanity and grievability of migrant lives. In Frames of War, Butler 
(2009: 38) writes:  
The differential distribution of public grieving is a political issue of enormous 
significance. It has been since at least the time of Antigone, when she chose openly 
to mourn the death of one of her brothers even though it went against the 
sovereign law to do so.  
In Calais and the surrounding area, mourning of lives which have been rendered 




Figure K | Demonstration against border deaths (Andreas Beissel)   
 
 




5.5. Activism, political mobilisations and autonomous housing   
As highlighted in an earlier section of this chapter, the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp provided a 
context in which individuals were able to exercise agency in multiple ways. Some would 
represent themselves as a community figure, first-aid volunteer or fire fighter, others 
became business owners running cafes, restaurants, and shops. Thus, the informal camp 
created a space for self-representation, which, in some ways, may have served to defy 
technologies of control and denial of political subjectivities. Aside from such 
‘humanitarian action’ and volunteering, other forms of more overtly political 
mobilisations have unfolded in the area over the years. Firstly, the No Borders movement, 
and Calais Migrant Solidarity, for instance, have been present in Calais for decades and 
have continuously sought to join together with migrants in joint activism over the years 
(see e.g. King, 2016; Rigby and Schlembach, 2013). The work of Calais Migrant Solidarity 
and the No Borders network is rooted in direct action alongside migrants, with the 
overarching aim of bringing down the border, rather than alleviating the symptoms 
thereof. This is summarised in the following passage on their website:  
Solidarity strives to be an equal relationship. We fight alongside each other. As the 
famous quote says, because ‘your liberation is bound up with mine.’ The borders 
certainly hit some people much harder than others. But they are an affront to all 
of us, and one part of a sick system that attacks us all. The problems in Calais will 
not be covered by a million blankets. (Calais Migrants Solidarity, 2015).   
Over the decades, No Borders has also been involved in autonomous housing through 
squatting, alongside migrants which could be understood as a practice of resistance and 
a form of migrant subjectivities. Pierpaolo Mudu and Sutapa Chattopadhyay (2016) 
suggest that ‘Squatting not only reasserts people’s rights to an autonomous and 
dignified life while trapped in France, but also actively subverts British border 
controls by supporting those who attempt to cross the border clandestinely. ’ 
Meanwhile, Deanna Dadusc (2019) argues that squatting allows migrants to ‘[reject] 
humanitarian solutions [and continue] to create radical home spaces through 
squatting, enacting a politics of inhabitance beyond citizenship ’ (2019: 593). 
Similarly, Dadusc et al (2019: 521) suggest that ‘the solidarities and collaborations 
between undocumented and documented activists challenge hitherto, prevailing notions 
of citizenship […] These radical spaces enable possibilities for inhabitance beyond, 
against, and within citizenship.’  
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However, through my field work, the actions of No Borders and the solidarist acts of 
squatting and ensuring radical inhabitance did not figure explicitly in the interviews, but 
nonetheless constitute an interesting area for further research and exploration. That said, 
it remains unclear to me whether the acts in early March 2016 of twelve Iranian Calais 
‘Jungle’ camp residents, who launched a hunger strike and sewed their lips together, was 
conducted in collaboration with No Borders, and likewise for demonstrations, which took 
place in December 2015, against the so-called ‘wall of shame’ being constructed across 
Calais with British tax money, and another demonstration in January 2018 in response to 
high levels of police violence recoded by Human Rights Watch.  
By the same token, in early 2019, a migrant-led movement called Collectif Appel d’Air 
emerged from the informal settlements in the Calais area, joining together with activists, 
potentially including the No Borders network, to stage demonstrations in the Calais town 
centre and by the port. When I spoke to two of the men who were actively involved in 
Collectif Appel d’Air in early 2019, they spoke of Europe’s colonialism and exploitation of 
African resources, and said it was time to ‘give back.’ They had already been running a 
migrant-run blog for over a year, called ‘Refugee Voices,’ and were currently trying to get 
in touch with the Gilets Noirs movement in Paris. Overall, they told me they felt really 
good at the time of their latest demonstration, because they felt like they were standing 
up for themselves and had support from groups and citizens as well (See Figure M) 
Another protest involving migrants was one in response to the shooting of the two-year-
old Iraqi Kurdish girl Mawda, who was killed by a police bullet during a police chase in 
May 2018 (Schneider, 2019). According to one of my interviewees, this migrant-led 
demonstration was: 
[A] totally spontaneous protest of people from the [Grande-Synthe] gymnasium 
[which was housing migrants at the time], who came out and blocked the 
motorway. It was [a manifestation of] anger and rage; I think it was an assertion 
of resistance. They were making themselves to be listened to.(Interviewee nr. 74)  
Similarly, in April 2019, a group of Sudanese youth, whose friend was being held in 
detention at the time, was thinking of staging a demonstration against deportations to 
Sudan, which were commonplace at the time and caused great distress. Another person 
asked if we could send some letters together to the French government about the 
deportations, which, indeed, we did, before we had to part ways. Migrants’ self-
mobilisation in the aforementioned contexts points to a demand to be recognised as 
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rights-bearers, despite their lack of legal status or citizenship. In the words of McNevin 
(2007: 672), this type of ‘radical contest of the political is the flip-side of extreme 
vulnerability.’ Both their actions and words (or intentions) illustrate the potential of 
political claims by migrants in the borderzone. This certainly stands in contrast with the 
notion of ‘bare life’ and migrants being reduced to a space where politics and 
subjectivities are impossible.  
Figure M | Appel d’Air Demonstration (Andreas Beissel)  
 
Various forms of activism were highlighted throughout the experiences of my 
interlocutors and interviewees, as the northern France area has seen action and protest 
under different guises over the years, including demonstrations, court cases, press 
conferences, and associative fora (Lequette and Le Vergos, 2016: 212). During the time 
of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp, some of its residents came together to meet with visiting 
British members of parliament to raise their grievances and recommendations. An 
interviewee explained to me: ‘We met Jeremy Corbyn, Alf Dubs, and many different MPs, 
and we spoke to them, we said that this is not a good situation.’ They also took action and 
sent letters to the UK Government regarding the need for constructive solutions. One 
Sudanese interlocutor explained to me: 
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We suggested an asylum processing centre – we sent a letter to Prime Minister 
Cameron – we suggested a legal centre – but he didn’t respond. And that is making 
the smugglers more wealthy and stronger. My idea was to open a centre and they 
could work individually or could send asylum seeker applications from there, and 
in the UK, the Home Office could check if that person needs protection or not, and 
we would be happy if they could just say no and we will not try to come. If the 
answer is no, [the person] could find another place, without putting himself or 
other people at risk. (Interlocutor nr. 5)  
Here, it is interesting to look at how migrant subjects constitute themselves as citizens, 
irrespective of their legal status. Rather than focusing on status and institutions, we can 
see here acts of citizenship, where the emphasis lies on constitutive politics rather than 
institutional politics, and everyday struggles rather than representational politics (Nyers, 
2015: 33). As Bojadžijev and Karakayali (2010) also suggest, ‘Many of the social conflicts 
initiated by migrants are, after all, not about becoming citizens, but about insisting that 
they are citizens already.’ By the same token, Calais ‘Jungle’ camp community leaders also 
joined meetings with the local authorities alongside grassroots groups, and made political 
claims that the camp must be allowed to remain. They did so without formal legal status, 
outside of the traditional reference frame for legitimate political practice (McNevin, 
2007: 656), thus making transformations in our understanding of political belonging. The 
fact that the authorities agreed to meet with, and listen to, the community leaders as 
actors in their own right, signal that there are alternatives to the traditional 
understanding of political belonging, and for making political claims.  
This resonates with what McNevin (2007: 664) refers to, in a separate context, as an 
‘implicit recognition’ of non-citizens and, if taken a bit further, what Monica W. Varsanyi 
(2006: 240) has explored as ‘a de facto consent for the formal membership of irregular 
migrants.’ Indeed, individuals who are formally outside of citizenship were nonetheless 
making political claims despite being excluded from formal political entity, and not 
necessarily demanding formal citizenship per se, but merely access to other rights. This 
resonates with McNevin’s (2007: 655-656) observation that migrant workers in the 
United States with insecure legal status were nonetheless able to form new political 
subjectivities through campaigning for legislation relating to wake payment, as they 
‘brought claims upon a political community from which they were excluded, yet they did 




5.6. Theorising migrant subjectivities and the defiance of the politics of 
exhaustion  
With this chapter, I set out to explore my second research question, regarding ways in 
which migrant subjectivities are performed in the borderzone, in what ways they 
(co)produce the bordering dynamics and how they are subverting and challenging the 
control methods, and thus giving shape to a form of counter-exhaustion. Through the field 
research findings, I have explored the resilience, motivations, understandings, and tactics 
of people trapped at the UK-France border, and examine how the bordering tactics, 
referred to as the ‘politics of exhaustion’ in the previous chapter, are also resisted, 
contested, and (re)appropriated in the borderzone through displaced individuals’ 
struggles for mobility and survival.  
While the Agambenian approach, with its strong ‘control bias’ and overall disregard for 
migrant agency, is an inappropriate framework for grasping the complex migrant 
subjectivities and resistance seen in this chapter, I was simultaneously careful not to fall 
into the traps for which the autonomy of migration scholarship has been criticised, 
namely that of over-romanticising the capacity of migrants to challenge state control, and 
for describing migrant agency with a high level of abstraction (see e.g. Nyers, 2015: 30). 
Therefore, I sought to anchor my work deeply into the lived experiences recounted to me 
by interlocutors and interviewees; indeed, through ‘embodied encounter’ (Scheel, 
2013b), the chapter contributes to scholarly literature with insights into dynamics 
through which migrant subjectivities are produced, in ways which go beyond the 
polarised binary of helpless victims versus autonomous heroes, which tends to 
characterise current academic, policy, and media narratives.  Also, following Scheel 
(2013b), I stress that human mobility always occurs relationally within a conflict with 
governance and techniques of mobility management, rather than misreading it in this 
chapter as completely self-determined and untouched by the effects of governmentality.  
In analysing the field research findings, I argue that political subjectivities are produced 
in the UK-France borderzone through a wide array of practices and through the 
enactment of agency. The different ways in which this unfolded were classified under four 
main headings as part of the differentiation of migrant subjectivities in the borderzone. 
These are: (a) pretence at stability, normality, and dignity, which involved the carving out 
of community spaces, inter-personal relationships, routines and activities; (b) everyday 
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acts of resistance, which involved the strategic navigation of the systems of control; (c) 
re-humanisation and counter-narratives, which involved attention being given to one’s 
appearance and portrayal, as well as grieving and mourning; and (d) activism, solidarity, 
and autonomous housing, both as part of initiatives led by others and migrant selves (see 
also Table 2). This array of migrants’ practices and methods echo what Johnson (2014: 
175) referred to as ‘the ever-present capacity for action and voice that the space of the 
Camp seemingly denies.’  
 
The analysis of these practices moreover helps to increase our understanding of the 
complexity of agency for these groups in relation to mobility control and bordering tactics 
deployed by the sovereign states; enabling us to make sense of a shift in what it means to 
be political in the context of border struggles. Many of these acts can be seen as 
performative of political agency or subjectivity, and do not require the actor to be a 
citizen, a person with legal status as ‘refugee,’ or anything else in order to make these 
claims to agency (see Lee and Pratt, 2012: 900; see also Butler and Spivak, 2007; Nyers, 
2008). Indeed, political subjectivity was understood in this chapter as a performative 
dynamic rather than merely a legal form or as grated through citizenship or official 
protection status. As such, the forms of agency and subjectivities analysed in this chapter 
indicate certain transformations in political belonging, problematising the binary of the 
inside/outside, and can open a space for an imaginary, which sees beyond the 
understanding of political community as belonging narrowly to citizenship within a 
nation state. While the dominant lens through which much academic work has viewed 
the notion of political belonging has tended to be based on the state/citizen/territory 
constellation as a reference framework for legitimate political practice, as McNevin 
suggests, ‘this framework cannot always account for political claims asserted by 
particular kinds of non-citizens’ (2007: 656).  
 
Thus, my work builds on the strand of scholarship, which engages with the theories and 
concepts from the perspective of ‘acts of citizenship,’ where migrant citizenships can be 
both formal and performative, and in essence, different, from the conventional notion of 
citizenship, and which take the perspective of migrants ‘from below’ (Nyers, 2015: 23). 
The chapter has thus contributed towards a comprehensive articulation of the modalities 
of agency which are at stake in the struggles of ‘illegalised’ migrants at European borders, 
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utilising the UK-France border as an example, also opening up academic analysis to 
considerations of how the borderzone can be understood as a ‘shifting ground of 
contestations and resistances’ (Squire, 2011: 8). 
 
In interrogating the forms of human agency and migrant subjectivities found in the UK-
France borderzone, I highlighted various ways of ‘being political’ within the UK 
borderzone, but it also needs to be stressed that the borderzone itself can be understood 
as a condition produced when control practices and tactics meet ‘autonomous 
migrations’ (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013). I argue that we ought to understand the 
borderzone as a space where dialectical interrelationships between human mobility and 
the tactics of migrants on the one hand, and bordering tactics of the state power on the 
other, lead to a ‘recalibration’ (Weber et al, 2019: 15) of the power dynamics in the 
borderzone.  
In this sense, human agency and sovereign control, the latter of which includes 
increasingly cruel tactics, are best understood as mutually constitutive elements. Human 
agency and resilience are used in the borderzone to ‘disrupt imposition of state power’ 
(Weber et al, 2019: 16) through the different methods and techniques I identified, thus 
co-producing a borderzone which is not only a site of insecurity, but also a space of 
‘contested and unsettled governance’ (Ibid). Indeed, as Squire (2011: 8) has argued in the 
context of migrant irregularity elsewhere, these situations and conditions are ‘produced 
both through the movements and activities of national, international and/or 
transnational agencies as well as through the movements and activities of migrants’ 
(emphasis on original). The role of NGOs and aid groups was also discussed in terms of 
being political, and although these play a critically important role in the borderzone, it 
was clear that, outside of their intervention, migrants themselves are continuously 
negotiating and reconstituting their own roles, agencies, and abilities to continue. As 
such, migrant subjectivities are intertwined with the politics of exhaustion, the latter 
which continuously struggle to deter, control, and exclude individuals from exercising 
their human mobility. As Scheel (2013: 285) suggests: ‘borders and migration are not 
performed unilaterally, neither by people on the move nor by the agents of control, but 
in and through the interactions between them.’ What follows then is that the dialectical 
interrelation between the autonomous migration and bordering technologies are 
performative dialogues which constitute borders and migration (Scheel, 2013: 289).  
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To conclude this chapter, I have demonstrated here how the control methods of the 
politics of exhaustion, which seek to produce conditions of abjectification, 
marginalisation, and precaritisation, are contested and resisted by displaced people who 
exert their agency and defy control. It is neither ‘escape’ or ‘control’ that comes first, and 
there is no uncontested binary between the two. Instead, an ‘ambivalent condition’ 
(Squire, 2011) is enacted in the borderzone, not only through the politics of control and 
exclusion, but also through politics of mobility and subversion. As such, this chapter of 
the thesis has permitted the tracing of performance of borders, also illustrating the 
‘stubborn incorrigibility of human life against the myriad forces that would seek to 
enforce its precarity and disposability’ (De Genova, 2017a: 10), shedding light on small 
openings for transformative potential political subjectivities, without discounting 
migrants’ vulnerabilities and the powerful reassertion of traditional territorial claims 




6. (In)visibilised state violence, (de)politicisation of 
racialised migrants’ suffering, and the (de)construction 
of a ‘moral alibi’    
6.1. Introduction  
Throughout this thesis, I have demonstrated that the UK-France migration governance 
technology has become increasingly sophisticated and serves to deter, control, and 
exclude by inflicting exhaustion upon migrants’ bodies and psyches as a way of 
controlling intention. The use of intent management through physical, mental, and 
emotional exhaustion is a bordering tactic which has, to date, remained under-theorised; 
by shedding light on this phenomenon, I am able to emphasise the centrality of state 
violence in this chapter within seemingly more benign bordering practices, thus 
contributing to an ongoing ontological shift, which understands violence constitutive of 
bordering technologies and has been partly absent in traditional migration studies.   
Indeed, given the brutality of the politics of exhaustion and its harmful impact upon the 
bodies and minds of racialised migrants, this chapter reverts back to this concept once 
more. I turn my attention here to the third research question; namely, interrogating how 
the violent nature of the external dimensions of the UK’s border can be understood and 
accounted for, and why the present bordering technologies represented by the politics of 
exhaustion might be privileged over other forms of migration government control in the 
borderzone. Indeed, it would feel insufficient, not least from an ethical standpoint, to 
simply conclude (as I did in the previous chapter) that the violent dynamics in the UK-
France borderzone are a dialectical and ambivalent relationship and a mutually 
constitutive process between sovereign power of control and human mobility and 
subversion, without bringing back to the fore the gravity of the violence and human 
suffering produced within this inherently asymmetrical power relationship. Thus, in this 
chapter, I commence by theorising the politics of exhaustion as state violence, drawing 
upon conceptualisations of violence previously seen in chapter 2 of this thesis. I later 
theorise how this state violence is ‘sanitised’ and ‘invisibilised’ through the following 
interlinked processes: (a) the displacement of state responsibility onto migrant bodies; 
(b) a partial absence of human ‘culprits’ and an accompanying depoliticisation of 
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suffering; (c) the production of a ‘vanishing point;’ and (d) by upholding a narrative of 
migrant illegality. 
Having designated the politics of exhaustion precisely as state violence, and casting doubt 
upon its logical underpinnings, I then proceed to unequivocally call into question the very 
legitimacy and standing of the UK and French Governments in regard to their 
undertakings in the borderzone. As such, I seek to destabilise the purported hegemonic 
legitimacy of the bordering tactics in the UK-France borderzone by defining it as state 
violence. Thus, I contribute to the challenging of what Barak Kalir (2019: 21) refers to as 
taken-for-granted ‘progressive, democratic, and liberal values to mark the (self-
proclaimed) moral position of Western states.’  
6.2. Politics of exhaustion as state violence  
As seen in chapter 2, which took us on a journey through relevant scholarly literature and 
theoretical concepts, the past couple of decades have witnessed what Tyner and Rice 
(2015: 2) referred to as ‘an upswing in the geographic writing – and theorizing – of 
violence.’ These endeavours have included efforts aimed at deepening our understanding 
of violence, not only in terms of its consequences, but also theories of the ‘act’ or ‘event 
of violence itself (Ibid). Moreover, we saw that scholarly studies and theorisations of state 
violence propose an array of definitions and approaches (Torres, 2018). In this section, I 
will build the aforementioned argument that the politics of exhaustion ought to be 
designated as state violence, for which the UK and French governments must be held 
accountable, and the legitimacy and legality of their actions must be scrutinised. In doing 
so, I contribute to theorisations of violence, within critical border and migration studies, 
which cannot rely on binary understandings of ‘structural’ versus ‘direct’ violence alone, 
but rather requires a dialectical understanding of the relationship between different 
forms of harmful practices.  
6.2.1. Hard-to-discern violence  
The previous chapter on the politics of exhaustion (refer to Table 1) shed light on the 
‘direct,’ or ‘subjective,’ physical violence (Žižek, 2008) which is delivered during episodes 
of evictions, apprehension, and other moments of police brutality. However, as 
emphasised, this only represents one of seven key components of the biopolitical 
bordering technology found in the politics of exhaustion. Meanwhile, violence is inherent 
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in all of the seven components of the politics of exhaustion, some of which may appear 
seemingly benign when viewed in isolation from the rest. These include: ‘direct’ or 
‘subjective’ physical violence (Žižek, 2008); ‘symbolic violence’ (Galtung, 1990; Bourdieu, 
2001; Simonson and Kofoed, 2020); ‘violence of language’ (Simonson and Kofoed, 2020); 
‘systemic’ (Simonson and Kofoed, 2020) and ‘structural’ (Galtung, 1969) violence; ‘slow 
violence’ (Nixon, 2011); as well as emotional and material violence. Table 3 depicts the 




Table 3 | Politics of exhaustion as state violence  
 
• ‘Direct’ or ‘subjective’ violence (Žižek, 2008) causing physical 
harm: beatings, rubber bullets, administration of pepper spray. 
• Sometimes accompanied by emotional abuse: destruction of 
possessions such as mobile phones. 
• Would at times involve the indiscriminate use of violence: e.g. 
misuse of tear gas, including in closed spaces or in ways which 
appear to be disproportionate.  
• ‘Symbolic violence’ (Galtung, 1990; Bourdieu, 2001; Simonson 
and Kofoed, 2020): humiliation tactics during evictions and 
apprehensions, affecting individuals’ sense of dignity, self-worth 
and value, and integrity.  
• ‘Violence of language’ (Simonson and Kofoed, 2020): heckling 
and racialised abuse, through which relations of domination are 
cemented, often through Othering.  
• ‘Structural violence’ (Galtung, 1969): acts of withdrawing and 
denying humane living conditions and basic rights, including the 
absence of access to water, sanitation and food.  
• ‘Systemic’ violence (Simonson and Kofoed, 2020): by means of 
creating a context within which individuals experience increased 
vulnerabilities and are put at heightened risk of inter-personal 
abuse, mafia violence and exploitation.  
• ‘Symbolic violence’ (Galtung, 1990; Bourdieu, 2001; Simonson 
and Kofoed, 2020): humiliation tactics during evictions and 
apprehensions, affecting individuals’ sense of dignity, self-worth 
and value, and integrity. (As above) 
• Assaults on personhood, dignity, sense of worth or value 
(Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004: 1) through confiscation of 
shoes, mobile phones, and other personal affects.   
• ‘Symbolic violence’ (Galtung, 1990; Bourdieu, 2001; Simonson 
and Kofoed, 2020): here in the shape of acts making impossible 
to form community relations; the prevention of pretence at 
privacy through defoliation; denial of dignity and rest.  
• ‘Structural’ violence (Galtung, 1969): acts of withdrawing and 
denying humane living conditions (as above). 
• ‘Structural violence’: Violence is built into the structure and 
“shows up as unequal power and consequently unequal life 
chances” (Galtung, 1969: 170-171) 
• Violence performed as an ‘ordering function’ (Shepherd, 2007: 
250) which organises politics and power. 
• ‘Slow violence’ (Nixon, 2011): Underlying uncertainty about the 
future; is not necessarily enacted through single events or 
actions but rather incremental over time. 
• ‘Symbolic violence’ (Galtung, 1990; Bourdieu, 2001; Simonson 
and Kofoed, 2020): impunity and lack of investigation into 




Through the conceptualisation of the politics of exhaustion, I have demonstrated here 
that the theoretical separation of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ violence limits our dialectical 
understanding of violence within the context of the study of border struggles in critical 
border and migration studies. Moreover, I argue that the politics of exhaustion, as a 
technique of biopolitical migration government, ought to be understood as a form of state 
violence in itself. This is, not least, because the politics of exhaustion comes with a 
temporal dimension where protracted and successive harm through the combination of 
the different tactics is induced over time and leads to staggering levels of harm. Indeed, 
it appears as though the politics of exhaustion co-produces a downward spiral of 
debilitation and hopelessness, having far-reaching impact on individuals’ safety, health, 
and wellbeing.  
Thus, by tracing lines between these undeniably harmful practices and the slow 
exhaustion and ‘bleeding away of life’ (Lee and Pratt, 2012: 902), I argue that, when taken 
together, a geography of time, space, and infliction of suffering on bodies and minds 
becomes apparent. Indeed, following Loughnan (2019a), I argue that ‘[t]he gradual yet 
unremitting effect of [certain] policies render them hard to discern as violence,’ but they 
constitute state violence nonetheless, and should not be understood merely as an 
unintended consequence or by-product of an unavoidable policy line.  
This makes visible the inherently violent approach undertaken in the UK-France 
borderzone and enables us to call for liability and accountably by the UK and French 
governments. To support this point, I draw again upon my field research interviews, 
many of which have shed abundant light on the harm-inducing effects of the politics of 
exhaustion, and which suggest that the responsibility for the harm caused by the politics 
of exhaustion has been moved onto the bodies of migrants themselves.   
6.2.2. Displacement of responsibility onto migrants’ mind and bodies  
Throughout my field work, the effects of the bordering tactics in northern France was a 
recurring theme, reaching back to the time of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp and throughout its 
aftermath. A long-term volunteer who spent several months serving in the Calais ‘Jungle’ 
camp told me:  
We’ve seen a rapid deterioration of mental health of people who are forced to live 
in these conditions. A big one […] I saw it more than people told me […] You see it 
in anger, hostility, self-harm, substance abuse. You see it in people who are clearly 
174 
 
very depressed; you see it when they have become apathetic and have lost hope… 
self-destructive behaviours. It’s so shocking – people have made really 
horrendous journeys, but when you get to Europe, the bedrock of human rights, 
tolerance, and acceptance, you get here and all you get is neglect and abuse, which 
is deliberate from the European governments. (Interviewee nr. 32)    
Another interlocutor with long-term engagement in the borderzone suggested, ‘This is 
about trying to squeeze life out of people’ (Interviewee nr. 39). In October 2018, a team 
of mental health experts and art therapists whom I interviewed raised alarms regarding 
the mental health situation in Calais. The professionals reported having seen an increase 
in clear signs of ‘depression, anxiety, and hopelessness as people became trapped and 
ensnared in a cycle of rejection from countries across Europe, and in the case of northern 
France, at the border, with no obvious way out of their predicament’ (Lloyd et al, 2018). 
The experts, who have been operating in northern France since 2015, argue that there is 
often an alarming combination of individuals’ complex layers of trauma from their 
country of origin and/or their journey, which is then compounded with the continuous 
and sustained abuses and a lack of recourse to support, which can make displaced 
individuals more at risk to themselves, as well as to other people in their surroundings. 
They have reported the following:  
Being in an enhanced state of sensory sensitivity for prolonged periods can have 
a long-term impact on the body and may tip people into paranoia, 
overwhelming anxiety, anger, hyper-vigilance, and aggression […] Disruption of 
sleep, destruction of tents, and confiscation of basic necessities, even drinking 
water, is taking its toll on people’s mental as well as physical health in worrying 
ways, appearing to have tipped many people beyond their ability to draw upon 
their own coping mechanisms, into mental health conditions which can lead to 
long-lasting damage. (Lloyd et al, 2018) 
Similarly, in Brussels, I interviewed an individual who was heavily involved in support 
activities, not only in Brussels, but across the borderzone. He suggested:  
People get tired and can’t think straight, so I think they act in ways they normally 
wouldn’t. For example, they would know that acting aggressively will not be in 
their own favour, but due to exhaustion, they lose their rational thinking and 
temper. (Interviewee nr. 27)  
Many others highlighted the misuse of alcohol and drugs as a result from suffering in the 
borderzone. The aforementioned therapists also suggested that this was linked to the 
escalation of mental health issues in the area, as well as a large increase in alcohol abuse. 
They reportedly could often smell the alcohol on the people at one of the food distribution 
points, with drugs also seemingly present. What was worse, they said, was that there was 
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no one in the area who was properly equipped to handle the situation. (Interviewee nr. 
62b)    
One of my Sudanese interlocutors similarly explained:  
People might [turn to] drugs or alcohol – they stay here and they feel hopeless. It 
destroys their humanity to stay in this situation. You can just imagine having a tent 
in plastic. (Interlocutor nr. 47)   
Meanwhile, in Brussels, an Afghan man I interviewed in Maximilian Park about his time 
in Calais and the wider borderzone, spoke very intensely about being on the brink of 
‘going mad’ and of wanting to ‘kill himself,’ just like so many others have uttered, too. 
(Interlocutor nr. 7)   
In Calais, a mental health professional shared the following concerns:  
People are exhausted and unable to cope. There are disassociations, people are 
struggling to be present, and have quickly fluctuating moods. People are 
expressing more hopelessness, depression, anxiety – everybody feels stressed, 
generally, but there are also many examples of people’s stress shifting into 
something more serious […] It leads to risky behaviours, particularly for the 
teenagers. There’s a rise in the number of deaths because of the lorries. […] There’s 
sexual promiscuity and young people putting themselves at risk of exploitation. 
We’ve seen that – there’s definitely an increase in all of this. It’s as though they 
were thinking, ‘what’s the point, I might as well get on a boat and cross the Channel 
[despite the risks]. (Interviewee nr. 62b)    
An academic operating in the borderzone similarly expressed to me during an interview 
that the conditions enforced upon people at the border ‘definitely have a very huge effect 
on people’s well-being.’ The same interviewee continued to describe the border zone as 
a ‘very conflictual space […] People have been there for a year, two years, and where they 
don’t have shelter, it’s surprising that they haven’t broken down. Some do.’ (Interviewee 
nr. 25)  
Something that stands out very clearly from these research findings is that the 
responsibility for the harm caused in the borderzone can be understood as having been 
shifted onto migrants themselves, onto their bodies and minds, due to the successive 
breakdown of their coping mechanisms. This, Loughnan (2019a) argues, does not just 
help with ‘sanitising’ the state violence, but also ‘invisibilising’ it. Along similar lines, Luca 
Mavelli (2017: 15) argues that the displacement of responsibility, where the source of 
harm inflicted is not immediately identifiable and/or diffusely shared between various 
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different actors, moreover contributes to a process of the depoliticisation of suffering. This 
will be developed further in the next sub-section.  
6.2.3. Absence of human ‘culprits’ and depoliticisation of suffering  
In accordance with the work of Weber and Pickering (2011), the absence, or invisibility, 
of clearly defined and identifiable ‘human culprits’ in the implementation of state 
violence (in this case, the politics of exhaustion) may give an illusion of the absence of 
intention to cause harm (Weber and Pickering, 2011: 94). Mavelli (2017: 16) refers to this 
as the construction of ‘suffering bodies as ‘victim[s] without a perpetrator’’ (see also 
Ticktin, 2011: 5), and asserts that when there is an occasional presence of a perpetrator, 
the state tends to place blame for migrants’ suffering on either criminal networks, or on 
the natural environment. Indeed, this is backed by academic literature, which has 
explored how blame can be shifted to the natural environment. For instance, Doty (2011: 
600) highlights the context of the US-Mexico border as, ‘the importance of geographic 
space in the process of obscuring official state responsibility for the moral consequences.’  
Squire (2017) makes a similar argument, looking at how official responsibilities are 
evaded and deflected in the context of irregular migration.  This creates a depoliticisation 
of suffering, due to the fact that the source of harm inflicted is not immediately 
identifiable and/or diffusely shared.  
Moreover, Mavelli (2017: 16) argues that the depoliticisation of suffering among 
individuals viewed as ‘migrant Others’ also tends to entail an act of blaming migrants 
themselves for their own suffering.  All of this resonates loudly with the UK government’s 
narrative in relation to those in the borderzone, and those trying to cross the border: by 
blaming migrants for being ‘irresponsible’ and ‘taking unnecessary risks.’ While the 
official narrative here clearly fails to take into account and acknowledge the wider 
European context facing migrants and asylum seekers, as well as the political causes of 
suffering (Mavelli, 2017: 16), which have forced or prompted individuals to flee their 
homes in the first place, it appears to serve the purpose of depoliticising suffering and 
constructing a ‘moral alibi’ (Doty, 2011) for state violence that has been perpetrated. As 
Mezzadra and Neilson (2013: 202) have argued, the struggles of migrants ‘who lose their 
lives every day in the attempt to cross borders worldwide […] are structurally erased by 
the rhetoric of migration governance and management.’ This, the scholars argue, needs 
to be ‘politically denounced for its complicity with some of the most violent forms of 
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contemporary necropolitics’ (Ibid). Mavelli (2017) takes matter of depoliticisation of 
suffering a step further and argues that the aim of such blame shifting, onto migrants 
themselves, follows the logic of ‘biopolitical care for the emotional well-being of the 
British population: a way of exempting it from responsibility for the recurrent tragedies’ 
(2017: 17).  
The responsibility for the politics of exhaustion can also be partly evaded by framing 
harmful and violent practices as mere ‘administrative matters.’ Indeed, as Tazzioli and De 
Genova (2020: 6) suggest within the context of their work exploring how kidnapping is 
used by states as a tactic of border enforcement, ‘ordinary criminal law and border 
policing and migrant detention are insulated as merely ‘administrative’ and discretionary 
matters.’ According to scholars, this makes it particularly difficult to ascertain whether 
such tactics and techniques can be understood to operate within the rule of law (Ibid). 
Similar reflections apply to the situation in the UK-France borderzone where certain 
components of the politics of exhaustion take the shape of administrative matters, 
including detention, the routine implementation of eviction orders by CRS officers, and 
so forth.  Such aspects of the politics of exhaustion could therefore be understood as 
‘effectively outside the purview of the law altogether’ (Tazzioli and De Genova, 2020:7; 
see also De Genova, 2017d). This lawlessness surrounding state tactics then compounds 
the already prevalent sense of the borderzone as a ‘lawless land,’ where mafia violence 
and inter-personal abuse is perpetrated against vulnerabilised individuals with impunity.  
 
6.2.4. ‘Vanishing Points’ and the abnegation of responsibility  
The sheer lack of accountability for the state violence perpetrated in the UK-France 
borderzone calls for a further discussion regarding the underpinnings that enable this 
impunity. I argue here that the UK-France borderzone represents a convenient space for 
the UK and French states to avoid accountability by constituting a ‘vanishing point’ 
(Gregory, 2007; Mountz, 2013). This concept refers to a site ‘where sovereign and bio-
power coincide’ (Gregory, 2007: 206) and where international law is ‘decentred, without 
a unitary sovereign ground to guarantee its powers’ (Ibid: 209). In this regard, Mountz 
(2013: 32) highlights how states tend to use ‘offshoring’ of border and immigration 
management to create vanishing points in response to the arrival of asylum seekers. This 
resonates with the ways in which the UK government is wielding sovereign powers 
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beyond its territory, without assuming responsibilities for the human insecurity, which 
results from its practices.  
As we saw in the introductory chapter, along with the UK Government’s extension of its 
border and immigration control onto French territory, comes extraterritorial powers to 
deny individuals entry anchored in the juxtaposed border arrangements emerging from 
the 1991 Sangatte Protocol, 2003 Le Touquet Treaty, and later, bilateral agreements 
(given effect in Britain through The Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 
(Juxtaposed Controls) Order 2003). Moreover, the UK has deployed hundreds of UK 
Border Force personnel to France and Belgium, to its Short-Term Holding Facilities and 
other functions; all of which are sites where UK criminal law powers apply. Due to the 
powers wielded by the UK here, one could convincingly argue that UK human rights’ 
responsibilities would also apply; yet this is, as we know, far from the case. Instead, a 
‘grey zone,’ or indeed, ‘vanishing point,’ has emerged, where migrants ‘are under UK 
control, but without the equivalent human rights protections’ (Refugee Rights Europe, 
2020: 6). This serves to produce an ‘abnegation of responsibility carried about by states 
that – though formally part of an international system – act in their own interest that 
allows violence, exploitation, and abuse and precarity to flourish over the protection of 
human life and rights.’ (Mountz, 2013: 32) 
 
It is precisely within this space, the ‘vanishing point’ of the UK borderzone, that the 
politics of exhaustion can be deployed with minimal accountability. This sheds light on 
how powerful states are able to obscure, to an important degree, their own violence (see 
Springer, 2016).  Here, I also refer to Mountz (2013: 32), who argues that, ‘On sovereign 
territory, states are more likely to uphold legal responsibility and international 
commitments. Being adrift between sovereign powers and territories leaves migrants 
and asylum seekers at greater risk.’ Along the same lines, I argue here that that the 
juxtaposed border controls and the outsourcing of violent practices to the British 
borderzone are essential to the continued practices of British statecraft, in that they 
provide a ‘moral alibi’ for any responsibilities of the British government for human rights 
violations, deaths, and human suffering. Arguably, the UK is privileging the politics of 
exhaustion over more overtly violent border control measures as the latter might 
‘jeopardis[e] its humanitarian self-image and human rights commitments’ (Johansen, 
2013: 258). Nonetheless, the fact that this form of UK state violence is taking place within 
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‘vanishing points,’ with the accompanying abnegation of responsibility, the politics of 
exhaustion is state violence all the same.  
 
6.2.5. Narrative of illegality  
Furthermore, it could be argued that the borderzone is also a space for discursive 
production; a productive site for exclusionary discourses’ (Martin and Mitchelson, 2009: 
459). In this vein, I argue that the depoliticisation of suffering and the abnegation of 
responsibility, as well as the UK Government’s sense of legitimacy and ‘moral alibi,’ are 
supported by the discursive construction of the migrants as ‘illegals.’ This is done both 
through political and public narratives of migrant illegality, as well as through the politics 
of exhaustion itself. The latter, through its breakdown of the mental and emotional 
wellbeing of migrants in the borderzone, has the potential of achieving the fixing of self-
fulfilling representations, which resonate with the discourse of the ‘illegal migrant.’  
Turning our attention firstly to the discursive construction of migrants as ‘illegals,’ it 
should be noted here that it is not my intention to present an in-depth discourse analysis 
or trace the discursive construction of ‘migrant illegality’ in the UK media and policy 
narratives. This has already been done by many others (see e.g. Gabrielatos and Baker, 
2008; Taha, 2019), and would moreover be outside the scope and methodology of this 
thesis to go into such a study in that type of meaningful manner. Suffice it here to briefly 
examine, in a non-exhaustive manner, the way in which the UK Government refers to the 
migrants in the UK-France borderzone, in order to precisely illustrate their ‘illegalisation’ 
as well as their conflation with matters of organised crime.  
For instance, even in 2009, then-UK Home Secretary Alan Johnson welcomed the closure 
of a makeshift camp in Calais with the following words:  
The measures that we have put in place are not only there to prevent illegal 
immigration, but also to stop people trafficking. We are working with the French, 
not only to strengthen our shared border, but that of Europe as a whole. (Cited in 
Reinisch, 2015: 517. Emphasis added)  
 
The discourse of illegality and combatting security threats continued, and if anything, 
intensified, over the coming years. In September 2014, the French Minister of Interior, 
Bernard Cazeneuve, and the British Home Secretary, Theresa May, released a joint 
statement on the two states’ agreed ‘steps to combat illegal migration,’ which would lead 
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to the establishment of a comprehensive action plan to enact the following: reduce the 
number of irregular migrants […]; strengthen port security to deter illegal crossings […] 
and address public order issues arising from the number of illegal migrants in Calais; 
increase operational cooperation to fight against the smuggling of migrants […]; ensure 
that all measures taken will deter illegal migrants from congregating in and around 
Calais.’ (Cazeneuve and May, 2014, emphasis added) Similar language was used in a joint 
ministerial declaration on UK/French co-operation released in August 2015, which called 
for the development of ‘an integrated plan to deter illegal migrants and defend the 
approach to the Port of Calais’ (Cazeneuve and May 2014, emphasis added). In February 
2019, speaking of the few hundred asylum-seeking Iranians who arrived in the UK by 
boat in winter 2018-2019, Steve Rodhouse, Director General of Operations of the 
National Crime Agency, highlighted to the Home Affairs Committee about the ‘efforts that 
our agencies together have made to tackle that threat [emphasis added].’  
 
The arrival of prospective asylum-seekers is hence treated as a threat, which would then 
logically require a securitised response. In the Seventh Report of Session 2016–17 
regarding Migration Crisis of the Home Affairs Committee, we read that the ‘[m]ovement 
of illegal migrants [emphasis added] within continental Europe has been facilitated by 
the removal of passport checks at internal borders, following the Schengen Agreement in 
1985’ (Home Affairs Committee, 2017: 33) and ‘[m]any of the illegal migrants [emphasis 
added] [in Calais] are assisted by criminal gangs’ (Home Affairs Committee, 2017: 8) and 
‘Libya is now the biggest source of illegal migrants trying to reach Europe [emphasis 
added],’ and this, according to the Committee, must be stopped at all costs (Home Affairs 
Committee, 2017: 27). There are countless examples of language of the illegality of 
migrants in the UK-France borderzone. Suffice it here to suggest that by framing the 
matters as a strategy to legitimately address illegality of non-citizens, as an act to exercise 
sovereignty and ‘taking back control over our borders,’ this is ‘widely taken to be 
inherently ‘legitimate’ as an exercise of the state’s sovereignty’ (Tazzioli and De Genova, 
2020: 6).  
 
What is even more pertinent to the focus of this thesis, is the way in which the politics of 
exhaustion can be understood to co-produce de facto situations of self-fulfilling situations 
of migrant deviancy and violence, used to justify the harm-inducing politics of exhaustion, 
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deterrence, and exclusion. Ruben Andersson (2014: 111-112) discusses in his extensive 
ethnographic work how individuals, when subjected to border control practices and 
methods, often turn to more suspect behaviours and begin to act in ways that confirm the 
redeployment of the same measures which produced the deviant behaviours in the first 
place. Jef Huysmans (2006: 58) has similarly suggested that: 
[T]he increase of border controls at [borders] [means that] some refugees will 
have to rely on human traffickers, who can smuggle them into countries of the 
European Union. This reinforces the image that refugees are not genuine refugees, 
but economic immigrants illegally entering the country and claiming asylum when 
caught. 
In the UK-France borderzone, subjecting migrants to the politics of exhaustion, along with 
a depoliticisation and displacement of the causes of suffering, helps to sustain the 
narrative of ‘migrant illegality.’ Indeed, the ‘illegality’ assigned to the individuals in the 
UK-France border zone, and sometimes their own acts of amplified deviance, can be 
mobilised by the state to present ‘an obvious need to repel such deviance that, in turn, re-
affirms the legitimacy of state responses’ (Pickering and Lambert, 2002: 77). This further 
supports securitisation and predispositions toward a violent response in the borderzone, 
through what Arendt (1985: 446) referred to as ‘guilt through punishment,’ as discussed 
below: 
Common sense reacted to the horrors of Buchenwald and Auschwitz with the 
plausible argument: ‘What crime must these people have committed that such 
things were done to them!’  
With these words, Arendt illustrated how public acceptance of, and support for, state 
violence is generated through state actions themselves. If ‘these people’ hadn’t committed 
terrible wrongdoings, then why would democratically elected state authorities inflict 
such horrific violence upon them? David Keen has applied this concept extensively to the 
context of the US-led war on Iraq in 2003. He suggests that, ‘Given a certain level of trust 
in – and deference towards – the US Government and the US President, guilt could, to 
some extent, be inferred from punishment’ (Keen, 2008: 91).  As such, he argues that an 
‘aura of legitimacy for violence’ can also be generated by violence itself. I would suggest 
that the same could be understood to apply within the context of ‘migrant illegality’ in the 
UK-France borderzone. In a parallel example, De Genova (2017a) has similarly explored 
ways in which states create de facto situations of deportability of migrants, while Arendt 
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once asked, ‘How can the refugee be made deportable again?’ (1985: 284). This question 
appears more pertinent than ever in the context of northern France today.  
 
It should be noted that I make no pretence in this thesis of going into a theoretical 
discussion of when and how asylum and migration was ‘securitised’ in Europe or in the 
UK in the first place. Certainly, it appears to be a widely accepted understanding that this 
is the case, as eloquently discussed by scholars like Huysmans, 2000; Bigo, 2002; 
Balzacq.iii Here, I merely seek to emphasise how certain border practices can be 
understood as co-producing migrant subjectivities and situations of insecurity by 
provoking desperation, violent resistance, and unauthorised border crossings, which, in 
turn, serve instrumentally to justify continued securitisation of border zones and state 
aggression against displaced people in the first place. It is not my aim either to discuss 
the legitimacy or effectiveness of such resistance or violence here; I am merely keen to 
highlight how these responses are appropriated by state discourse to deepen and widen 
the ongoing state violence and rights violations perpetrated against migrants. 
 
Lastly, in relation to the narratives underpinning the perceived legitimacy of the politics 
of exhaustion, it must be emphasised here that the racialisation of migrants is inherent in 
this process as well. As De Genova (2017c: 21) argues, ‘the very figure of migration is 
always already racialized, even as dominant discourses of migration in Europe 
systematically disavow and dissimulate race as such.’  
 
Indeed, Kalir (2019: 27) also suggests that the oppression of ‘illegalised migrants’ in 
Western states is generally ‘met with little political and public resistance […] because it 
widely resonates with deeply ingrained perceptions about the need to protect the 
territory of White people, or what we call ‘White spaces,’ from any ‘invasion’ by racialized 
Others.’ This resonates with Foucault’s deployment of race within his work on biopolitics, 
where violence against those ‘contaminating’ the population would be legitimised (Kalir, 
2019: 28). On that note, I would call for a deeper exploration of the racialisation of 
migrants in the UK-France borderzone, which was not possible within the scope of the 





6.3. The notion of ‘intentionality’  
I wish to now return to the concept of intentionalityiv in relation to the politics of 
exhaustion. Here, I draw on Tyner and Rice (2015: 3), who propose three criteria to 
ascertain intentionality, namely whether the perpetrators of state violence: ‘(1) are 
aware of harmful policies and practices that might disallow life; (2) have the opportunity 
to stop or remedy these policies and practices; and (3) have the financial – or political – 
ability to prevent harm.’ As I proceed to interrogating whether the UK Government holds 
responsibility for the state violence in the borderzone, produced through the politics of 
exhaustion, I argue that the answer to the three questions would be necessarily 
affirmative. Indeed, countless reports have been published in regard to the situation in 
the borderzone, and the harmful impact of the state policies and practices. For instance, 
NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Doctors of the World UK, and Refugee Rights Europe, 
amongst others, have traced the harm produced through the official state policies in their 
reports, many of which have also been submitted to parliamentary inquiries and hearings 
over the years. These accounts, combined with wide-ranging media coverage over the 
years, make it impossible to argue that the authorities should somehow be unaware of 
the harmful impact of their policies and practices which disallow life.  
Secondly, there is an array of proposals regarding how the policies and practices could 
be remedied, provided by civil society actors through campaigning and the 
aforementioned parliamentary inquiries. The opportunity to stop and remedy the 
practices is hence readily available to the state authorities, yet the political will to do so 
is lacking.  
Thirdly, the UK and French Government have the financial ability to prevent harm. In fact, 
the amounts spent by the UK Government on arrangements and practices related to the 
politics of exhaustion during the timeframe of 2010-2016 amounted to at least £315.9 
million (Full Fact, 2017); an extortionate amount which could instead have been allocated 
to the humane processing of asylum claims, the provision of dignified reception 
conditions, and other forms of support for the migrants in the borderzone. The three 
criteria of intentionality presented by Tyner and Rice (2015) are therefore met, 
suggesting that intentionality underpins the practices and methods in the borderzone. 
This implies that responsibility for the state violence produced in borderzones must be 
assumed by the UK and French authorities, who conversely place blame elsewhere and 
184 
 
frame the former as being unintentional (‘collateral damage’), and/or as being socially 
produced due to the illegality of migrants.    
Having argued that there is a strong case for the intentionality behind the harm in the 
borderzone, I nonetheless believe it to be fruitful to also consider the utility of cutting 
across the dichotomy of ‘intended versus unintended harms’ (Weber and Pickering, 
2011: 94). Here, it is asserted that, irrespective of the intent behind some of the more 
seemingly benign forms of practices and methods, one must look at whether state 
practices are essentially malignant in their outcomes (see e.g. Roberts, 2008: 20). Based 
on the field research seen in this thesis and on the countless reports from civil society 
and media over the years, it is difficult to see how the UK-France bordering technology 
could be understood as constituting anything but precisely practices which are malignant 
in their outcomes.  
Therefore, as I have argued elsewhere (Welander, 2020a; 2020b), contrary to the façade 
of legitimacy and legality of the UK-France cooperation on border control in northern 
France, the externalisation of the British border to France arguably mirrors more than is 
usually acknowledged in regards to the inhumane production of harm in the context of 
the externalisation within the subordinate relationships between states of the global 
North and their global South counterparts. In terms of its malignancy, it is arguably not 
far removed from the deeply deplorable ‘letting die’ approach in the Mediterranean and 
in Libya, which leaves individuals in deeply violent and harmful conditions and plunges 
migrants into a fate of death, or the brutal forms of violence at the Spanish-Moroccan 
borders in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Indeed, the conceptualisation of the politics 
of exhaustion in the UK-France borderzone is a disturbing illustration of hard-to-discern 
state violence in the context of border struggles, and the accompanying negation of 
responsibility and accountability by powerful states.  
6.4. The fallacy trap of the UK-French approach to human mobility  
The harmful state violence notwithstanding, given the extortionate sums of funding 
which go into the politics of exhaustion, one would expect the state authorities to ensure 
an evaluation of the ‘effectiveness,’ in relation to the states’ intended outcomes, of the 
politics and practices underpinning it. However, while the Independent Chief Inspector 
of Borders and Immigration provided the Home Office with an evaluation of the 
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juxtaposed border arrangements (2013) and of the Home Office’s response to in-country 
‘clandestine’ arrivals (‘lorry drops’) and irregular migrants arriving via ‘small boats’ 
(2020), there is yet to be a serious discussion about the logics behind the broader 
approach, namely the deployment of the politics of exhaustion. In order to constitute 
veritable scrutiny, such a policy evaluation ought to look closely at the intended outcomes 
and weigh these up against the staggering financial and human, as well as international 
law-related, costs of such an approach. If the UK Government were to do so, there could 
be hope of a different reality for the women, men, and children trapped in the borderzone.  
Indeed, it is only through a veritable process of seeking to truly understand the broader 
dynamics and root cases of the situation in northern France that the UK Government 
would be able to acknowledge the reality unfolding in the borderzone. In doing so, I argue 
that serious doubts regarding the logical underpinnings of the politics of exhaustion as a 
deterrence method would be uncovered; shedding light on a policy ‘fallacy trap’. This 
argument, again, is based on many interviews and conversations over the years, which 
unequivocally suggest that the violent environment in northern France paradoxically 
appears to drive people further into their pursuit of reaching the UK. Indeed, one 
interviewee suggested: 
The way that [the state] deals with people tends to be extrapolated to the entire 
country; so [the migrants we work with] seem to think that the entirety of France 
is that unwelcoming and violent. And unfortunately, that’s very much not true, but 
it’s hard to convince someone that the rest of the country is nice, when all of their 
evidence points to the contrary - - so, absolutely, their interactions with state 
officials will be extrapolated to the whole country. For example, I have lots of 
friends who are in the UK now -- they love taking photos with the police in the UK 
because they are generally quite friendly, compared to the French. They think it’s 
hilarious that they’re friendly. (Interviewee nr. 32)  
A British social worker reflected on the effects of the politics of exhaustion on the 
intentions and ambitions of youth and children:  
Children are not stupid; they’re children, but they don’t want to be here [in 
northern France]; they want to go to the UK. To walk home is a walk of shame that 
is just not within them. You’ve come this far; are you going to quit after 100 days? 
[…] They are led to believe that the French are keeping them out of the UK, and the 
UK is carrying a benign aura. [For the youth], British values and beliefs push 
people to come here. I work with kids who will get a message from a friend who 
sends photos of their school and football kit. A lot of the pull factors are also about 




Another interviewee similarly suggested the following:  
I don’t think the approach is working. Most people obviously try to come to the 
UK, and the violence [in Calais] is a driver above all; it pushes people to try to get 
to the UK; their experience of state violence here makes them think everyone in 
France is [unwelcoming]. (Interviewee nr. 39)   
Another theme that emerged from the field research was that many interlocutors 
(although far from all) were under the impression that the French were keeping them in 
France, for various reasons, and that the British had little to do with the border closure 
and violence unfolding in the borderzone. One Afghan man, for instance, said:  
It is the French who don’t want us to go, because they get free money from the 
British or the UN if they have more refugees. It is also good for young people who 
can get jobs here [pointed at the volunteers, believing that they were salaried]. 
(Interlocutor nr. 20)  
An Iranian man similarly believed that the French government was keeping them in the 
borderzone; using them to get money (Interlocutor nr. 13a). An Eritrean 24-year-old man 
thought the French government has chosen to put up all the fences; he thinks the UK 
Government is good and that the French are ‘really evil’ (Interlocutor nr. 17). A group of 
Sudanese young men held similar opinions; they thought very highly of the UK 
Government, and they emphasised that the British police was probably better than the 
French (Interlocutor nr. 59a). Indeed, while the British government seems to 
conceptualise the border zone practices as measures to remove any perceived ‘pull 
factors’ drawing individuals to Britain, my field interviews cast serious doubt upon this 
reasoning.  
Some individuals exposed to the politics of exhaustion may certainly give up, being drawn 
into a ‘funnel of expulsion’ (Johansen, 2013), and thus re-direct their journeys. Others 
would fall into the depths of substance abuse and further deterioration of mental and 
physical health, experiencing deep emotional effects of the brutal mobility governance in 
the borderzone. However, migrants evidently resist and carry on, as illustrated through 
the many ways in which migrant subjectivities worked in defiance of the politics of 
exhaustion to continue their struggle, until they, one day, they might make it to their 
envisaged destination. A Sudanese man explained:  
Because we had reached a point, there was no way we could go back. Even if you 
think you should go back, where are you going to go, and how? You feel that you’ve 
reached a point where there is no way to look back – you just have to carry on. You 
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don’t know what’s waiting for you, so you just keep going, because you don’t have 
choice, as I said. (Interlocutor nr. 38)  
 
An independent support worker in Maximilian Park, who worked very closely with the 
youth there, shared reflections on the wider approach to deterrence in Calais and 
Brussels alike:  
 
I think the tactics are designed to scare people, and give them constant 
uncertainty, but these kids have unfortunately experienced much worse situations 
– like in Libya – so this doesn’t really put them off in the end. (Interviewee nr. 27)  
 
A similar sentiment was expressed by a support worker who has been involved in the 
situation in Calais since October 2015 and is still supporting significant activities in the 
area: 
When dealing with men who have spent the last 18 months [in displacement], 
they’re not going to be phased by [intimidation tactics such as shoe confiscation]. 
They are just going to be inconvenienced. You just got the sense that they had been 
inconvenienced and they had to go find more shoes. (Interviewee nr. 50)  
Another interviewee spoke of the same dynamics, suggesting the following:  
The theme and narrative running through are determination, so the approach by 
the authorities won’t work because of this tenacity of determination. ‘I must do 
this, I can do this, I will do this’ […] The tenacity of the refugee community amazes 
me; they have endured so much, and they still endure. It seems they persist no 
matter what new things the police put in place. (Interviewee nr. 34)   
Countless others whom I have interviewed, spoken to, or encountered during participant 
observations, have expressed the sentiment of very strong determination to defy the 
politics of exhaustion, suggesting that the logics underpinning this approach as a 
deterrence tactic might be a fallacy. Interlocutors would utter words like, ‘It’s the UK or 
death,’ or ‘I’d rather die than give up my goal,’ and ‘I have nothing left to lose, just look at 
my life!’ When asked, several of my interlocutors, from a variety of countries and age 
groups, were of the impression that the best way forward was to continue to try and cross 
the border, not least due to the violent handling by the French authorities. Indeed, it 
appears, based on many interviews and conversations in the borderzone, that individuals 
who have been on the move for months, if not years, and who may have endured and 
survived some of the most heinous forms of violence and abuse along their journeys, are 
unlikely to be phased by the politics of exhaustion. Rather, they will be pushed deeper 
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into risk-ridden forms of existence and border crossings, at a very high cost to their own 
health and wellbeing, and with staggering risks involved.  
Indeed, given the tight securitisation of the UK border, new irregular routes would 
emerge. As Alison Mountz and Nancy Hiemstra (2012: 456) have highlighted, ‘smuggling 
and enforcement practices develop symbiotically.’ Therefore, presumptions that 
hardened borders and increasingly harsh control measures would halt mobility and 
smuggling would appear misguided. Instead, such state measures have proven to merely 
‘alter the spatiality […] in terms of routes, tactics, danger, cost’ (Mountz and Hiemstra, 
2012: 459) rather than arriving at any solutions. Over the research period, starting in the 
winter of 2018-2019, human smuggling businesses shifted some of their attention from 
freight traffic to boat crossings across the channel; a trend which later peaked in 2020, 
and was to become a major preoccupation of the Home Office under Home Secretary Priti 
Patel (Home Office, 2020b).  
Indeed, as mentioned in a previous chapter, migrants would constantly seek new ways to 
try to successfully cross the border. This would include seeking out new parking lots 
where UK-bound lorries were taking a pit stop, travelling to other parts of France and 
Belgium to try from there, cutting through fences and razor wire, and in some extreme 
cases, individuals even tried swimming across the channel. This resonates with a 
noteworthy body of research, which indicates that increased enforcement does not deter 
people (see e.g. Koser, 2000; Hiemstra, 2013, Mountz, 2013; Nadig, 2002; Nevins 2010). 
That is to say, harsh deterrence measures ‘prove damaging, disruptive, and 
unsustainable’ (Mountz, 2013: 43). Instead, by challenging and circumventing the 
integrity of the border, migrants in the UK-France borderzone are undermining the 
state’s ability to exert its control. In Johnson’s (2014: 129) words, they ‘thus become a 
challenge to state security, both in contesting the inviolability of borders and in 
challenging the sovereign power to define, code, and classify.’  
To sum up this sub-section, there appears to be a discrepancy between the UK 
Government’s assumptions regarding their tactics in the borderzone on the one hand, and 
migrant individuals’ perceptions of the situation on the other. Moreover, as De Genova 
(2017c: 18) rightly asserts, the root causes for people to embark upon heterogenous 
migratory projects tend to be ‘disarticulated from the European political and economic 
interests implicated in producing and sustaining their fractured presents.’ 
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6.5. Concluding remarks  
Given the brutality of the politics of exhaustion and its harmful impact upon the bodies 
and minds of racialised migrants, as seen in a previous chapter of this thesis, I reverted 
back to the concept once more. I interrogated how the violent nature of the external 
dimensions of the UK’s border could be understood and accounted for, theorising the 
politics of exhaustion as state violence. I argued that the displacement of responsibility 
from state authorities onto the bodies and minds of migrants serves to depoliticise 
suffering within the context of the politics of exhaustion. This, in combination with the 
partial absence, or invisibility, of clearly defined and identifiable ‘human culprits’ in the 
implementation of the bordering technologies, may serve to give an illusion of the 
absence of intention to cause harm, thus producing an aura of legitimacy and moral alibi. 
This, in turn, helps the governments of the UK and France to sanitise and invisibilise the 
violence inherent in this form of externalised border control.  
As such, its current approach to the UK-France borderzone may be more easily justified 
than more drastic and overtly unlawful measures, such as blanket returns and 
refoulement, mass detention, physical torture, or sending individuals directly to their 
death. Instead, the politics of exhaustion helps liberal democratic states to ‘sanitise’ and 
‘invisibilise’ (Loughnan, 2019a) the harm and violence inherent in their externalised 
border control. This resonates with what Tazzioli and De Genova (2020: 6) have referred 
to as state practices which persistently ‘experiment with new tactics for the deployment 
of violence, and thereby also constantly engage in renewed gambits of legitimation.’ 
(Emphasis added)  
In this chapter, I moreover explored the notion of intentionality through three criteria 
laid out by Tyner and Rice (2015) and suggested that the UK must be understood as 
intentionally participating in the state violence in the UK-France borderzone. Also casting 
doubt upon the logical underpinnings of the politics of exhaustion in the sub-section on 
the ‘fallacy trap,’ it was furthermore argued that the bordering technologies of exhaustion 
do not merely produce unbearable conditions or auto-expulsion (Fassin et al, 2014), but 
they also produce subjectivities which serve to strengthen a narrative of migrant 
‘illegality’ which, once again, helps to legitimise state violence in the borderzone. 
Lamentably, the displacement of responsibility and depoliticization of suffering 
moreover obscures critically important questions of the causes for domination, violence, 
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and injustice at European borders, replacing these conversations with narratives of 
criminality and ‘blame’ upon migrants themselves for their exclusion and suffering.   
The chapter contributes to an advancement of our understanding of the ontological and 
empirical intersections between borders and violence, which is something that remains 
understudied within critical border studies. As Brambilla and Jones (2020: 291) have 
asserted, it is by focusing our attention on ‘the articulated tensions – embedded in 
borders – between movements and processes that control and restrict movements that 





7. ‘Inconclusion’: A temporarily permanent, forever 
temporary ‘border struggle’ 
Within the context of the multiplication and heterogenisation of ‘border struggles’ across 
Europe and beyond, where autonomous human mobility projects meet states’ 
increasingly brutal control measures, the focus of this thesis was the ‘site of struggle’ 
found in the UK-France borderzone. Right at the UK’s doorstep, a violent and harm-
inducing situation for migrants in transit has seen thousands of women, men, and 
children, in search of sanctuary, come and go over the decades, subjected to violence and 
abuse, with their informal settlements flattened to the ground by heavily geared riot 
police. The UK Government’s tunnel vision in regards to this situation, and its unrelenting 
narrative of ‘illegal migration’ and ‘organised criminality’ needing to be curbed at all costs 
has prompted the UK to inject extortionate amounts of funding into securitisation 
measures and to enable the construction of walls and fences on the coastline, whilst 
tacitly supporting the French state’s uprooting, harassment, and abuse of migrants in the 
area.  
 
When encountered with migrant subjectivities and the unrelenting, incorrigible force of 
human mobilities, the French and UK state authorities have continuously responded with 
even firmer control measures. This brings to mind Arendt’s theorising of the relationship 
between power and violence, which suggests that: 
 [E]very decrease in power is an open invitation to violence – if only because those 
who hold power and feel it slipping from their hands, be they the government or 
be they the governed, have always found it difficult to resist the temptation to 
substitute violence for it.’ (Arendt, 1970: 87)  
 
Through the voices and experiences of my 75 interlocutors and interviewees who 
generously shared with me some of their first-hand experiences of, and reflections about, 
the UK-France borderzone, it has been argued in this thesis that the juxtaposed border 
arrangements between the UK and France have not simply led to the re-localisation of 
the UK’s physical border controls to an extraterritorial space and the bolstering of visible, 
physical and spatial interdiction, deportations, and official non-entrée policies. In addition 
to such developments which serve to strengthen traditional bordering methods, it was 
argued that sovereign power manifestations have been successively complemented by 
more insidious, temporal, and corporeal biopolitical technologies of bordering, 
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particularly since 2015, when the borderzone saw renewed autonomous human 
mobilities appear. It could thus be argued that migrants in the borderzone are ‘driving 
border management practices to become much more flexible’ (Casas-Cortes et al, 2015: 
894).  
 
In any event, it was precisely this intense border struggle, characterised by the morphing 
of biopolitical techniques of migration government with sovereign manifestations of 
power – as well as their encounters, tensions, and entanglements with migrant 
subjectivities, resistance, and agency – which served as the starting point for my research 
engagement in the borderzone. Indeed, the year 2016, when the so-called Calais ‘Jungle’ 
camp had come to host several thousand migrants, symbolising the incorrigibility of 
human mobilities and the unrelenting state technologies of control, the conceptualisation 
of the politics of exhaustion emerged, and my PhD journey began.   
 
7.1. Key research findings, main arguments and contribution to 
knowledge 
 
Overall, this thesis constitutes a timely and important piece of academic work, where an 
ongoing, real-life contemporary European border struggle meets academia. My 
ethnographic work, comprising 75 interviews and conversations as well as participant 
observation over several years’ time in the UK-France borderzone, contributes to the 
interdisciplinary scholarly field of critical border and migration studies.  
 
The fact that my work on the politics of exhaustion has been cited and built on, not only 
in academia but also within the realms of policy and practice, is testament to its utility as 
a conceptual tool.v The fact that I approached my PhD research questions not only as an 
academic, but also as an activist with longstanding policy-related experience relating to 
the UK-France border, has allowed me to contribute to knowledge in valuable ways. I 
have generated a unique, in-depth account and theorisation of how migration 
governance, and the associated migrant resistance, operate within border struggles.  
 
I have also argued that an in-depth scholarly study of the UK-France border is an 
important case well beyond its own local context in Calais. First of all, this border struggle 
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constitutes a noteworthy contemporary example of ‘internal externalisation’ (Barbero 
and Donadio, 2019), allowing me to advance scholarly work on the distinct yet 
intersecting biopolitical technologies of mobility governance which are deployed as part 
of externalised border enforcement between European states. This generates insights 
which would be of interest to scholars across different European locations, but also those 
studying the biopolitical technologies at play at the US-Mexico border, the land border 
between Spain and Morocco in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as Australian 
bordering tactics and the EU’s approach to cross-Mediterranean migration.  
Indeed, as I have demonstrated, the UK-France border is a particularly fruitful site of 
study, given that many of the seemingly disparate border policing and migration 
management tactics witnessed across Europe are converging here in stark and seemingly 
relentless ways. This intensity allowed me as a researcher to clearly identify different 
kinds of bordering tactics, and propose a new framework for understanding biopolitical 
bordering technologies, through the term ‘politics of exhaustion.’ Once again, this concept 
can be applied to many other borderzones in Europe and beyond, and serves as a useful 
conceptual tool for diagnosing border struggles in different geographical locations. As 
such, my work helps to advance an emerging body of scholarship that looks at how states 
are resorting to increasingly sophisticated (micro) practices and policies to deter, exclude 
and control, by influencing the choices and intention of people on the move; with 
applicability not only in the context of the UK-France borderzone but more broadly to 
critical border and migration scholars further afield. 
In my thesis, I made a number of key arguments. In the chapter 4, I developed the 
argument that the UK-France ‘border’ has gone from being exclusively based on 
sovereign power manifestations symbolised by walls, control points, and overt spatial 
interdictions, towards also entering into spaces of everyday lives of migrants in the 
borderzone – through an insidious ‘politics of exhaustion.’ The latter consists of an array 
of tactics devised to render life governable and pliant, and bodies docile, with the 
premeditated intention to negate migrants’ personal autonomy, agency, wellbeing, and 
self-efficacy. This politics of exhaustion, as a biotechnological migration management 
technique, seeks to curb autonomous migratory movements, influence decisions, and 
manage intent through the physical, mental, and emotional exhaustion of its subjects.  
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I demonstrated that the use of such intent management through exhaustion is a bordering 
technology which has, to date, remained under-theorised. Thus, I have built upon, and 
contributed to, emerging bodies of academic work which look at new and increasingly 
sophisticated forms of bordering tactics aimed at influencing the choices and intention of 
people on the move. In this same chapter, I moreover understood exhaustion as 
constitutive of bordering processes, and of the ‘border’ itself, and argued that this 
phenomenon cannot be grasped within the biopolitical ‘making live/letting die’ 
dichotomy and notions of necropolitics, but rather requires us to move beyond this 
binary. The conceptualisation of the politics of exhaustion thus helps us to understand 
forms of migration government techniques which do not directly foster life nor kill, but 
which rather insidiously grind down the autonomy and agency of people on the move.  
 
Thus, the thesis makes a significant contribution in advancing scholarly work which seeks 
to move the application of biopolitics in migration studies beyond its theoretical 
‘impasse,’ concerned with whether/how biopolitics need to be substituted (through e.g. 
necropolitical or thanatopolitical theorisations) in order to make sense of seemingly 
contradictory and non-sensical bordering technologies.  
 
Having thus dissected the technologies of biopolitical control through which migrants’ 
lives and movements are governed – that is to say, the biopolitical technologies in the 
government of migration aimed at producing governable mobile subjects – the 
subsequent chapter turned my gaze towards the autonomous mobilities of migration. 
Thus, in chapter 5, I argued that my thesis would be an incomplete encounter with the 
UK-France borderzone unless the notion of migrants’ struggles, and forms of human 
resistance against the modes of control, were explored and analysed. The production of 
subjectivities in the borderzone were therefore the focus of the fifth chapter, shedding 
light on the dialectical relationship between control and resistance.  
I argued here that my analysis of the field research findings, which saw manifestations of 
subjectivity ranging from smaller, everyday acts of resistance to larger, pronounced 
political activities and the outright circumvention of control, helped gain a critical 
understanding of the complexity of agency. This was done precisely by looking through 
the lens of migrants who are ‘fracturing’ (Ansems De Vries et al, 2017) sovereign power 
and claiming political subjectivity in relation to the strict controls and bordering tactics 
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of sovereign states. This resonates with a body of academic work which has focused on 
the ‘ambivalence of irregularity’ (see Squire, 2011; Nyers, 2011) where ‘irregularity’ or 
‘campzenship’ (Sigona, 2015) ‘can be engaged both by a politics of control and by a 
politics of migration or movement’ (Squire, 2011: 9). The analytical frame I proposed in 
the chapter differed starkly from Agambenian approaches to critical border and 
migration studies, in that it viewed the borderzone as a relational site of political struggle 
(Squire, 2011: 15), rather than simply a site of biopolitics and state control. Through this 
chapter, the thesis contributes to the autonomy of migration scholarship in important 
ways, by helping to move further beyond criticisms suggesting that autonomy of 
migration scholars are romanticising migration and glossing over the relational and 
embodied aspects of border struggles. My proposed typology on ‘resistance in border 
struggles’ demonstrated how many of the smaller acts taking place in borderzones – 
including daily forms of resistance – are also inherently political and co-produce migrant 
subjectivities and performative politics outside of official forms of citizenship. As such, I 
shed light on small openings for transformative potential political subjectivities within 
this space, without discounting their vulnerabilities and the powerful reassertion of 
traditional territorial claims, which are manifested through the politics of exhaustion.  
Furthermore, I demonstrated that there is a dialectical interrelationship between the 
politics of exhaustion and migrant subjectivities. In this way, the autonomous practices 
of migrants and the heterogeneity of ways in which they challenge the border regime in 
the UK borderzone, have co-produced the evolution of an experimental approach to 
bordering, amounting to the politics of exhaustion. At the same time, the autonomous 
forces of migration within the borderzone also require continuous reformulations in 
response to those bordering tactics. Hence, the research clearly demonstrated how the 
two are intertwined in a dialectical, co-constitutive, processual relationship.  
Through my analysis of the rich field research findings, I thus highlighted that that there 
is not simply a static binary between control and resistance. Rather, we should 
understand the UK-France borderzone as a site where interrelated and co-constitutive 
elements (co)produce the border, with a state of ambivalence running through both, 
making their separation impossible. Indeed, as suggested by Tazzioli and De Genova 
(2020: 6), the autonomy of migration and migrant resistance means that state authorities 
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need to ‘persistently experiment with new tactics for the deployment of violence, and 
thereby also constantly engage in renewed gambits of legitimation.’  
As such, my analysis of the multiplicity of struggles, contestations, and resistances, as well 
as powers at play in the UK-France borderzone, have contributed to an emerging and 
growing body of critical migration scholarship, which neither take borders as a given, nor 
speak to binaries of resistance and control, but rather refuse a disciplinary division which 
separates studies of border security from studies of human mobility. In brief, the field of 
scholarly work upon which my thesis builds shows that borders are, as articulated by 
Brambilla and Jones (2020: 293), ‘continuously constructed, de-constructed, and re-
constructed through multiple socio-spatially ambiguous processes of b/ordering, which 
disrupt the modern, state-centric geopolitical order as well as its essentialized, fixed, and 
unconventional understandings of borders.’  
Subsequently, in chapter 6, the dialectical and ambivalent relationship between control 
and resistance was scrutinised further. I argued that it would be insufficient, at least from 
an ethical standpoint, to simply conclude that the dynamics in the borderzone are 
dialectical, without bringing back to the fore the brutality of the state violence and human 
insecurity produced within this processual and starkly asymmetrical interrelation of 
power. Through this chapter, I emphasised the centrality of state violence within the 
seemingly more benign bordering practices, thus contributing to an ongoing ontological 
shift which understands violence constitutive of bordering technologies, which is 
something that has been partly absent in traditional migration studies.   
Through my theorisation of the politics of exhaustion as state violence, I suggested that 
this violence was being ‘sanitised’ and ‘invisibilised’ through a number of interlinked 
processes. Firstly, this invisibilisation and sanitation takes place through the 
displacement of state responsibility onto migrant bodies themselves. Linked to this is the 
partial absence of human ‘culprits’ and an accompanying depoliticisation of suffering 
among racialised, migrant Others. I moreover argued that the borderzone had seen the 
production of a ‘vanishing point’ (Gregory, 2007), where sovereign and biopolitical 
powers converge and where responsibilities for human insecurity is typically abnegated.  
Lastly, the chapter argued that the borderzone is also a space for discursive production, 
which serves to uphold a narrative of ‘migrant illegality.’ Indeed, the politics of 
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exhaustion, through its breakdown of the mental and emotional wellbeing of migrants in 
the borderzone, has the potential of achieving the fixing of self-fulfilling representations, 
which resonate with the discourse of the ‘illegal’ or ‘deviant’ migrant. I argued that this 
continued discursive production of migrant illegality, coupled with the aforementioned 
depoliticisation of suffering and the abnegation of responsibility, equips the UK 
Government’s with a sense of legitimacy and ‘moral alibi’ for its violence.  
In sum, through the designation of the politics of exhaustion as state violence in this 
chapter, I was able to emphasise the centrality of violence within seemingly more benign 
bordering practices, thus contributing to an ongoing ontological shift within critical 
border and migration scholarship, which understands violence as constitutive of 
bordering technologies; something that has only been partly featured in traditional 
migration studies.  As Confucius once said, ‘the beginning of wisdom is to call things by 
their proper name’ (cited in Kalir, 2019: 19), and as such, this chapter sought to 
destabilise the purported hegemonic legitimacy of the bordering tactics in the UK-France 
borderzone by defining it as state violence.  
7.2. Reflections on my methodological Bricolage 
As I outlined in chapter 3, which discussed my methodological choices and approaches 
within this thesis, I have been inspired by a feminist sociological approach, through which 
I emphasise the importance of starting one’s analysis of power from individuals’ everyday 
lived experiences rather than by taking abstract categories as the starting point (see e.g. 
Smith, 1987). I found inspiration in the work of Aradau et al (2015), who proposed a 
‘performative and experimental approach to methods.’ (2015: 15) where methods are 
not only viewed as tools to bridge a gap between theory and practice, but rather serve as 
something which would allow the researcher to engage more freely in an experimental 
approach exploring the interplay between theory, methods, and practice (2015: xi).  
Accordingly, I adopted the idea of ‘method as an experiment,’ allowing me to intervene in 
the very complex and thorny situation in the northern France area, which is characterised 
by displacement, legal limbos, and violent state practices. The result was a method of 
Bricolage, which, according to Aradau et al (2015: 8), allows the researcher to bring out 
otherwise invisibilised relations by experimenting with theories, concepts, methods, and 
data in new ways. Indeed, my methodology was not entirely fixed, but instead left room 
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for some adaptation along the way. This also resonated with what Scheel (2013b) has 
referred to as the study of ‘embodied encounters,’ which takes migrants’ struggles as the 
centre of analysis and entails a radical constructivism.  
Reflecting back on my approach of methodological Bricolage and ‘embodied encounters,’ 
I believe that these methodological choices served me well. They allowed for an 
experimental research journey through the UK-France borderzone, where the voices of 
my interlocutors and interviewees served to guide me through my theorisation of the 
politics of exhaustion, my exploration of migrant subjectivities and resistance, and my 
analysis of violence as being constitutive of bordering technologies. Overall, I believe that 
my methodology itself makes an important contribution to academic study; both in 
relation to the specific geographical location of the Calais borderzone, and also in relation 
to theorisations of the functions and ontology of the ‘border.’ Given my starting point 
being the ‘struggles,’ this has allowed me to be part of a scholarly shift pushing away from 
the International Relations position of state-centric approaches, where ‘the territorial 
state has ever reflected a universal reality in which the state has been the central or 
exclusive spatiopolitical identify’ (McNevin, 2007: 662). Instead, I have gone into a 
direction where our analytical focus is situated within the struggles ‘on the ground.’  
Throughout my research journey and this thesis, I have emphasised that I do not claim to 
‘represent’ or ‘speak on behalf of’ any of my interlocutors or interviewees. Instead, their 
accounts have lent me unique insights and knowledge, and for this, I am indebted to all of 
the participants in this study. Their insights have allowed me to propose a new 
framework for conceptualising the harmful technologies of border control in the context 
of the UK’s externalisation to France, and to further our understanding of migrant 
subjectivities within border struggles, as well as theorisations of violence in the context 
of the government of migration. The act of placing ‘illegalised’ migrants’ voices and self-
reporting at the centre of my research was a political act aimed at carving out a space for 
participation of my excluded migrant counterparts in academic debates and theorisation. 
I strongly believe that this is a modest contribution towards what hopefully will be the 





7.3. New trajectories?  
Having visibilised the politics of exhaustion as state violence, arguing that the suffering 
in the UK-France borderzone is certainly avoidable, I will here argue briefly that new 
policy trajectories are urgently overdue. The strategy of border enforcement through 
exhaustion criminalises the border crosser rather than the structural conditions within 
which they find themselves, amounting to an inhumane and perverse form of border 
enforcement which disregards the cost in human lives and which moreover ignores the 
long-standing effects on those who do survive and one day make it to the UK or elsewhere.  
Through the policies and practices currently implemented in northern France, namely 
the politics of exhaustion, we are witnessing a detrimental cycle of violence, control, and 
appropriation, followed by manifestations of resistance and re-appropriation at the 
detriment of any reasonable, long-term solutions. Underpinning the politics of exhaustion 
in the borderzone are law-reserving practices designed to enforce the UK’s longstanding 
control and exclusion practices. These practices, in light of the findings and theorisations 
within my thesis, are in dire need of revision by state leaders and policy makers.  
While it is outside the scope of this thesis to elaborate any detailed policy proposals, 
suffice it to say that the UK Government ought to first and foremost revise their existing 
approach to individuals’ access to the UK asylum system, whether through humanitarian 
visas or asylum travel documents, access to asylum procedures at all border points, or by 
making available other types of safe and legal routes to the territory. The autonomy of 
migration means that individuals will continue to arrive at the UK border by their own 
means, outside of formal arrangements and without the required permissions. It must be 
acknowledged that these individuals are rights holders under international and 
European human rights law, as well as international refugee law, and the UK-French 
border arrangements must guarantee that those rights are upheld under all 
circumstances. A good place to start would be by ensuring that individuals are treated in 
a humane and rights-compliant manner, with dignified reception conditions, legal advice, 
and protection from all forms of violence. 
That said, the prospects for finding new trajectories relating to the UK-France borderzone 
appear far from sight and, indeed, very bleak. This is not least in the context of ‘Brexit’ 
and the accompanying demonisation of migrants within media and policy narratives, the 
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prevailing hostile approach to immigration with its concomitant focus on ‘border 
security,’ and the focus on preserving and reviving the notion of a ‘British nation state.’ 
Moreover, following Huysmans (2006), it would appear as thought the UK Government’s 
insistence on pushing and fanning a narrative of migrant illegality and criminality would 
inevitably make constructive dialogue difficult:  
[R]epresenting immigrants and refugees, either through metaphors indicating a 
flood or a mass, or through images of criminality, suggests that communication or 
negotiation is difficult, if not impossible. How does one communicate with a mass 
of people? Should one negotiate with criminals? (2006: 59) 
Indeed, the current state of affairs in the UK brings to mind McNevin’s (2007: 669) 
reflections on sovereign territorial borders, the scholar suggests that ‘a commitment to 
border policing provides explicit recognition of the continued significance of sovereign 
territorial borders and the priority (and possibility) of protecting the community of 
citizens they contain.’ She further argues that ‘Border policing thus forms part of those 
ongoing practices through which sovereignty is produced’ (Ibid). Hence, in order to shift 
the current policies into new, humane directions, it is likely that new perspectives on the 
inside/outside of citizenship and political community would first need to be advanced 
from their current status quo.  
As I have highlighted earlier, the broader context of the politics of exhaustion in the UK-
France borderzone ought to be understood as situated within deeply cemented, 
underlying global inequality structures, where some of the world’s most disadvantaged, 
racialised groups of people are excluded and prevented from accessing their share of the 
world’s resources, opportunities, and conditions for a safe and dignified life. The politics 
of exhaustion in the UK borderzone, stretching from northern France to the capitals of 
Brussels, Paris and beyond, is arguably part of a global project of human classification, of 
exclusion and control, where people end up trapped in transit or in countries of origin, 
due to borders and the Western world’s arbitrary and exclusionary immigration rules. To 
resist the continuation of this trajectory, we must, first of all, reaffirm our common 
humanity, as argued by Agier (2013) and many others. 
7.4. Future research agenda  
Indeed, I have argued above and elsewhere in this thesis, that the contemporary British 
approach to migration represents a continuity of historical modes of racial subjugation 
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which previously affected colonised people, carried out through its tactics to deter, 
control, and exclude, and is also reflected in the widely studied paradigm of ‘hostile 
environment.’ This resonates with Tazzioli and De Genova’s (2020: 13) assertion that 
border violence is ‘overwhelmingly perpetrated against racially subordinate populations, 
[and] are inextricable from the centuries-old sociopolitical order predicated upon a 
global post/colonial regime of white supremacy.’ While I have sought to bring these 
intricate entanglements into the thesis, I believe I am nonetheless guilty of reproducing 
what David Moffette and William Walters (2018) have referred to as a ‘flickering 
presence’ of race in studies of biopolitics and governmentality. Admittedly, my work does 
not go far enough in bridging the debate and ensuring that race is addressed beyond 
‘infrequent appearances’ (Moffette and Walters, 2018: 95). This is an area for further 
research, which could build on this thesis as part of a future research agenda, looking at 
race, racialisation, and White supremacy within the violence producing practices of the 
politics of exhaustion. This could include looking at the beliefs and attitudes of the actors 
who implement the politics of exhaustion on a day-to-day basis, to test a hypothesis 
regarding the presence of deeply engrained structures of racism contributing to the 
fuelling of the brutality through which the politics of exhaustion is implemented, 
supported, and left unquestioned.   
Moreover, as discussed earlier in this thesis, a useful addition to my field work would 
have been a series of interviews with police officers and other officials operating in the 
borderzone, as well as policy makers addressing the situation at the state policy level in 
the UK. This is something I aim to achieve as part of future research endeavours, given 
that such research components laid outside the scope of this particular research project 
concerned with the voices and experiences of ‘illegalised’ migrants; voices that are far too 
often unheard and unprivileged.  
7.5. Postscriptum  
As I was just completing this thesis for submission in late November 2020, news reached 
me of the tragic death of yet another person in the borderzone. His friends, or ‘travel 
companions’ to use their own words, issued a statement (see Figure N) with the support 
of the associations forming part of the ‘Groupe décès’ (the latter which was introduced in 
chapter 5). In their deeply felt statement, Mohamed’s travel companions expressed grief, 
202 
 
and mourned not only the death of their friend, but also called out the brutality of the 
border and the absence of legal passageways to the UK: 
On the 19th of November 2020, on the A16 road, a young 20-year-old Sudanese 
man lost his life and his dreams. He was our compatriot, our brother, our friend 
[…] Our hearts, our consciences, and the conscience of humanity cry out as we 
think of his 20 years of life. Here is an echo of our cry, that of the displaced people 
of Calais: ‘We do not know what to do, we would like to enter the UK legally, we 
dream of a life of dignity, of a human life. The circumstances weaken us, but our 
hearts are strong, and hope pushes up to cross borders. […]’ As you know, we are 
here out of necessity, after having gone through many sufferings on the road. The 
police and governments must understand this. (Figure N) 
This death, and the related statement, coincided with the UK and French governments’ 
announcement of a new bilateral agreement on 28 November 2020, in which Home 
Secretary Priti Patel and French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin ‘reaffirmed their 
commitment to make this route unviable’ (Home Office, 2020b). The two state parties 
signed an ‘enhanced agreement,’ which focuses on increasing the number of 
interceptions of small boats on the channel, and a doubling of the number of gendarmes, 
French police, patrolling the beaches in northern France, with the aim to ‘significantly 
enhance law enforcement operations against illegal immigration’ (Ibid). There would also 
be:  
[An] enhanced package of cutting edge surveillance technology - including drones, 
radar equipment, optronic binoculars, and fixed cameras [to] allow the French to 
be more efficient in searching and clearing areas faster and helping ensure officers 
are deployed in the right place at the right time, as a result increasing the number 
of migrants and facilitators detected and prevented from entering the water. 
(Ibid) 
The continued use of extortionate amounts of statutory funding to operate the politics of 
exhaustion and exclusion reminds me of what one of my Iranian interlocutors 
desperately expressed, seemingly full of disbelief as he gazed over the dozens of tents 
propped up on an industrial wasteland in Calais, in sub-zero degrees in December 2018: 
This is tax that the British people are paying. It is British people’s right to know 
where their money is being spent. It is being spent like this. These are our living 
conditions. This is the money you are investing to keep us living in under such 
conditions. This is the money you are investing for us to live like this. That’s it. 
(Interlocutor nr. 45a)  
While it is not possible to tell for certain where these latest policy developments will lead 
us, we do know that the incorrigible force of human mobility will continue to challenge 
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the control methods of sovereign states; as Mohamad’s travel companions noted, the 
circumstances weaken people, but their hearts are strong, and hope pushes them to cross 
borders (Help Refugees, 2020). Sooner or later, one would hope that governments are 
able to listen, understand and seek new trajectories. For those of us unable to watch the 
current dynamics unfold, it is important to remember that borders which kill can be 
challenged in the same way that people throughout history have refused to accept the 
system of slavery, colonialism, and apartheid, allowing us to continue to seek a more just 
future. On that note, I would like to end with a quote from one of my Sudanese 
interlocutors, who asked me to try and pass on the following message to the UK 
Government. I told him I would try. His voice was filled with determination and resolve 
as he suggested:  
Just try to […] respect refugees and see us as human beings – the same as you. One 
is not better than the other, we are all the same in the end, so accept the situation 
and listen to us about why we don’t want to stay [in northern France] and why we 
want to go [to the UK] – everyone has a reason. Thank you. (Interlocutor nr. 64)  
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Overview of interviews, group interviews, conversations 
Code Type With  Location Date  Language Category 




Four Afghan men, 20s 
and 30s 
Paris 08/06/2018 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 
3 Conversation  Two Cote d’Ivoirian 
men, 20s 
Paris 08/06/2018 French Migrant 
interlocutor 
4 Interview  Activist and support 
worker, woman  
Paris 09/06/2018 English  Other 
interviewee  
5 Interview  Sudanese man, 30s London 04/08/2018 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 
6 Interview  Sudanese man, 30s London 08/08/2018 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 
7 Interview  Afghan man, 20s Brussels 09/08/2018 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 
8 Interview  Sudanese man, 20s Calais 17/08/2018 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 
9 Conversation  Ethiopian man, 20s Calais 17/08/2018 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 
10 Conversation  Three Sudanese men, 
20s 
Calais 17/08/2018 Arabic Migrant 
interlocutor 
11 Conversation  Ethiopian male, minor  Calais 17/08/2018 Amharic Migrant 
interlocutor 
12 Interview  Long-term volunteer, 
woman  




Five Iranian men, 20s 
and 30s 
Calais 18/08/2018 Persian  Migrant 
interlocutor 
14 Conversation  Iranian man, 40s Calais 18/08/2018 Persian  Migrant 
interlocutor 
15 Conversation  Iranian man, 30s Calais 18/08/2018 Persian  Migrant 
interlocutor 
16 Interview  Eritrean man, 20s Calais 18/08/2018 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 
17 Interview Eritrean man, 20s Calais 18/08/2018 Tigrinya Migrant 
interlocutor 




19 Conversation  Ethiopian man, 20s Calais 18/08/2018 Amharic Migrant 
interlocutor 
20 Conversation  Afghan man, 20s Calais 18/08/2018 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 
21 Conversation  Eritrean man, 20s Calais 18/08/2018 Tigrinya Migrant 
interlocutor 








Seven Eritrean men, 20s Calais 19/08/2018 Tigrinya Migrant 
interlocutor 




Three Afghan men, 20s   Brussels 24/09/2018 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 
27 Interview  Activist, man  Brussels 24/09/2018 English  Other 
interviewee  
28 Conversation  Two Sudanese men, 20s  Paris 28/09/2018 Arabic Migrant 
interlocutor 
29 Conversation  Two Sudanese males, 
teenagers 
Paris 28/09/2018 Arabic Migrant 
interlocutor 
30 Conversation  Ethiopian man, 20s  Calais 04/10/2018 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 
31 Interview  Academic, woman  Skype 11/10/2018 English  Other 
interviewee  
32 Interview Long-term volunteer, 
woman   
London 12/10/2018 English  Other 
interviewee  
33 Interview Long-term volunteer 
and youth worker, man 
London 14/10/2018 English  Other 
interviewee  
34 Interview Support worker, man Skype 19/10/2018 English  Other 
interviewee  
35 Interview  Long-term volunteer, 
woman   
Skype 19/10/2018 English  Other 
interviewee  
36 Conversation  Sudanese man, 30s London 14/11/2018 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 
37 Interview  Performing arts 
professional, man  




38 Interview  Sudanese man, 30s London 25/11/2018 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 
39 Interview  Long-term volunteer, 
woman   




Three Iranian men, 20s  Calais 01/12/2018 Persian  Migrant 
interlocutor 
41 Interview  Iranian man, 30s Calais 01/12/2018 Persian  Migrant 
interlocutor 
42 Interview Afghan man, teen Calais 14/12/2018 Persian  Migrant 
interlocutor 








Five Iranian men, 20s 
and 30s 
Calais 14/12/2018 Persian  Migrant 
interlocutor 
46 Interview  Iranian man, 30s  Calais 14/12/2018 Persian  Migrant 
interlocutor 




Five Ethiopian men, 20s Brussels 29/12/2018 Arabic Migrant 
interlocutor 
49 Interview  Pakistani man, 20s Calais 22/02/2019 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 




Two East African 
women, 20s and 30s 
London 18/03/2019 Arabic Migrant 
interlocutor 
52 Interview  Sudanese man, 20s Calais 22/03/2019 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 
53 Interview  Activist, man  London 24/03/2019 English  Other 
interviewee  




Four Ethiopian men, 20s Calais 04/04/2019 Arabic Migrant 
interlocutor 




57 Interview Iranian man, 30s Calais 05/04/2019 Persian  Migrant 
interlocutor 




Four Sudanese men, 
teenagers and 20s 
Calais 05/04/2019 Arabic Migrant 
interlocutor 
60 Conversation  Afghan man, 20s Calais 06/04/2019 Persian  Migrant 
interlocutor 




Three art therapists, 
women  
Calais 24/04/2019 English  Other 
interviewee  
63 Interview  Activist and academic, 
woman  
London 05/05/2019 English  Other 
interviewee  
64 Interview  Sudanese man, 20s London 13/05/2019 English  Migrant 
interlocutor 
65 Interview  Long-term volunteer, 
man  
Skype 13/05/2019 English  Other 
interviewee  
66 Interview  Youth worker, man  London 16/05/2019 English  Other 
interviewee  
67 Interview  Volunteer and academic, 
woman  
Skype 29/05/2019 English  Other 
interviewee  
68 Interview  Long-term volunteer, 
woman  
Skype 31/05/2019 English  Other 
interviewee  
69 Interview  Long-term volunteer, 
man 
Skype 01/08/2019 English  Other 
interviewee  
70 Interview  Long-term volunteer, 
woman  
Calais 17/08/2019 English  Other 
interviewee  
71 Conversation  Support worker, man Calais 18/08/2019 English  Other 
interviewee  
72 Interview  Long-term volunteer, 
woman  
Skype 19/08/2019 English  Other 
interviewee  
73 Interview  Long-term volunteer, 
woman  
Skype 23/08/2019 English  Other 
interviewee  
74 Interview  Long-term volunteer, 
woman  
Skype 23/08/2019 English  Other 
interviewee  





Oral Consent Form (for qualitative interviews with migrant interlocutors) 
Date of interview: 
Location: 
Respondent nr:  
 
The interpreter reads each of the following statements aloud to the respondent in their 
native language and awaits their answer. Researcher to circle ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ for each question.  
 
Taking Part 
I have been shown a participant information sheet outlining information about the research.  
Yes / No 
I have understood the information about the research. Yes / No 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the research. Yes / No 
I agree to take part in the research.  Taking part in the research will include being interviewed, and 
my responses will be linked to my respondent number. Yes / No 
I understand that my taking part is voluntary; I can withdraw from the interview at any time during 
the interview, and I do not have to give any reasons for why I no longer want to take part. 
Yes / No 
I understand that some of the questions can be upsetting and personal, and it will be my choice 
whether I answer them or skip to the next question. Yes / No 
I understand that my participation will not result in any immediate benefits for myself, for my family, 
friends or community. There is therefore no benefit in providing information which is untrue, as this 
will not generate any support or desired outcomes. Yes / No 
I understand that by agreeing to take part in this study, I agree to give truthful responses to all 
questions. Everything I say will be true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and good faith.  
Yes/No  
Use of the information I provide  
I understand that no personal details or any identifiable information will be asked of me. Yes / No 
I understand that the answers I give may be used in the research outputs, and my words may be 
quoted anonymously in the research outputs. Yes / No 
I understand and accept that there are circumstances, such as the commission of crimes or imminent 
danger facing a child or vulnerable individual, where the law requires the researcher to report a matter 
to competent authorities. Yes/No 
I understand that notes and/or a transcript of my answers will be stored in a locked cabinet on 





Oral Consent Form (for other interviewees)  
 
Please circle ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ for each question:  
 
Taking Part 
I have been shown a participant information sheet (2pp) outlining information about the research.  
Yes / No 
I have understood the information about the research. Yes / No 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the research. Yes / No 
I agree to take part in the research.  Taking part in the research will include being interviewed and/or 
being part of a focus group with other respondents.  
Yes / No 
I understand that my taking part is voluntary; I can withdraw from the interview at any time during 
the interview or focus group and I do not have to give any reasons for why I wish to withdraw. 
Yes / No 
I understand that some of the questions can be upsetting or sensitive, and it will be my choice 
whether I answer them or skip to the next question. Yes / No 
I understand that my participation will not result in any immediate benefits for myself, for my 
organisation or the voluntary sector. Yes/No 
Use of the information I provide  
I understand that no personal details or any identifiable information will be revealed to anyone 
except the researcher, the interpreter (if applicable) and the researcher’s supervisory team. 
Yes / No 
I understand that the answers I give may be used in the research outputs, and my words may be 
quoted anonymously in the research outputs.  
Yes / No 
I understand and accept that there are circumstances, such as the commission of crimes or imminent 
danger facing a child or vulnerable individual, where the law requires the researcher to report a matter 
to competent authorities. Yes/No 
I understand that this consent form and any other documents containing personal data, as well as a 
transcript of my answers, will be stored in a locked cabinet on University premises and in the 
University secure server and destroyed at the end of the research project. Yes/No 
Participant nr:  
Location and date:  
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Participant Information Sheet (for interviews with migrant interlocutors) 
 
This is an academic research project that seeks to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
experiences of refugees and displaced people in the border-zone between the United 
Kingdom and France (Calais, France and Paris, France). It is conducted by PhD student Ms 
Marta Welander from the University of Westminster, London, which operates as a charity and 
a company limited by guarantee (Reg no. 977818 England).  
 
The research project looks at the relationship between states’ border practices (such as police 
violence and tightened border controls) and the lived experiences of refugees and displaced 
people.  
 
Taking part in the research will include being interviewed. While we will not be taking any 
personal details or other identifiable information, we will be recording and writing down your 
answers to the questions. You will be asked questions about your experiences in Europe, your 
goals and your views on border controls and police practices.  
 
We will write down your answers to the questions with pen and paper or on a laptop. Your 
answers will be accessible to the researcher, the interpreter (if applicable) and the 
researcher’s supervisors at the University of Westminster. Your responses will be kept 
securely anonymously in electronic and hard copy format in accordance with the university’s 
strict ethical guidelines. Any documents will be deleted five years after the study has ended. 
There will be no photos taken.  
 
What you say might be used anonymously in the research outputs and you might be quoted 
anonymously. Taking part or declining to take part is entirely your choice. Participation is 
voluntary, and you can choose to stop the interview at any time and you do not have to give 
any reasons for why you no longer wish to take part. Some of the questions can be upsetting 
and personal. It is your choice whether you would like to answer them, skip to the next 
question or stop the interview.    
 
Participation will not result in immediate benefits for you, for your family, friends or 
community. We will not be able to help you with your asylum application or current living 
situation, and we will not be able to give you any financial remuneration for your 
participation. There is therefore no benefit in providing information which is untrue, as this 
will not generate any support or desired outcomes. We will be able to tell you about different 
refugee support organisation operating in the research location at end of the study, in case 
of interest.  
Lastly, there are circumstances where the law requires us to report a matter to competent 
authorities. For instance, if you tell us anything that makes us concerned about the safety of 
children, or a serious crime committed, we would have an obligation to speak to someone 
about this, but we would not say how we found out this information so no one will know it 
came from you. There are a few other circumstances we would need to report, but we would 
let you know beforehand.  
You are now welcome to ask the researcher any questions you may have.  
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Participant Information Sheet (for interviews with other interviewees) 
 
This is an academic research project that seeks to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
experiences of refugees and displaced people in the borderzone between the United Kingdom 
and France (Calais, France and Paris, France). It is conducted by PhD student Ms Marta 
Welander from the University of Westminster, London, which operates as a charity and a 
company limited by guarantee (Reg no. 977818 England).  
 
The research project looks at the relationship between states’ border practices (such as police 
violence and tightened border controls) and the lived experiences of refugees and displaced 
people. You will find further details about the project on the following page of this document.  
 
Taking part in the research will include being part of a focus group, discussing various themes 
and questions, and/or being interviewed individually.   
 
Through the focus group and/or interview, you will be asked questions about your 
observations relating to refugees’ experiences in Europe, observations of state practices, as 
well as your views on border controls, police practices and state support for refugees. We will 
be recording and writing down your anonymous comments and answers to the questions. 
 
Your anonymous answers will be transcribed on a computer. Your answers will be accessible 
to the researcher, the interpreter (if applicable) and the researcher’s supervisors at the 
University of Westminster. Your responses will be kept securely in electronic and hard copy 
format in accordance with the university’s strict ethical guidelines. Any documents will be 
deleted five years after the study has ended. There will be no photos taken.  
 
What you say might be used anonymously in the research outputs and you might be quoted 
anonymously. Taking part or declining to take part is entirely your choice. Participation is 
voluntary, and you can choose to stop the interview at any time and you do not have to give 
any reasons for why you no longer wish to take part. 
 
Some of the questions can be upsetting and sensitive. It is your choice whether you would 
like to answer them, skip to the next question or remain silent.    
Participation will not result in immediate benefits for you, your organisation or the refugees 
you work with. We will not be able to help your beneficiaries with their asylum application or 
current living situation, and we will not be able to give you or your organisation any financial 
remuneration for your participation. We will be sharing the research outputs with your 
organisation at end of the study, in case of interest, and we hope that the study will raise 
awareness about the issues facing refugees in France.  
Lastly, there are circumstances, such as the commission of crimes by any actor, or imminent 
harm or danger facing a child or vulnerable individual, where the law requires us to report a 
matter to competent authorities. You are now welcome to ask the researcher any questions 




کت کننده گان    )برای مصاحبه های کیفی با پناهندگان(اطالعات برای شر
 
ن انگلیس و فرانسه   آکادمیک است که به دنبال درک عمیق از تجارب پناهندگان و آوارگان در منطقه مرزی بی 
این یک پروژه تحقیقی
ا خانم مارتا والندر از دانشگاه وست  مینستی )کاله در فرانسه و پاریس در فرانسه( یم باشد. این پروژه تحقیقی توسط دانشجوی دکتی
ن )شماره ثبت لندن انجام یم شود، ک  یه و سازمان محدود به تضمی    انگلستان( عمل یم کند.  ۹۷۷۸۱۸ه به عنوان یک موسسه خت 
ل قوی مرزها( و تجارب  ن شیوه دولتها از حمایت مرزها )مانند خشونت پلیس و کنتی  به برریس رابطه بی 
توجه این پروژه تحقیقاتی
 روزمره پناهندگان و آواره گان یم باشد. 
کت در این تحقیق شامل مصاحبه شدن یم باشد. ما هیچ گونه اطالعات شخیص یا اطالعات قابل شناساتی از شما نیم پرسیم.  شر
ل مرزها و شیوه های رفتاری پلیس خواهد بود. ما پاسخهای  سواالت درباره تجارب شما در اروپا، اهداف و نظرات شما در مورد کنتی
 شما به سؤاالت را یادداشت میکنیم. 
یس خواهد بود. پاسخ ها  جم )در صورت وجود( و شپرستان محقق در دانشگاه وست مینستی قابل دستی ی شما برای محقق، متی
 دانشگاه حفظ خواهد 
ی
ونییک و کپی با توجه به دستورالعمل های دقیق اخالق
پاسخ های شما به صورت کامال ناشناس در قالب الکتی
  شد. هیچ عکیس گرفته نخواهد شد. 
د و شما ممکن است به صورت ناشناس   آنچه شما یم  گویید ممکن است به صورت ناشناس در نتایج تحقیقات مورد استفاده قرار گت 
کت کردید.    نقل قول شوید. هیچ کس متوجه نخواهد شد که شما در این پروژه تحقیقی شر
کت کردن یا رد کردن در این تحقیق کامال با شماست. مشارکت  داوطلبانه است و شما یم توانید هر زمان که حق انتخاب برای شر
کت کنید بدهید.   خواستید مصاحبه را متوقف کنید و مجبور نیستید دلییل برای اینکه نیم خواهید در مصاحبه شر
برخن از سواالت ممکن است ناراحت کننده و شخیص باشند. انتخاب با شما است که آیا میخواهید به آنها پاسخ دهید یا نه، به 
   ل بعدی بروید یا مصاحبه را متوقف کنید. سوا 
مشارکت در این تحقیق منافع فوری برای شما، خانواده تان، دوستان و اجتماعتان نخواهد داشت. ما قادر نخواهیم بود به شما در 
 یا وضعیت فعیل زندگیتان کمیک بکنیم. ارائه اطالعاتی که صحت ندارد هیچ مزیپی نخوا 
ی
هد داشت، زیرا مورد درخواست پناهندگ
 یا نتیجه مطلوتی را ایجاد نخواهد کرد. و لطفا توجه داشته باشید که ما نیم توانیم برای مشارکت 
این امر هیچ گونه حمایت اضاقن
از  پایان مصاحبه در مورد سازمان های مختلقن که  توانیم در  این تحقیق به شما کمک مایل بدهیم. در صورت تمایل، ما یم  در 
 مایت میکنند به شما اطالعات بدهیم. پناهندگان ح
اییط وجود دارد که قانون ما را  ی در آخر، شر ن  را به مقامات ش رشته گزارش دهیم. به عنوان مثال، اگر چت 
ملزم یم سازد که مشکالتی
تیم با کیس در به ما بگویید که ما را در مورد امنیت بچه ها نگران سازد و یا جرم جدی که کیس مرتکب شده است، ما مجبور هس
این باره صحبت بکنیم، اما به آنها نخواهیم گفت که این اطالعات را چگونه پیدا کردیم، بنابراین کیس نیم فهمد که اطالعات از 
 شما آمده است. چند موقعیت دیگری هم وجود دارد که ما باید گزارش دهیم، اما همیشه قبل از این کار به شما اطالع یم دهیم. 




مشارك )للمقابالت النوعية مع الالجئين( للورقة معلومات   
 
بين المملكة المتحدة  الواقعة  لتجارب الالجئين والنازحين في المنطقة الحدودية  عميقلحصول على فهم لمشروع بحث أكاديمي يسعى 
طالبة دكتوراه من جامعة وستمنستر في وهي مارتا فيالندر ،  يقوم بإجراء البحث السيدةوفرنسا )كاليه ، فرنسا وباريس ، فرنسا(. 
) عنوانها مسجلهمؤسسة خيرية وشركة  تدير وهيلندن ،  Reg no. 977818 England .) 
)مثل عنف الشرطة وتشديد  التي تمارسها الدول على حدودها بين الممارسات العالقة التعرف على المشروع البحثي إلى يهدف
لالجئين والنازحين. التي عاشها االرقابة على الحدود( والتجارب   
أي معلومات تحدد هويتك, شخصية أو  معلومات أي  نأخذ منكلن خالل المقابلة . ةإجراء مقابل تكون من خالل المشاركة في البحث 
ثم . والرقابة على الحدود  ممارسات الشرطة  تجاربك في أوروبا وأهدافك وآرائك حول  فقط عن سنسألك  أي صور.  ولن يتم التقاط
األسئلة.  عن هذهسنقوم بكتابة إجاباتك   
إذ . االساتذة المشرفين على البحث في جامعة وستمنستر هم فقط من يستطيعون اإلطالع على اجاباتكوالمترجم )إن وجد( و ةلباحث ا
 وفقا  مطبوع وبشكل إلكتروني ال يحدد شخصية صاحب اإلجابات, وستُخزن بشكل  مجهول آمن و سيتم االحتفاظ بإجاباتك بشكل 
. للتعليمات االخالقية الصارمة الُمتبعة في الجامعة   
حبه , لن يعرف أحد قد يقتبس ما ستقوله في المقابله أو يُستخدم ال غراض البحث إال أنه سيُعرض بشكل مجهول ال يحدد شخصية صا 
 بأنك شاركت معنا.
بدون تقديم أي مبررات عن قاف المقابلة في أي وقت أي مكنك لمشاركة هو اختيارك بالكامل. المشاركة طوعية، ويُ عدم االمشاركة أو 
. ستمرار المقابلهعدم رغبتك في ا أسباب   
دم اإلجابة عليها أو تجاوزها وحتى ايقاف المقابلة. إال أنه لديك الحرية الكاملة في ع بعض األسئلة مزعجة وشخصية.قد تكون   
لن نكون قادرين على مساعدتك في يتمخض عن المشاركة أي منافع مباشرة لك أو لعائلتك أو ألصدقائك أو للوسط المحيط بك. لن 
 لن يولد أي دعم إضافي، ألن ذلك  صحيحةغير من تقديم أي معلومات طلب اللجوء الخاص بك أو الوضع المعيشي الحالي. ال فائدة 
 إخبارك بمعلومات. كما يرجى مالحظة أننا لن نتمكن من إعطائك أي مكافأة مالية لمشاركتك. سنكون قادرين على أي عوائدأو  لك
. رغبتك بذلكدعم الالجئين في نهاية المقابلة ، في حالة التي ت  اتمنظمالعن   
 منا إبالغ السلطات المختصة بمسألة ما. على سبيل المثال ، إذا أخبرتنا بأييطلب فيها القانون  بعض الحاالت التي، هناك  أخيرا  
سنكون ملزمين بالتحدث إلى شخص ما في مثل هذه الحالت جريمة خطيرة ارتكبها شخص ما ،  عن سالمة األطفال ، أويتعلق ب  شيء
نا أن  يعرف أحد ال  حرصا  منا على أن لمعلومات نخبرهم عن الطريقة  التي حصلنا من خاللها على هذه احول هذا األمر ، لكننا لن 
. بذلك مسبقا  حتاج إلى إبالغ ، لكننا سنخبرك ت بعض الحاالت األخرى التي  ثمت منك.  حصلنا عليها  




የተሳትፎ መረጃ ገጽ 
(ለስደተኞች ጥራት ያለው ቃለ መጠይቅ ለማድረግ) 
 
ይህ በዩናይትድ ኪንግደም እና በፈረንሳይ (ካሊስ ፣ፈረንሣይ እና ፓሪስ፣ ፈረንሣይ) መካከል ባለው የድንበር-ሰፈራ ክልል 
ውስጥ የሚገኙ ስደተኞችን እና ተፈናቃዮች  ተሞክሮዎችን በጥልቀት መረዳትን የሚፈልግ የትምህርት ጥናት ፕሮጀክት 
ነው። ይህ የሚካሄደው በ ለንደን በ ዌስትሚንስተር ዩኒቨርሲቲ የዶክትሬት ተማሪ የሆነችው ወ/ት ማርታ ወላንደር ሲሆን 
ይህም በጎ አድራጎት እና ዋስትና የተገደበ ኩባንያ ሆኖ ይሰራል  (ምዝ. ቁጥር 977818 እንግሊዝ)። 
 
የጥናቱ ፕሮጀክት በአከባቢው የድንበር ልምዶች (የፖሊስ ብጥብጥ እና ጥብቅ የድንበር ቁጥጥሮች) ፣የስደተኞችን እና 
የተፈናቃዮች የህይወት ፡የኑሮ ልምዶችን ይመለከታል። 
 
በጥናቱ ውስጥ መሳተፍ ቃለ መጠይቅ ማድረግን ያካትታል። ምንም ዓይነት የግል መረጃዎችን ወይም ሊታወቁ የሚችሉ 
መረጃዎችን አንወስድም።  በአውሮፓ ስላለው ልምዶች፣ ግቦችዎ ፣ ስለ ድንበር ቁጥጥር እና የፖሊስ አሠራር ያለዎትን 
አስተያየት በተመለከተ ይጠየቃሉ። ለጥያቄዎችዎ መልሶችዎን እንጽፋለን። 
 
መልሶችዎ ለአስተርጓሚው (የሚመለከተው ከሆነ)፣ ጥናት ለሚያደርገው እና በ ዌስትሚኒስተር ዩኒቨርሲቲ ላሉት 
ተቆጣጣሪዎቻቸው የሚዳረስ ይሆናል።  ምላሾችዎ በዩኒቨርሲቲው ጥብቅ የስነ-ምግባር መመሪያዎች መሠረት 
በኤሌክትሮኒክ እና በወረቀት ወይም ሃርድ ኮፒ ማንነትዎ እና ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ  በሆነ መልኩ እንዲሆኑ ይቀመጣል። 
ምንም ፎቶ አይነሳም። 
 
የምትናገረው ነገር ማንነትዎ  የተጠበቀ  በሆነ መልኩ በጥናት ውጤቶቹ ላይ ሊገለገሉ ይችላሉ ፣እና ማንነትዎ የተጠበቀ  
ሆነው ሊጠቀሱ ይችላሉ። ማንም እርስዎ እንደተሳተፉ አያውቅም። 
 
ተሳትፎን መቀበል ወይም አለመቀበል ሙሉ በሙሉ የእርስዎ ምርጫ ነው።  ተሳትፎ በፈቃደኝነት ነው፡ እና ቃለ መጠይቁን 
በማንኛውም ጊዜ ለማቆም መምረጥ እና ለምን መሳተፍ እንደማይፈልጉ ምክንያቶች መስጠት የለብዎትም። 
አንዳንድ ጥያቄዎች የሚረብሹ እና የግል ሊሆኑ  ይችላሉ። ለጥያቄዎቹ መልስ መስጠት በሙሉ የእርስዎ ምርጫ ነው፡ 
ወደሚቀጥለው ጥያቄ ይሂዱ ወይም ቃለ መጠይቁን ያቁሙ። 
 
መሳትፍ ለእርስዎ፣ ለቤተሰብዎ፣ ለጓደኞችዎ ወይም ለማህበረሰብዎ ፈጣን ጥቅሞችን አያስገኝም።  በጥገኝነት ማመልከቻዎ 
ላይ  የእርስዎን  ወይም የአሁን የኑሮ ሁኔታዎ መርዳት አንችልም። ምንም ተጨማሪ ድጋፍ ወይም ገቢዎች ስለማይፈጥር፣ 
እውነት ያልሆነ መረጃ መስጠት ምንም ጥቅም የለውም። በተጨማሪም፣ ለሚሳተፉበት ምንም ዓይነት የገንዘብ ክፍያ 
ልናደርግልዎ እንደማንችል እባክዎ ልብ ይበሉ።  ፍላጎት ካለዎት በቃለ መጠይቁ መጨረሻ ላይ ስለተለያዩ የስደተኞች ድጋፍ 
ድርጅት ልንነግርህ እንችላለን። 
 
በመጨረሻም ሕግ ጉዳዮችን ችሎታ ላላቸው ባለስልጣናት ሪፖርት ለማድረግ የሚያስፈልጉ ሁኔታዎች አሉ። ለምሳሌ፣ ስለ 
ህጻናት ደህንነት የሚያሳስብን ማንኛውንም ነገር ቢነግሩን፣ ወይም አንድ ሰው ከባድ ወንጀል ቢፈጽም ስለዚህ ጉዳይ ለሌላ 
ሰው የማነጋገር ግዴታ አለብን ነገር ግን ይህን መረጃ እንዴት እንደምናገኘው አናሳውቅም፣ ስለዚህ ማንም ቢሆን ከእርስዎ 
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i In 2016, I wrote about the politics of exhaustion alongside Leonie Ansems de Vries in the context 
of the demolition of the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp (Ansems de Vries and Welander, 2016a, 2016b). The 
concept ‘Politics of Exhaustion’ has previously featured in the work of Dominic Pettman (2002). 
His work After the Orgy: Toward a Politics of Exhaustion identifies and examines the dynamic 
tensions of various apocalyptic discourses, in order to highlight the complex constellation of 
exhaustion, anticipation, panic, and ecstasy in contemporary culture. This is entirely unrelated to 
my work and has in no ways inspired or informed my proposed conceptualisation of the politics 
of exhaustion in the context of human mobility. 
 
ii Others, such as Travis Van Isacker (2019), have suggested that the evictions and bussing of 
people to accommodation centres across France constitutes a ‘carrot-and-stick domicide’ where 
the destruction of informal settlements and accompanying offer of state accommodation are a 
strategy to drive migrants towards a detain/deportability situation. Meanwhile, Tazzioli (2017: 
30) explores how migrants in Calais and in Paris were approached by the local Prefectures and 
France Terre d’Asile, being encouraged to come to asylum accommodation (‘centres de répit’) 
with the promise of receiving assistance and protection, once they arrived, some were returned 
by force to Italy under the Dublin Regulation. 
 
iii Jef Huysmans (2006) for instance emphasises that while an increased emphasis has been placed 
on the nexus between migration and asylum and security since the attacks on 11 September 2001 
in the United States, these developments were present long before 2001, and are linked to the 
European integration process which started in the mid-1980s and culminated with the ‘Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice’ in the treaty of Amsterdam of 1997. Didier Bigo (2002) similarly 
argued back in 1998 that ‘immigration had been framed as a threat by EU actors’ which arguably 
paved the way for further enquiry of securitisation theory to address EU immigration policy. In 
attempting to explain the reasoning behind the process of securitisation of migration, Huysmans 
(2006) suggests that ‘[m]igration and asylum become a factor in a constitutive political dialectic 
in which securing unity and identity of a community depends on making this very community 
insecure.’ As such, leaders can sustain an image of a complete, harmonious political unit which 
appears to only experience any form of conflict, violence or disintegration if external factors 
disrupt it. Here, Huysmans draws on the work of R. B. J. Walker (1993) who suggested that a 
‘constitutive dialectic relation’ is at work in security framing, that is, creating a unity in the plural 
world requires the claiming of an ‘inside’ by separating it from and ‘outside’. 
 
iv It is not the intention of this thesis to go into an in-depth academic discussion or theorisation of 
‘intentionality.’ Many others have done so, in particular in the context of sociology and 
psychology, but also more broadly within the social sciences, including in the International 
Relations discipline. Approaching intentionality primarily from a sociological perspective, 
Bertram Malle et al (2001) emphasise that considerations of intentions and intentionality 
permeate human social life and that, indeed, ‘[t]heories and research programs on the role of 
intention and intentionality in social cognition are distributed over many scholars, traditions, and 
disciplines.’ (2001: 24) The scholars argue that intentionality is a foundation for social cognition, 
amongst other reasons because it ‘brings order to the perception of behaviour in that it allows 
the perceiver to detect structure – intentions and actions – in humans’ complex stream of 
movement.’ (2001: 2) Meanwhile, within the broad academic body of literature examining the 
philosophical foundations of International Criminal Law, Jaroslav Větrovský (2018) also 
discusses the complexities of intentionality. He emphasises the difficulties in ensuring adequate 
interpretation of intentionality, despite the relatively clear wording contained within the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, where Article 30(1) provides that a person is 




with intent and knowledge (mens rea). Within the International Relations discipline, scholars 
such as Alex Prichard (2017) have explored the concept of ‘collective intentionality,’ arguing, 
through the notion of radical pluralisation, that contemporary theories of collective intentionality 
enable us to think about anarchy in the international sphere in new and challenging ways. 
Meanwhile, within this PhD thesis, it was not my intention to contribute to the advancement of 
the broad inter-disciplinary body of literature dealing with this concept. Nor do I claim to have 
developed scholarly thinking on this matter; instead, I adopted an understanding of intentionality 
as proposed by Tyner and Rice (2015). The scholars have developed a robust framework which 
lends itself particularly well to my work, in proposing three criteria to ascertain intentionality in 
the context of state violence. The scholars argue that intentionality is present when policy 
makers: ‘(1) are aware of harmful policies and practices that might disallow life; (2) have the 
opportunity to stop or remedy these policies and practices; and (3) have the financial – or political 
– ability to prevent harm’ (2015: 3). I adopted this particular definition advanced by Tyner and 
Rice as an analytical tool allowing my research project to shed light on, and draw attention to, the 
UK Government’s awareness of the harmful impact of its policies, as well as its seeming 
unwillingness to seek other alternative policy lines, despite its ability and opportunities to do so. I 
have also within the thesis emphasised, following Weber and Pickering (2011:94), that it is 
sometimes necessary to cut across the dichotomy of ‘intended versus unintended harms’ when 
examining state violence in the context of bordering tactics, in particular in contexts where one 
is unable to ascertain the underlying logic of certain policy choices or decisions. I therefore argue 
in this thesis that, irrespective of the intent behind some of the more seemingly benign forms of 
practices and methods resorted to in borderzones, it is at times more fruitful and instructive to 
look at whether such state practices are essentially malignant in their outcomes (see e.g. Roberts, 
2008: 20).  
 
v Scholars have deployed and developed the concept of ‘politics of exhaustion’ in various 
directions and within multiple geographical contexts. For instance, focusing on ‘illegalised’ 
migrants in Brussels, Belgium, Robin Vandevoordt (2020) draws on ethnographic work alongside 
the civil society movement ‘Citizen Platform for the Support of Refugees,’ demonstrating how the 
Belgian state has consciously produced a humanitarian crisis as part of a broader ‘politics of 
exhaustion.’ Robin Vandevoordt and Larissa Fleischmann (2020) moreover drew on my work in 
their account of grassroots initiatives supporting migrants in Belgium and Germany, highlighting 
how those initiatives are navigating different but interwoven temporalities. Fleischmann (2020) 
moreover cited my work in her account of practices of solidarity which she found to be 
intertwined with questions of power. These are just a few examples of cases where the notion of 
politics of exhaustion has been borrowed by other scholars within critical border and migration 
studies. Moreover, in 2019, I was requested to deliver a podcast episode specifically dedicated to 
my conceptualisation of the politics of exhaustion as part of the human rights podcast series 
‘Declarations,’ run out of the Centre for Governance and Human Rights (CGHR) at the University 
of Cambridge. In 2020, I was similarly asked to present the politics of exhaustion to other scholars 
in an online seminar regarding grounded transmobilities. Furthermore, my ability to successfully 
conduct field research in the highly complex environment of the UK-France borderzone prompted 
professional researchers carrying out a research project for the Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI) to seek my advice on the recruitment of interviewees among ‘illegalised’ migrants in the 
area, seeking my guidance on how to best approach their own research study in a similar vein.  
 
